



VOICES OF BOUGAINVILLE

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Damana (Our Land, Our Future)

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Photographs of people from the Panguna region have not been included in this report due to the sensitive nature of the issues raised.

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BLUT I KAPSAIT NA WASIM GIRAUN.

Common Bougainvillean expression

THE LAND IS AWASH WITH BLOOD.

...to Bougainvilleans, land is like the skin on the back of your hand. You inherit it, and it is your duty to pass it on to your children in as good a condition as, or better than, that in which you received it. You would not expect us to sell our skin, would you?

Raphael Bele in *The Bougainville Land Crisis*, 1969: 29 cited in *Bougainville: The Long Struggle for Freedom*, Moses and Rikha Havini p.12

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Panguna copper and gold mine has played a central role in Bougainville's recent economic and political history. During the course of its operation—from 1972 until 1989—the mine formed the foundation of an economic development model centred on large-scale mining, providing a major revenue source for government, investors and other businesses linked to the mine's operation. Subsequently, the eruption of intense social conflict over the mine's operation played a central role in triggering the region's decade long civil war. The mine now lies at the heart of debates over the region's political and economic future, as discussion surrounding the mine's proposed reopening gains momentum. These debates are closely intertwined with discussions over the island's prospective independence from Papua New Guinea. As these debates unfold in tandem, the next 12 months will be a critical time for the people of Bougainville.

Official public discussion surrounding the mine's future has often projected sentiments of both inevitability and united public purpose in support of the mine's reopening. Yet despite optimistic declarations over the potential to overcome past conflict and achieve broad-based support amongst affected people for the mine's reopening, there have been numerous warning signs that significant social tensions surrounding the mine persist.

REPORT AIMS

Drawing on interviews with a range of everyday Bougainvilleans living in villages around the Panguna mine area, this report explores some of the ways in which complex legacies related to the conflict, and mining, are intersecting with equally complex debates over Bougainville's economic and political future. The report endeavors to relay voices from mine-affected communities in Bougainville, voices that have been distant from recent public discussions surrounding the mine—raising some difficult and troubling questions about the mine's past, and its soon to be determined future.

RESEARCH METHOD

The interviews were carried out by two researchers in ten different sites in the Panguna region during November and December 2013. The researchers spoke to people from most of the key villages in or around the mine site, including a majority of the main villages located in the Special Mining Lease Area and in the Upper and Middle Tailings Areas. A snowball sampling method was used in order to identify participants, who were broadly divided across a range of ages and genders. In all, 65 individual interviews were carried out as well as one focus group discussion with 17 participants.

RESEARCH FINDINGS: HISTORY OF THE MINE AND THE CONFLICT

The individuals consulted in this study overwhelmingly felt that from the very start, the decision to have a mine at Panguna was imposed upon them by outsiders; they felt that the legal regime and economic enticements which convinced some to agree to the operation had been part of a deliberate strategy to undermine their way of life and to steal their resources. They felt that the mine, both during its construction and operation, had produced a range of disastrous impacts, citing most prominently the pollution and environmental destruction it had caused to their land and ecosystems; in addition they felt that it had made them dependent on outsiders, prompted an influx of foreigners, eroded their sovereignty, and generated insecurity. Relations with the mine operator were also flagged as an issue of concern.

The conflict years (1988-1997) were remembered as a time of trauma, both by those who lived through the period directly as well as by those who were too young to have personal memories of the events. The most common causes of this trauma were the loss of property and livelihood, the shortages of food, medicine and services, and the killing or maiming of family members. The respondents overwhelmingly identified the mine, and the environmental destruction associated with it, as the cause of the conflict, although discontent with benefit-sharing arrangements and the enrichment of elites and landowner associations were



also mentioned as significant factors. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army was still widely held to have waged a just war, although some acknowledged that it had committed violations. In contrast, the atrocities committed by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), were felt to have been worse and less forgivable. The role of the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Australia, in addition to the mine operator Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), in supporting the conflict was well understood and the cause of ongoing resentment and mistrust towards all three actors.

RESEARCH FINDINGS: PLANS TO REOPEN THE MINE

Opposition to the opening of the mine was near universal; individuals not only expressed their personal opposition but reported that this was the feeling of the majority in the area. The three main reasons for this opposition were: the negative environmental and social consequences associated with the first period of mining, the role the mine played in sparking the conflict, and the lack of meaningful reconciliation and justice, associated with which is ongoing trauma from the conflict period. Around one fifth of the respondents would be prepared to consider discussing the prospect of reopening the mine after the independence vote has been taken; other additional conditions for reopening were local ownership/control of the mine or a proper reconciliation ceremony.

Respondents were deeply critical of recent consultations surrounding the proposed reopening of the mine. Some felt that the consultations had not been sufficiently inclusive of communities that would be directly affected by the reopening, and that youth, women and elders had been excluded and/or their opinions disregarded. Others felt that they had been poorly represented by the landowner associations or their elected representatives; others felt that there had been misleading statements in the media about the enthusiasm of Panguna residents for the mine reopening, and about what the reopening would mean. Others still appear to have deliberately chosen not to engage because of ongoing trauma associated with the conflict, and mistrust of the actors pushing for reopening.

RESEARCH FINDINGS: RECONCILIATION AND ASPIRATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Although not all respondents expressed their opinion on the peace process to date, those who did reported unanimous dissatisfaction. Nearly three quarters felt that although there was now an end to the violence, the problems facing families have not yet been addressed. Related to this, a sizeable majority felt that lasting peace had not been restored and that more reconciliation was necessary. Smaller numbers reported variously that there had been peace but no justice; that the peace process has not been properly consultative; or that the process itself was an initiative to serve the needs of Australia/Papua New Guinea. All respondents felt that the ongoing fact of trauma present in their communities was a serious problem and that there needed to be more support services to address it.

When asked about the future of Bougainville, respondents identified a number of principles which they would like to be adhered to secure a healthy and prosperous life for their communities and their island. The most important among these were respect for the natural environment, a commitment to a 'people-centred' development, and a development process designed and controlled by Bougainvilleans. A significant number rejected the attempt to link the issue of Bougainvillean independence with the reopening of the Panguna mine.



II. INTRODUCTION

1. SOCIAL OVERVIEW OF BOUGAINVILLE

Lying on the northern tip of the Solomon Islands archipelago, Bougainville forms part of Papua New Guinea's eastern border region. Like the rest of Melanesia, Bougainville is largely an agrarian society, where communities are differentiated most visibly by clan, and clan lineage.¹

Clan membership is essential to an individual's social life, and shapes the reciprocal obligations they owe to community members. As an organisational body, clans are also the custodians of the land on Bougainville – accordingly, a household's clan membership affords them particular use-rights to land holdings.² However, in contrast to other regions of Papua New Guinea, clan membership on Bougainville is largely determined down matrilineal lines. Consequently, it is women, not men, who are regarded as custodians of the land.

While there is no one-form of traditional leadership on Bougainville, chiefs – who continue to wield significant authority – are generally selected through deed, rather than birth line. Chiefs are those leaders of high standing who display outstanding ability to mediate complex relationships within the community and between communities.³

Custom remains the overarching normative framework that regulates relationships at a village level. While custom embodies a fluid set of norms at its heart are the principles of balance and reciprocity. That is, maintaining balance within and between communities and maintaining balance between communities and the natural/spiritual world, through forms of reciprocal exchange.

These complex social structures have proven resilient in the face of rapid changes to the island's political economy, prompted by the arrival of three colonial powers – Germany, Australia, and Japan. It was Australia, however, who has left the largest footprint on Bougainville, having assumed control of the island in 1914.⁴

Facing a skeletal colonial regime, Bougainville's village communities were in a relatively strong position to negotiate change during the colonial period, ensuring that even as agricultural production became increasingly geared towards world-markets, it remained largely in the hands of Bougainvillean smallholders.⁵ However, a notable exception in this respect was the Panguna copper and gold mine, which was established in the face of significant local resistance.

BOUGAINVILLE AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA



1 John Connell, Taim Bilong Mani: The Evolution of Agriculture in a Solomon Island Society (Canberra: Australian National University, 1978); Donald D. Mitchell. Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi, Papua New Guinea (Boroko: Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, 1976); Tushar Kanti Moulik. Bougainville in Transition (Canberra: Australian National University, 1977); Eugene Ogan, Business and Cargo: Socioeconomic Change among the Nasioi of Bougainville. (Canberra: Australian National University, 1972); Douglas Oliver. Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937 - 1991 (Melbourne: Hyland House Publishing, 1991); Terence Wesley-Smith. "Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production in Papua New Guinea," *Dialectical Anthropology* 14 (1989): 307-321.

2 Ogan, "Nasioi Land Tenure".

3 Connell, Taim Bilong Mani; Bill Sagir. "We Were Born Chiefs: Chiefly Identity and Power in Haku, Buka Island" in *Bougainville: Before the Conflict* eds. Anthony J. Regan and Helga-Maria Griffin (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005a); Bill Sagir, "Traditional Leadership and the State in Bougainville: A Background Paper" pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pidp/its/sagir.htm (2005b); Wesley-Smith, "Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production in Papua New Guinea".

4 James Griffin, Hank Nelson and Stewart Firth. *Papua New Guinea: A Political History* (Richmond: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1979); Douglas Oliver. *Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937 - 1991* (Melbourne: Hyland House Publishing, 1991).

5 Scott MacWilliam, "Post-War Reconstruction in Bougainville: Plantations, Smallholders and Indigenous Capital", in *Bougainville: Before the Conflict* eds. Anthony J. Regan and Helga-Maria Griffin (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005).

2. HISTORY OF THE MINE

The Panguna copper and gold mine – which has been at the centre of Bougainville’s political economy since 1972 – lies in the Crown Prince Ranges, a mountainous area that runs down the centre of the island. The mine lease area, which covers 13,047 hectares of territory, is populated by agrarian communities who depend on the land and surrounding ecosystem to engage in a mixture of subsistence agriculture, and cash-cropping.⁶

The mine’s origins extend back to the early 1960s, when a colonial geologist noted the Crown Prince Ranges may contain a copper and gold deposit sizeable enough to support large-scale mining. This finding was followed up by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia’s (CRA) exploration arm in 1964, and subsequently confirmed.⁷

The mine, and associated facilities (including, for instance, multiple townships, a port, roads, a power station, a concentrator plant, water supply infrastructure, and a limestone quarry), demanded extensive land allocations. This land was secured through 22 different kinds of leases.⁸

Opposition to CRA’s presence was immediate, with exploration teams facing hostility from local villages.⁹ Resistance grew during the mine’s construction phase, which was being managed by a CRA subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL). Although the company agreed to pay rent and compensation to the traditional owners, the locals vocally opposed what they saw as the alienation of customary land to a foreign organisation with no local standing. This opposition culminated in a large protest of women landowners at Rorovana on Bougainville’s east coast, which saw the colonial administration employ riot squads to disperse protestors, while the military was placed on stand-by.¹⁰

In defence of the colonial administration, Australia’s Minister for Territories, Charles Barnes, argued his government had initiated an extensive process of consultation with landowning communities affected by the mine. Nevertheless, the region’s MP, Sir Paul Lapun, would later complain that communities were only told ‘one side of the picture ... the bad side ... was hidden from us’.¹¹

To cement the mine’s place in the political structure of PNG, a mining agreement setting out BCL’s ‘leasehold entitlements’, as well as their ‘ongoing obligations’ in terms of taxation, royalties, and the provision of benefits, was shepherded by Canberra through PNG’s House of Assembly, and enshrined in the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act 1967.¹²

The mine opened in 1972. When PNG obtained independence in 1975, it assumed control of a 20 per cent equity stake in the company, dividends from which supplemented tax receipts.¹³ According to CRA figures, during the mine’s life (1972-89), the operation generated a total of K1.7 billion in revenue (approximately US\$2 billion), of which 32.8 per cent went to non-government shareholders (dividends), 61.5 per cent went to the PNG national government (tax + dividends), 4.3 per cent went to the North Solomons provincial government (royalties + tax), and 1.4 per cent went to landholders (royalties + compensation).¹⁴

During this period, the operation’s environmental impacts were considerable, with 300 000 tonnes of ore and waste rock being removed from the mine on a daily basis.¹⁵ The disposal of mine tailings had devastating effects on the local terrain, including the Jaba river, while the process of ore extraction is also said to have contributed to erosion, flooding, chemical pollution, air pollution, the contamination of drinking water, and the health of village communities, in addition to surrounding animal and marine life.¹⁶

Coinciding with significant environmental impacts were a range of other contentious developments. The emergence of cash cropping, coupled with a range of tertiary industries, prompted social differentiation within rural communities. Ethnographies from the 1960s and 1970s reveal that households with larger smallholdings were beginning to diversify profits into business, while others who lacked access to the necessary resources for the household’s reproduction (land, labour, capital), turned to temporal bouts of wage-labour to earn money.¹⁷ Furthermore, with land increasingly employed to facilitate crops destined for international markets, a burgeoning generation of young landowners, who entered adulthood during the 1980s, were facing the prospect for the first time of landlessness.

The mine exacerbated social anxieties associated with rapid change. This was partly due to its significant environmental impact. However, in addition to this the mine had also prompted the rise of a relatively wealthy local elite who were monopolising political and economic opportunities, in addition to a migrant class who had come to the island in search of jobs and business opportunities.¹⁸

The tensions generated by social differentiation, and

13 Quodling, *Bougainville: The Mine and the People*.

14 Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia, “Bougainville Update: The Economic Impact of Bougainville Copper”, *CRA Gazette*, 25:6 (1990).

15 Applied Geology Associates Limited, *Environmental, Socio-Economic and Public Health Review of Bougainville Copper Mine, Panguna* (Wellington: 1989).

16 Volker Boege, “Mining and Conflict on Bougainville”, in *Development as a Cause of Conflict: The Bougainville Issue in Papua New Guinea*. Proceedings of a Conference held in the Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll, Germany 10 - 12 March 1995, *Protokollendienst* 22/95, (Bad Boll: 1995); John Connell. “Compensation and Conflict: The Bougainville Copper Mine, Papua New Guinea” in *Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia* eds. John Connell and Richard Howitt (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1991); Don Vernon. “The Panguna Mine” in *Bougainville: Before the Conflict* eds. Anthony J. Regan and Helga-Maria Griffin (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005).

17 Connell, Taim Bilong Mani; MacWilliam. “Post-War Reconstruction in Bougainville; Mitchell. *Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi, Papua New Guinea*; Donald D. Mitchell. “Frozen Assets in Nagovisi”, *Oceania* 53:1 (1982): 56-66; Tushar Kanti Moulik. *Bougainville in Transition*, (Canberra: Australian National University 1978); Ogan. *Business and Cargo*; Oliver. *Black Islanders*.

18 James Tanis, “Nagovisi Villages as a Window on Bougainville in 1988” in *Bougainville: Before the Conflict* eds. Anthony J. Regan and Helga-Maria Griffin (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005).

6 Anthony J. Regan, ‘The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas’, in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (London: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2003), 137.

7 Donald Denoon. *Getting Under the Skin: The Bougainville Copper Agreement and the Creation of the Panguna Mine* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 2000); Paul Quodling, *Bougainville: The Mine and the People* (Sydney: The Centre for Independent Studies, 1991).

8 Applied Geology Associates Limited, *Environmental, Socio-Economic and Public Health Review of Bougainville Copper Mine, Panguna* (Wellington: 1989).

9 Denoon, *Getting Under the Skin*.

10 Denoon, *Getting Under the Skin*; Ian Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945-75* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1980).

11 Paul Lapun, Interview with Gill Andrew, Bougainville Copper Limited, Mabes Village, (14 April 1988), 23

12 Denoon, *Getting Under the Skin*, 90-6, Paul Quodling, *Bougainville: The Mine and the People* (Sydney: The Centre for Independent Studies, 1991), 23

the company's perceived role in this process, were succinctly captured by a Guava villager at a meeting shortly before the crisis: 'the company has created classes in our society, where there were none before ... family disputes have now occurred over land, even within families and within villages'.¹⁹

These merging antagonisms were practically articulated through a significant shift in the Panguna Landowners Association's (PLA) leadership. Formed in 1979, the PLA was the overarching representative body for mine affected communities.²⁰ Its executive was responsible for negotiating mine arrangements with BCL, and administering a trust in which certain compensation payments were made. In 1987, a new generation of landowner leaders challenged the original executive to an election. PLA founders, including Lawrence Daveona, Michael Pariu, and Michal Kove, were voted out, and a new executive led by Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona was voted in.²¹

In contrast to the outgoing executive, the new leadership opposed the mine, and to that end initiated a peaceful campaign of protest and civil disobedience to shut it down.²² Working with traditional leaders, the new PLA held sizable protests outside BCL's offices, and employed sit-ins to block access to the mine. While the association is most famous for demanding a K10 billion (US\$12 billion) compensation payment from the

company in April 1988, its Secretary would later claim in July of that year, 'we are not worried about money. Money is something nothing. The operation is causing hazards health wise. We don't want to talk anymore'.²³

Contestation turned into confrontation during November 1988, when the PLA used industrial sabotage to close the mine for eight days. While the national government initially opted to enter into mediation with the PLA, PNG's Police Commissioner scuppered negotiations when he launched a surprise attack on landowner villages employing mobile squad units – a paramilitary force with a reputation for gross human rights abuses²⁴ – which had arrived on the island, following a request from BCL's Managing Director on 26 November 1988.²⁵ PLA leaders escaped into the surrounding jungles, and organised into a guerrilla force under the leadership of Francis Ona, which was named the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).

'the company has created classes in our society, where there were none before ... family disputes have now occurred over land, even within families and within villages'.



19 Applied Geology Associates Limited Environmental, Socio-Economic and Public Health Review of Bougainville Copper Mine, Panguna, (Wellington: 1989) at Appendix II.

20 Henry Okole, "The Politics of the Panguna Landowners' Association", in *The Bougainville Crisis* eds. Ronald James May and Matthew Spriggs (Bathurst: Crawford House Press, 1990).

21 Bob Wiley, "Bougainville: A Matter of Attitude", *The Contemporary Pacific*, 4:2 (1992): 376–78.

22 Kristian Lasslett, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance to Mining*, (London: Pluto Press, 2014), Chapter 3.

23 Bougainville Copper Limited, Meeting minutes (31 July 1988).

24 Sinclair Dinnen, *Law and Order in a Weak State: Crime and Politics in Papua New Guinea*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); Bill Standish, "Papua New Guinea: The Search for Security in a Weak State", in *Papua New Guinea: Issues for Australian Security Planners* ed. Alan Thompson (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994).

25 Bougainville Copper Limited, Meeting minutes (26 November 1988). During the 26 November meeting, BCL's Managing Director Advised the PNG Government that it: 'was necessary to have at least two riot groups [meaning the mobile squads] and special flight arrangements to get them to Bougainville today.'

3. THE CONFLICT PERIOD

Initially, the PNG government believed that the nascent rebellion could be quashed employing paramilitary tactics, known locally as 'destructions'. During March and April of 1989, hundreds of villages were sacked by a security force contingent made up of police mobile squad units and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). When the BRA failed to cede ground on its demand for the mine's permanent closure, the national government declared a state of emergency, which placed the security arrangements under PNGDF command.

BCL was informed by the Minister of State in June 1989 that the national government was now planning to employ 'brutal firepower' to quash the uprising.²⁶ In a subsequent meeting with PNG's Prime Minister, BCL's Managing Director issued his support for the military offensive, and identified important targets, including influential Chief Damien Dameng.²⁷ The Managing Director's position, in this respect, echoed the strong stance taken by the company's Chairman back in November 1988; when informed that the Prime Minister planned to negotiate with the saboteurs, the Chairman threatened to withdraw CRA investment from PNG.²⁸

With momentum moving in the company's favor during 1989, BCL provided considerable logistic support to the military. This included trucks, fuel, accommodation, storage space, messing facilities, offices, and communications equipment.²⁹ The Australian government – which had frenetically lobbied the PNG government to enact a military solution to the crisis – supplemented BCL's support with armaments, helicopters, and military advisers, the latter of which helped plan offensive operations.³⁰ A senior Australian diplomat stationed in Port Moresby recalls, 'we were



26 Bougainville Copper Limited, Meeting Minutes (8 June 1989).

27 Bougainville Copper Limited, Meeting Minutes (13 July 1989). In the meeting notes, the Managing Director 'told PM that security forces offensive activities OK and should continue, however at present defensive is lacking.'

28 Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, Memorandum from Donald Carruthers, Chairman Bougainville Copper Limited, to Directors, Melbourne, 6 December 1988. Relaying a meeting he had with the PNG Prime Minister on the 28 November 1988, the Chairman said: 'The PM's priority was to "appease" the landowners. I expressed the view that CRA would want to review its assessment of PNG as a place to invest.'

29 Bougainville Copper Limited Official A, Personal Communication, 31 May 2006; Bougainville Copper Limited Official B, Personal Communication, 7 June 2006; Bougainville Copper Limited Official C, Personal Communication, 26 October 2006; Lasslett, State Crime on the Margins of Empire. Yauka Aluambo Liria. "Declaration of Yauka Aluambo Liria," Alexis Holyweek Sarei, et al., v Rio Tinto, plc. et al., Case No. 00-11695 MMM AIJx (United States District Court – Central District of California, Western Division, 2001); Prime Minister's Department Official, Personal Communication, 4 July 2006; Jerry Singirok. "Declaration of General Singirok," Alexis Holyweek Sarei, et al., v Rio Tinto, plc. et al., Case No. 00-11695 MMM AIJx (United States District Court – Central District of California, Western Division, 2001).

30 Australian Defence Force Official, Personal Communication, 1 September 2006; Australian Department of Defence Official, Personal Communication, 23 August 2006; Australian High Commission Official A, Personal Communication, 25 August 2006; Kristian Lasslett. "State Crime by Proxy: Australia and the Bougainville Conflict," *British Journal of Criminology*, 52:4 (2012): 705-723; Lasslett, State Crime on the Margins of Empire, 127-30.

certainly pushing them to do that, pushing them to get more troops over there and that sort of thing. Ben Sabumei was the [Defence] Minister, and I used to see him all the time saying, "get your people over there".³¹

Using this wide-ranging package of state-corporate assistance the PNGDF engaged in a series of counterinsurgency operations during 1989-90. Villages around the mine were burnt, and displaced residents put into detention camps, labelled 'care centres' by the national government, where sexual assaults, torture, extra-judicial killings, and restrictions on basic freedoms were reported.³² Civilian areas were frequently strafed from the air using M60s and M203s, supplemented by land bombardment employing 81mm mortar fire (including white phosphorous rounds).³³ As a result, civilian deaths were common. During this period, Amnesty International also documented the frequent use of torture and extra-judicial killings by government forces.³⁴

In early 1990 the BRA staged a significant counter-attack. BCL were forced to abandon the mine, while in March 1990 the PNGDF retreated from Bougainville, as casualties mounted. A military blockade was then installed. It was implemented through Emergency Order No.31 – the order stated that from 6 May 1990, a 12 nautical mile exclusion zone would be placed around the islands of Bougainville and Buka. According to a leaked internal document from PNG's Department of Defence, the government intended to exacerbate the emerging humanitarian crisis on Bougainville, by denying civilians access to essential goods and services – including medicine and surgical equipment – in the hope that the BRA forces would implode under popular pressure.³⁵

The blockade was supported by the Australian government and by BCL. One senior diplomat recalls, 'the government was in spite of itself on the right course, which was to deny goodies. They [Bougainville] were well off, comparatively speaking. And the way to bring them to heel, was frankly to cut off the tap, to ensure that they would pay for not having the mine to operate, that they would pay for their defiance if you will'.³⁶ According to Papua New Guinea's former Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, BCL's Chairman, Don Carruthers, also supported the blockade. He is alleged to have remarked, '[let's] starve the bastards out'.³⁷ A

31 Australian High Commission Official A, Personal Communication, 25 August 2006. Lasslett, State Crime on the Margins of Empire, 121.

32 Amnesty International. Papua New Guinea: Human Rights Violations on Bougainville 1989-1990, (London: Amnesty International Secretariat, 1990a); Marilyn Taleo Havini, A Compilation of Human Rights Abuses Against the People of Bougainville: 1989 – 1995, Vol.1 (Sydney: Bougainville Freedom Movement, 1995); Marilyn Taleo Havini, A Compilation of Human Rights Abuses Against the People of Bougainville: 1989 – 1995, Vol.2 (Sydney: Bougainville Freedom Movement, 1996); Marilyn Taleo Havini, "Questions and Answers", in Women Speak Out on Bougainville: Forum Papers (Neutral Bay: Women for Bougainville, 1997); Marilyn Taleo Havini, "Journey into Exile," in As Mothers of the Land eds. Josephine Sirivi and Marilyn Taleo Havini (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2003).

33 Marilyn Taleo Havini, "Human Rights Violations and Community Disruptions", in The Bougainville Crisis eds. Ronald James May and Matthew Spriggs. (Bathurst: Crawford House Press, 1990); Trevor Rogers. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force: Vanuatu (1980) to Bougainville (1990), Unpublished PhD, (Canberra: Australian National University 2002); Deborah Snow. "Blood on the Bougainvillea," Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Sydney: 24 June 1991).

34 Amnesty International. Papua New Guinea: Human Rights Violations on Bougainville 1989-1990 (London: Amnesty International Secretariat, 1990a).

35 Defence Intelligence Branch, An Intelligence Resume for Contingency Planning for North Solomons Province (Port Moresby: 1990).

36 High Commission Official B, Personal Communication, 6 September 2006.

37 Declaration of Michael Somare, Alexis Holyweek Sarei, et al., v Rio Tinto, plc, et

senior BCL manager explained there were a range of serious concerns underpinning this support, ‘there were two things we were worried about. One was the ability of the militants to get more weapons to increase the level of their militancy. And the second was that there was always these threats that they were going to sell off the mine equipment’.³⁸

The blockade’s humanitarian toll was seismic. Commenting during the conflict Bougainvillean nurse and health educator, Ruby Mirinka, observed, ‘since the [blockade] in March 1990 there has been no hospital facilities on Bougainville, no medicines, no doctors particularly in Central area and some parts of south Bougainville.’³⁹ Mirinka goes on to provide a first-hand account of an infant dying from sepsis, a teenager dying from malaria, children affected by malnutrition, girls using dirty rags as menstruation pads, women unable to have their uterus cleared following a miscarriage, in addition to untreated cases of asthma, pneumonia, high blood pressure, gastro-enteritis and dysentery. This first-hand account is echoed in the broader findings of Community Aid Abroad’s Lissa Evans, who implored the international community following a visit to the island in 1991, ‘it is my firm opinion that the total lack of medical supplies to Bougainville between May 1990 and February 1991 has created an emergency situation. Bougainvillean doctors who have remained on Bougainville throughout the conflict estimate that over 3,000 people have died as a direct consequence of the blockade.’⁴⁰

In response to the blockade, the BRA leadership attempted to restore normality through establishing an Interim Government. Nevertheless, the rebel contingent faced significant challenges, including no outside recognition or support, an inability to generate income, a growing law and order problem, and the breakdown in internal discipline.⁴¹ During this period an increasingly paranoid BRA leadership used torture, and extra-judicial killings against perceived opponents.⁴²

As internal schisms emerged on the island, the PNG Government organised, funded and armed local paramilitary forces opposed to the BRA, which paved the way for the PNGDF’s return in September 1990.⁴³ The war rapidly evolved into a complex civil conflict that pitted the PNGDF and anti-BRA paramilitaries against the rebel force, complicating matters – pre-

existing local disputes and tensions became militarised in this environment of growing inter-communal violence. A lasting cease-fire was not reached until 1997, when the PNGDF revolted against the government’s decision to contract the private military company, Sandline International.⁴⁴

By the time the war ended with the signing of the 2001 Peace Agreement, the conflict was estimated to have taken between 10,000 and 15,000 lives.⁴⁵

One enduring point of controversy associated with the conflict has been allegations surrounding BCL’s complicity in PNGDF military operations during 1989-90. This complicity was the subject of a class action launched against Rio Tinto in the US during 2001 (it was subsequently dismissed in 2013 on jurisdictional grounds).

In response to the accusations raised in the case, BCL has consistently denied any wrongdoing, arguing in its defence that the mine delivered ‘social benefit on a scale never seen before or since in Papua New Guinea.’⁴⁶ Both the United States and Australia have backed the company, claiming any attempt to seek legal remedy against BCL or Rio Tinto could seriously undermine the peace process. Their position has often been supported by some of the region’s most prominent experts.⁴⁷

However, despite these public denials, senior managers who operated the company during 1989-90 have testified to BCL’s involvement in the counter-insurgency, statements which have been corroborated by Papua New Guinea state officials, and internal company records. One senior BCL official recalls: ‘We did everything they [PNGDF] asked of us to make their life more comfortable, and better able to manage through, with transport, communications, provisions, whatever, fuel. You know we gave them everything, because as far as we saw it we were hoping that they were going to solve the situation, so we could start operating again. So we supported them every way we could’.⁴⁸ A senior official from Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister’s Department affirms how critical this support was: ‘We relied heavily on some of the civilian facilities provided by the company. They did everything, I mean we spent lots and lots of money, to provide backup support services for the operation. But the defence force was not properly equipped at all.’⁴⁹

Accordingly, BCL’s impunity remains a significant and unresolved issue both internationally and locally.

al. Case No. 00-11695 MMM AIJX (United States District Court – Central District of California 2001).

38 Bougainville Copper Limited Official B, Personal Communication, 7 June 2006. For a detailed catalogue of BCL’s involvement in the counterinsurgency.

39 Ruby Mirinka, ‘Speech Transcript’, 29 March 1994, Sydney.

40 Lissa Evans, ‘The Health and Social Situation on Bougainville,’ in *The Bougainville Crisis: 1991 Update*, eds. Donald Denoon and Matthew Spriggs (Bathurst: Crawford House Press, 1992), 45-6; see also Lasslett, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire*. For a more benign view of the effect of the blockade, see Anthony J. Regan, ‘Submission – Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond’, in *Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Jointing Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, 39th Parliament, Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, Submissions – Inquiry into the Bougainville Peace Process, Volume 2, Submissions Numbers 25-30* (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1999).

41 Lasslett, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire*, 160-64.

42 Amnesty International, *Submission, submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Sub-Committee on Australia’s Relations with Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1990b); Pauline Onsa, ‘The Impact of the Bougainville Crisis on the Women of Buka’, in *The Bougainville Crisis: 1991 Update* eds. Donald Denoon and Matthew Spriggs (Bathurst: Crawford House Press, 1992); Anthony J. Regan, *The Bougainville Conflict: Origins and Development, Main ‘Actors’, and Strategies for its Resolution* (Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea Faculty of Law, 1996).

43 Lasslett, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire*.

44 Sean Dorney, *The Sandline Affair* (Sydney: ABC Books, 1998); Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, *Enemies Within: Papua New Guinea, Australia and the Sandline Crisis* (Sydney: Doubleday, 1999).

45 Roderic Alley, ‘Ethnosecession in Papua New Guinea: The Bougainville Case,’ in *Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions* eds. Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff (London: Sage Publications, 2003).

46 Bougainville Copper Limited, ‘Bougainville Copper Limited AGM’, press release, 8 May 2008, <http://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20080508/pdf/3190zpc92gh58.pdf>

47 Anthony J. Regan, ‘The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas’, in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (London: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2003); Anthony J. Regan, ‘Bougainville: Conflict Deferred?’ in *Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Other’s Don’t* eds. Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey, and Anthony J. Regan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) 132. Lasslett, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire*, 128.

48 Bougainville Copper Limited Official, Personal Communication, 26 October 2006. See also Kristian Lasslett, ‘Winning hearts and mines: the Bougainville crisis, 1988-90,’ *Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 148-149.

49 Prime Minister’s Department Official, Personal Communication, 4 July 2006. See also Lasslett, ‘Winning hearts and mines,’ 148-149.

4. HISTORY OF THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD

The peace process on Bougainville has had to respond to a range of complex challenges emerging from a highly divided and traumatised society.⁵⁰ It is often described as involving a two-part process, or a mix of 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' efforts, which began as early as 1990 and is still unfolding today.

Following several peace talks facilitated by New Zealand, Australia, and the Solomon Islands, and two failed attempts to establish a ceasefire in 1990 and 1994,⁵¹ 'top-down' approaches finally succeeded in 1997 with the signing of the Burnham Truce by a large number of leaders from Bougainville's opposing combatant groups, and representatives from the PNG state. The subsequent Lincoln Agreement in 1998 established a third ceasefire which paved the way for the realisation of a series of other peace and state building agreements, including: the conclusion of the Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001, which enacted a weapon disposal plan and a deferred referendum on independence; the elaboration of a constitution for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in 2004; and the conducting of elections in 2005 to establish the first Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG).⁵² The 'top-down' dimensions also included peacekeeping operations between 1997 and 2005 administered by neighboring countries (including Australia) and the UN. The peacekeeping contingent consisted of unarmed monitoring missions that were not directly involved in security or policing provision.⁵³

The successful ceasefire was also the culmination of considerable peacebuilding work that had been conducted by domestic and international civil society during the war, in conjunction with leaders from both sides of the conflict. Prominent in the peace process were local women's groups such as the Bougainville Women's Forum.⁵⁴ At the 1998 Lincoln Peace Talks, this central importance of woman in Bougainville culture was summed up in the following excerpt from the Bougainville Women's Statement:

To survive, we looked within our culture, our traditional society and ourselves. In almost all areas of Bougainville, women traditionally own the land. The land is sacred and protected by men on behalf of the women. The men as guardians share leadership with women, taking the responsibility in open debate to protect women from potential conflict; however, women have the power to veto

50 See the description of humanitarian, economic and social impacts of the conflict on Bougainville society in John Braithwaite et al. *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing peace in Bougainville* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010).

51 See description of peace talks, conference and attempted ceasefire supervised by neighbouring countries since 1990 in: BICWF. "Chronology", PDF tool developed in December 2001, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord%2012_19Chronology_2002_ENG.pdf. And, Australian Civil-Military Centre. "Partnering for Peace: Australia's Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experiences in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste," (2012).

52 See also Joanne Wallis, "Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums: Unresolved Questions from Bougainville, Papua New Guinea," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 19:3 (2013): 310-332.

53 See Australian Civil-Military Centre. "Partnering for Peace: Australia's Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experiences in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste," (2012).

54 Marilyn Taleo Havini, "Human Rights Portfolio," in *Mothers of the Land* eds. Marilyn Taleo Havini and Josephine Sirivi (Canberra: Pandanus, 2004) 107-118.

*decisions, and therefore are involved in the final consultative process.*⁵⁵

The 'bottom-up' efforts also consisted of a village-level reconciliation process: about half the villages in Bougainville have participated in a process of reconciliation since the early years of the conflict.⁵⁶ It is argued that local reconciliation has been effective in restoring relationships through the public acknowledgement of trauma, forgiveness and eventually, the exchange of gifts to restore balance.⁵⁷

The innovative synthesis of top-down and bottom up measures has been widely praised in the peacebuilding literature.⁵⁸ However, the latter research suggests some caution still needs to be exercised when gauging the effectiveness of the peace process on Bougainville.

First, the village level reconciliation process remains incomplete, with many cases still awaiting resolution. Related to this, participation in the reconciliation process has been voluntary, meaning that there are few options for victims wishing to seek justice or truth if perpetrators are not willing to engage.⁵⁹ The lack of involvement of Papua New Guinea security forces and leaders is critical here, as is the omission of international actors involved in the hostilities.⁶⁰

Second, although 'islands of civility'⁶¹ have been established from 1990 onwards, they contrast with the ongoing 'no go zone' around the defunct mine site. Francis Ona's reluctance to be involved with top-down peace processes, along with other ex-BRA combatants, led to the creation of a 'no go zone', which has reduced in size over time as more and more leaders joined the peace and reconciliation process (and after Ona's death in 2005).⁶² However, according to Reddy, 'a substantial number of people who live in the no go area have not yet reconciled and so have not been reintegrated with the rest of their island and society'.⁶³

Third, the 'top-down' process of disarmament is itself incomplete. Arms continue to be in circulation and localised armed conflicts in south Bougainville have occurred since 2005, involving 10 to 12 small armed groups.⁶⁴

55 "Lincoln Peace Talks: Women's Statement" in *Mothers of the Land* eds. Marilyn Taleo Havini and Josephine Sirivi (Canberra: Pandanus, 2004) 107-118.

56 John Braithwaite and Ray Nickson, "Timing Truth, Reconciliation, and Justice after War," 27 *Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.* 443 (2012).

57 Peter Reddy, "Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, Peacekeeping and Restorative Justice," *Contemporary Justice Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative Justice*, 11:2 (2008): 117-130.

58 John Braithwaite and Ray Nickson. "Timing Truth, Reconciliation, and Justice after War"; Volker Boege. "Peacebuilding and state Formation in Post-Conflict Bougainville," both papers presented at the International Peace Research Association Conference (Sydney: July 6 - 10, 2010).

59 See the provision of amnesty for "all persons involved in crisis-related activities" and pardons for those convicted of crisis-related activities in Bougainville Peace Agreement, Papua New Guinea-Bougainville, cl. 331, 30 August 2011, http://jps.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm/resourcedocuments/bougainville/PDF/BougainvillePeaceAgreement29A_uq01.pdf.

60 As well as the neglect of the wrongs caused to mainland and Chinese residents and migrant workers who for the most part never returned to Bougainville.

See John Braithwaite et al. *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing peace in Bougainville* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010).

61 Braithwaite and Nickson. "Timing, Truth, Reconciliation, and Justice after War".

62 Stan Starygin. "The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine", *Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security* 3:1 (2013): 56-76.

63 Reddy, "Reconciliation in Bougainville".

64 Australian Civil-Military Centre, "Partnering for Peace: Australia's Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experiences in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste," (2012).

Finally, regional analysts agree that both the deferred referendum, due to take place in the next five years, and the prospective reopening of the mine, could be highly destabilising events for the still fragile peace on Bougainville. For instance, there is a risk that the PNG parliament could refuse to ratify the referendum if Bougainvilleans indeed opt for independence, which would create further instability.⁶⁵ In regards to the mine, there are concerns that the mine has become sidelined as a factor in the peace process. One scholar has concluded that ‘[c]onsequently, grievances relating to the mine have not been fully resolved, but instead effectively suspended until serious moves are made to reopen the mine.’⁶⁶

Despite officially denying complicity in any war crimes or human rights violations, BCL has recently committed to participate in a traditional ‘Bel Kol’ reconciliation ceremony, which will include funding for a number of local programmes, deemed a ‘gesture of goodwill’ by the company.⁶⁷

“To survive, we looked within our culture, our traditional society and ourselves. In almost all areas of Bougainville, women traditionally own the land. The land is sacred and protected by men on behalf of the women. The men as guardians share leadership with women, taking the responsibility in open debate to protect women from potential conflict; however, women have the power to veto decisions, and therefore are involved in the final consultative process.”

‘[c]onsequently, grievances relating to the mine have not been fully resolved, but instead effectively suspended until serious moves are made to reopen the mine.’



⁶⁵ Australian Civil-Military Centre. “Partnering for Peace”.

⁶⁶ Joanne Wallis, “Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums: Unresolved Questions from Bougainville, Papua New Guinea,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 19, Issue 3, 2013.

⁶⁷ Peter Taylor, “Chairman’s Annual General Meeting Statement,” 6 May 2014, <http://www.bcl.com.pg/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/bcl-agm-2014-chairmans-statement.pdf>

5. RECENT PLANS TO REOPEN THE MINE

Although concerns remain over the lack of meaningful reconciliation in critical areas of Bougainville, which are amplified by BCL's enduring impunity, the ABG has, with the clear support of BCL, initiated a campaign to reopen the Panguna mine.

Spearheading this effort is current ABG President, John Momis, who was elected in 2010. Regarded as one of PNG's great elder statesman, Momis chaired the committee which drafted PNG's constitution during the 1970s. Momis then cemented his role in the national political fabric through successive ministerial and diplomatic posts over the next three decades.

Throughout his career Momis has strongly argued that a greater share of mining benefits must flow to Bougainville. Despite critical encounters with BCL, Momis has been a supporter of large-scale mining, and pioneered an unsuccessful initiative in 1987 to lift a mining moratorium on Bougainville which would have allowed BCL to expand in operation, in return for providing the province with a larger share of the mine revenues.⁶⁸

Soon after his election in 2010, Momis signaled that the ABG would look to reopen the Panguna mine. This he has argued extends, rather than counteracts, the legacy of Francis Ona: 'Francis was not trying to end the mine forever. No - his complaint was about the unfair treatment of Bougainville ... He wanted fair distribution of the revenue ... we have continued the same struggle throughout the peace process'. It has been observed, however, that this statement appears to contradict the archival material on Ona's position with respect to the mine.⁶⁹

The President has further justified his decision, noting, 'it is my view that without the mine it will be nigh impossible to generate enough revenue to run the autonomous government'.⁷⁰ He also suggests, 'once the mine is open, Bougainville will be very well off',⁷¹ pointing in particular to the mine's spin-off benefits: 'Panguna mine will be like a magnet that attracts a lot of other businesses ... to come and generate income for the people and revenue for the government'.⁷²

President Momis has argued there is widespread support for Panguna's reopening. According to the President 'more than 97 per cent' of Bougainville back the government's initiative.⁷³ He claimed in 2013 that

68 John Momis, Correspondence from Fr John Momis, Member for Bougainville, to Paul Quodling, Managing Director Bougainville Copper Limited (Panguna, North Solomons Province, 4 May, 1987); John Momis, Correspondence from Fr John Momis, Member for Bougainville, to Paul Quodling and Robert Cornelius, Outgoing and Incoming Managing Director Bougainville Copper Limited (Panguna, North Solomons Province, 25 May, 1987).

69 Cited in Timothy King, "Bougainville President Fails Victim's Brutal Resource Conflict," last modified 15 July 2013, <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/bougainville-president-fails-victims-brutal-resource-conflict>.

70 Bougainville 24, "Only mine can drive autonomy - Momis," last modified 20 February 2014, <http://www.bougainville24.com/bougainville-aid/only-mine-can-drive-autonomy-momis/>

71 Business Advantage PNG, "Interview: John Momis, President, Bougainville Autonomous Government," last modified 9 July 2013, <http://www.businessadvantagepng.com/interview-john-momis-president-bougainville/>

72 Jemima Garrett, "Bougainville's president says Rio Tinto cannot assume it will operate Panguna mine," ABC News, last modified 22 May 2014, <http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-22/rio-tinto27s-bid-to-operate-mine-in-bougainville/5471706>

73 Rowan Callick, "Battle intensifies over Bougainville copper," The Australian, last modified 16 July 2011, [http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/battle-](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/battle-intensifies-over-bougainville-copper/story-e6frg6z6-1226094940146)

only 'a small group' remain opposed to mining,⁷⁴ which the President attributes, 'to a lack of understanding'.⁷⁵ Accounts in PNG's national press echo the President's position. For example, the Post-Courier reported in June 2013, 'it's an all go for the Panguna Mine reopening with all stakeholders in Central Bougainville reaffirming their support for the Autonomous Bougainville Government'.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the ABG has faced criticism domestically and internationally for entering into negotiation with BCL as the preferred operator, in light of the latter's human rights record. In response to these criticisms, President Momis has argued, 'the leaders of the landowners from the mine lease areas have consistently indicated that they prefer to deal with BCL rather than a new potential operator. They talk of preferring the "devil they know, and not a new devil"'.⁷⁷

Broadly speaking, BCL supports the Momis initiative to reopen Panguna. At the company's 2011 Annual General Meeting, BCL's Chairman, Peter Taylor, remarked: 'This [Momis' election] is an important development for the company because the next five years is the period in which the mine should be reopened to take advantage of the resurgence in mineral commodity prices and demand'. In an upbeat conclusion to his speech, Taylor noted the ABG President 'has established an office in Port Moresby which will allow him to meet directly with BCL and the PNG Government on a regular basis ... The tide is running our way'.⁷⁸

Like the ABG President, statements by BCL have implied that the resumption of mining is welcomed by the island's population. In a 2011 speech to the Australia-PNG Business Council the company's Chairman claimed:

*There is a very wide consensus on Bougainville today that peace and continuing good order will be best achieved by economic means. That the normal aspirations of the people for a good life and a fulfilling future for their children will be delivered by employment, training, regular income, infrastructure and business activity. After a few false starts the consensus is now firmly in favour of BCL being the preferred operator of the mine at Panguna if it restarts, and that the mine and its associated activities will be the engine driving all those benefits.*⁷⁹

BCL has also flagged an interest in exploring 'adjacent tenements', which could substantially increase the size

[intensifies-over-bougainville-copper/story-e6frg6z6-1226094940146](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/battle-intensifies-over-bougainville-copper/story-e6frg6z6-1226094940146)

74 Jemima Garrett, "Bougainville president in-depth on new mining legislation and more," ABC Radio, aired 8 March 2013, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/bougainville-president-indepth-on-new-mining-legislation-and-more/1099044>

75 Business Advantage PNG, "Interview: John Momis, President, Bougainville Autonomous Government," last modified 9 July 2013, <http://www.businessadvantagepng.com/interview-john-momis-president-bougainville/>

76 Romulus Masiu, "Communities approve reopening of Bougainville mine," Pacific Islands Report, last modified 28 June 2013, <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2013/June/06-28-04.htm>

77 John Momis, "Deciding the future of the Panguna mine," posted on blog Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, last modified 21 May 2014, <http://ramumine.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/john-momis-deciding-the-future-of-the-panguna-mine/>

78 Bougainville Copper Limited, "Annual General Meeting - 19 April 2011," press release, 19 April 2011, http://www.bougainville-copper.eu/mediapool/59/599247/data/BCL_Dokumente/Chairman_AGM_2011.pdf


79 Peter Taylor, "Speech to the Australian PNG Business Council," Madang, (17 May 2011).

of the Panguna operation.⁸⁰ However, the company maintains that it will only reinstate mining on Bougainville if it can secure, 'the full support of customary landowners in the mine affected regions.'⁸¹

A shareholder proposal presented at BCL's 2014 Annual General Meeting, which called for an independent inquiry into the company's past actions, was rejected by BCL's principal shareholder, Rio Tinto.⁸² BCL's Chairman explained in a subsequent interview that an independent inquiry is culturally inappropriate.⁸³

While the ABG and BCL remain optimistic over Panguna's future, international aid agencies have proven more hesitant. For instance, in 2013 USAID noted the Panguna mine was 'the primary catalyst' for the conflict; accordingly, they warn that reopening the mine is a 'high-risk endeavor.'⁸⁴ This echoes the view expressed in a 2008 AusAID report, which forecast that the reopening 'may create political shocks in Bougainville to destabilise the island in the run up to the autonomy referendum due between 2015 and 2020.'⁸⁵

BCL has also flagged an interest in exploring 'adjacent tenements', which could substantially increase the size of the Panguna operation. However, the company maintains that it will only reinstate mining on Bougainville if it can secure, 'the full support of customary landowners in the mine affected regions.



80 Bougainville Copper Limited, "Bougainville Copper Limited AGM", press release, 8 May 2008, <http://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20080508/pdf/3190zzpc92gh58.pdf>

81 Bougainville 24, "Landowners lead the way in Panguna discussions," last modified 24 February 2014, <http://www.bougainville24.com/abg/landowners-lead-the-way-in-panguna-discussions/>

82 Bougainville 24, "Landowners lead the way in Panguna discussions"

83 Jemima Garrett, "Rio Tinto votes down plan for inquiry into Bougainville civil war", ABC Radio, aired 7 May 2014, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/rio-tinto-votes-down-plan-for-inquiry-into-bougainville-civil-war/1306942>. The Jubilee Australia Research Centre's sister organisation, Jubilee Australia, was involved in the preparation of this motion, along with the Australian Centre for Corporate Responsibility.

84 USAID, "Bougainville Stability Desk Study," 10 October 2013, <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Bougainville%20Desk%20Stability%20Study.pdf>

85 Raoul Craemer, Ian Scales and Indra Thappa, "Market chain development in peace building: Australia's roads, wharves and agriculture projects in post-conflict Bougainville," February 2008, http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/Bvllle_market_chain_report_Feb08.pdf

6. THE CONSULTATION PROCESS

Bougainville's President has maintained that any remaining doubts over mining can be resolved through education and consultation. And to that end, the ABG has embarked upon an island-wide process of consultation.

In his 2014 address to the Australian-PNG Business Council, President Momis noted, 'large meetings were held in each [mine] lease area in March and July 2010. These meetings established that most landowners were open to the possibility of the Panguna mine reopening'.⁸⁶ As a result of these findings, Momis observes, 'from mid-2010, the ABG worked closely with the landowners from the mine lease areas to establish associations to represent their views'.⁸⁷ The President continues, 'in 2012 and 2013 the ABG organised Regional Forums throughout Bougainville to provide information and solicit the views of stakeholder groups'.⁸⁸ President Momis concludes, 'the Forums indicated support for reopening Panguna, as long as this could be done in a way that is fair and just and contributes to the welfare, security and wellbeing of the Bougainvilleans'.⁸⁹ Currently, there is very little publicly available information concerning the nature of the consultations that have so far occurred.

Dovetailing with the consultation process, a stakeholder forum has been set up by the ABG to establish the framework for BCL's prospective return to Panguna. Called the Joint Panguna Negotiations Coordinating Committee (JPNCC), it features representatives from the ABG, BCL, PNG government and the landowner community. The JPNCC is the primary vehicle for establishing agreement on mine reopening protocol, the distribution of mine-benefits, and the monitoring of mine environmental impacts.


Landowners are represented at the JPNCC by the United Panguna Mine Affected Landowners Association (UPMALA), which has been accepted by BCL and the ABG as the legitimate representative body for mine affected communities. The umbrella body consists of representatives from nine landowner associations from the six mine lease areas. According to UPMALA's constitution, its role is to 'to be the voice for all the Landowner Associations and their members in negotiating and discussing dialogues for the development of Panguna Mine, including opening and closing of Panguna mine'.⁹⁰

UPMALA's executive has declared its support for a resumption of mining. UPMALA's Chairman, Lawrence Daveona, who was elected unopposed,⁹¹ informed Islands Business in 2014, 'landowners of Panguna mine and the surrounding leases were united for the reopening of the mine'.⁹² An UPMALA executive, Michael

Pariu, claims only a small fraction of landowners remain opposed to the mine.⁹³

However, more recently UPMALA's Chairman has raised concerns over BCL's return, before the company had adequately addressed past wrongs; in addition, he has come out in opposition to a mining bill passed by parliament on 8 August 2014, which will allow BCL to resume mining without landowner consent.⁹⁴

The Australian government has assisted UPMALA and the ABG through the provision of advisors, paid for out of Australia's foreign aid budget, for the development of a new mining bill and in the process of community consultations surrounding the mine.⁹⁵



Bougainville," last modified January 30 2014, <http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/papua-new-guinea/4429/oneill-gives-green-light-for-repeal-of-mining-act/>
93 Islands Business. "Panguna landowners want mine reopened," last modified 29 April 2013, <http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/papua-new-guinea/1016/panguna-landowners-want-mine-reopened/>

94 Radio New Zealand. "Government govt told to change approach to mining restart", aired 5 June 2014, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/datetimepacific/audio/2598431/bougainville-govt-told-to-change-approach-to-mining-re-start>; PNG Mine Watch.9 "Rio Tinto's inhumanity has no precedent on Bougainville - Bel Kol doesn't apply", 4 August 2014, <http://ramumine.wordpress.com/2014/08/04/rio-tintos-inhumanity-has-no-precedent-on-bougainville-bel-kol-doesnt-apply/#comment-26755>

95 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 21 November 2013, Questions in Writing, pp.541-553, available at: http://www.aph.gov.au/-/media/Estimates/Live/fadt_ctte/estimates/sup_1314/dfat/dfatqonanswers.pdf

86 Momis, "Deciding the future of the Panguna mine."

87 Momis, "Deciding the future of the Panguna mine."

88 Momis, "Deciding the future of the Panguna mine."

89 Momis, "Deciding the future of the Panguna mine."

90 Umbrella Panguna Mine Affected Landowners Association, Constitution, adopted 22 March 2013.

91 Bougainville Copper Limited. "Panguna landowners elect representatives," last modified 8 October 2013, <http://www.bcl.com.pg/latest-news/panguna-landowners-elect-representatives/>

92 Islands Business. "O'Neill gives green light for repeal of mining act in

7. ADDRESSING GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE

Despite suggestions from a range of organisational actors that there is near unanimous support for the mine's reopening, anecdotal evidence from the communities most acutely affected by the mine's operation, and the subsequent conflict, has suggested there are significant currents of opposition. Indeed, powerful representations have repeatedly been made at a community level opposing both the resumption of mining, and the return of BCL.⁹⁶ This opposition would appear to accord both with the strong sentiments expressed in 1988-89, and the subsequent grass-roots condemnation of BCL for its role in PNGDF operations.

The apparent tension between these contrasting accounts has been the motivation for this study's systematic attempt to record the views of those living in the mine affected areas. Accordingly, this study was undertaken in order to empirically gauge the feelings of the mine-affected communities towards current plans to reopen the mine. Attached to this are a series of important questions:

- To what extent have communities been adequately engaged with, and consulted?
- Do they want the mine to reopen?
- If so, when, by whom, and under what conditions?
- If not, why not?

However, these questions cannot be asked without recognising that mining, conflict, development and sovereignty have knotted in complex ways throughout Bougainville's modern history. Accordingly, context-laden answers to the latter questions can only be produced by inquiring into legacy issues that have emerged in mine-affected communities, both as a result of the mine's operation between 1972-1989, and the subsequent war.


In particular, it is important to understand more precisely the experience of dislocation and trauma suffered by communities during the conflict, and how this experience intermeshes with local perceptions of the mining operations during 1972-89, and the current proposal to re-establish the mine under BCL auspices.

Furthermore, local views on the impunity of state-corporate actors must be examined, given their omission from the peace and reconciliation process. Indeed, while ex-combatants have found culturally sensitive mechanisms to acknowledge the past and reconcile, it is important to establish the impact BCL and Australia's perceived impunity has had on local communities, given both are buttressing plans to reopen the Panguna mine.

Connected to these restorative questions are forward-looking questions about economic and political change. If local perceptions of mining are to be contextualised, it is important to listen to grassroots views on how peace, security, and prosperity will be best economically sealed in the long term - especially given it is rural communities themselves which are often best placed to determine the types of development strategies that fit local needs and capacities.

With the above in mind, these contextual questions are grouped around three organising themes:

- The experience of mine-affected communities during the Panguna mine's operational period (1972-1989), and the subsequent conflict (1988-1997).
- The reaction of mine-affected communities to the reconciliation process, including the omission of certain organisational actors.
- The type of development that mine-affected communities would like to see Bougainville pursue in the future.



⁹⁶ See, for example, Clive Porabou, *Saving our Land*, (Solomon Islands: Eel Productions, 2011); Clive Porabou, *Panguna Voices*, (Solomon Islands: Eel Productions, 2014); Antony Loewenstein. "Bougainville mine: locals who oppose its reopening must have a voice," *The Guardian*, last modified 19 December 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/19/bougainville-mine-locals-who-oppose-its-reopening-must-have-a-voice>

III THE PARTICIPANTS

RESEARCH PROCESS

Interviewers visited 10 sites (8 villages and 2 hamlets or sub-villages) within the Panguna district during the months of November and December 2013. Participants were identified employing a purposive sampling method. In total 65 semi-structured interviews were conducted, in addition to one focus group discussion (FGD) consisting of 17 participants.

Interviews were conducted in Tok Pisin, or Nasioi. All interviews were recorded with the consent of participants. Principles of transparency, neutrality, anonymity, informed consent, and voluntary participation were observed during the data collection process.

For more details of the research methodology and a demographic breakdown of the participants, see the Appendix.

PLACES VISITED

All participants' villages were located in the Panguna district and can be disaggregated into four areas, according to their proximity to the mine, and the various landowner groups that represent them.

1. Special Mining Lease area (SML) - This area covers the mine pit area where the copper and gold was extracted. This area was managed under the terms outlined in the Bougainville Copper Agreement (1967 and revised in 1974), and is characterized today by extreme damage to the land.⁹⁷ During the conflict, heavy fighting took place around the area over control of the mine site, particularly during 1989-90 when the PNGDF moved its operational headquarters to BCL facilities at Panguna. Participants in the study came from three villages located in the heart of the SML area including:

- Dapera village which was entirely relocated away from its original site to the mine's periphery and has been the object of numerous studies since the end of the conflict. It is recognised as one of the places most impacted by the mine and the conflict. Dapera village still endures the consequences of mining, with a very limited portion of land available for its community to survive on today.⁹⁸
- Pirurari village was also relocated; it now lies several kilometers away from its original location at the periphery of the mine site.⁹⁹ In 1988 women and students from Pirurari village organised a demonstration, blocking roads to the mine, in protest against the waste being released on their land by BCL.

97 Approximately 300,000 tonnes of ore and waste rock were being moved from the mine on a daily basis. According to a former Chairman of BCL, Don Vernon, the dumping of waste rock created 'some 300 hectares of flat land, but totally obliterating the underlying terrain'. See: Don Vernon. "The Panguna Mine," in *Bougainville: Before the Conflict* eds. Anthony J. Regan and Helga-Maria Griffin (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005).

98 From direct observations during the conducting of interviews under the present study.

99 See relocation map of 28 villages and hamlets in the AGA report: Applied Geology Associates, Environmental, Socio-Economic and Public Health Review of Bougainville Copper Mine Panguna (Auckland: 1989).

- Guava village remains on its original site, very close to the mine site. One of the incidents that triggered the start of the conflict took place in this village with the murder of Mathew Kove, a prominent member of the old PLA, allegedly by his nephew Francis Ona who subsequently became an influential BRA leader.¹⁰⁰
- Researchers planned to interview residents from Moroni, another village in the SML area. However, inclement weather at the time prevented them from gaining access. Thus no participants from Moroni were recorded.

2. Upper Tailings: This area is located within the SML area, further down from the mine's pit, along the Kawerong river.¹⁰¹ It consists of Enamira village and its surrounding hamlets or sub-villages: Kavarongnau, Barako and Makosi. Kavarongnau and Barako were actually visited by the researchers; the Makosi respondents were interviewed at other sites. Some community members from this region were reported to have been forced to move further up the mountain due to changes in the river flow and pollution during the mine's operation.¹⁰²

3. Middle Tailings: This region used to be part of the upper tailing area during the mine operation, however a Middle Tailings Landowners Association has been formed recently. It is characterised by water pollution, soil erosion and the deleterious impacts of mine tailings disposal. Heavy fighting also occurred here during the conflict. Participants in the study were from Darenai village, also called Toku village, which is spread all along the Kawerong river.

4. Outside mine site: For the purpose of this study, the 'outside mine site' area refers to visited villages located outside of the mining lease areas as defined in the Bougainville Copper Agreement, and within the limits of Panguna district. Most of these regions are harder to reach due to their remote location up in the mountain; some parts were less affected by pollution during the operational period. Participants from this area come from the following villages:

- Paruparu (Evo region) village: Part of the village is along the river, and today Paruparu is affected by the threat of collapsing sand banks triggered by mine waste in the Kabarong river. The community moves to higher grounds for safety every month or so.¹⁰³ During the conflict, the village was targeted by helicopter fire. Paruparu is also made up of a number of sub-villages from which the respondents were drawn (Sirobai, Sipuru and

100 See PLA's president, Daveona's statement of the need for reconciliation to happen in Guava village because this is where "the conflict started". Source: "Bougainville Govt told to change approach to mine re-start", Radio New Zealand International, aired on 5 June 2014, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2598431/bougainville-govt-told-to-change-approach-to-mining-re-start>.

101 The choice to present this area separately from the above SML category is based on the fact that villages under this category have been represented by a specific Landowners Association, the Upper Tailing Landowner Association. See Introduction for more details about the constituency and dynamics amongst the UPMALA.

102 From direct observations during the conducting of the present study.

103 From direct observations during the conducting of the present study.

Mainoki).

- Dupanta village: The researchers visited Dupanta village, where at the request of local residents a focus group discussion was conducted with 17 individuals instead of individual interviews. See the Appendix for details.
- Oune and Onove: A small number of respondents also came from these villages.

In total:

- 28 respondents came from the SML area (14 from Dapera, 9 from Pirurari and 5 from Guava);
- 11 from the Upper Tailings area;
- 13 from the Middle Tailings and 13 from outside the mine site area (not including the Dupanta focus group).

For a breakdown of these groups by age and gender, see the Appendix.



PANGUNA VILLAGES VISITED AS PART OF THIS STUDY

IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS

THEME 1: EXPERIENCES OF THE PAST

1. What was the experience of interviewees during the Panguna mine's construction phase, and subsequent operation?¹⁰⁴

A) Interviewee perceptions of the Panguna mine's establishment, and the associated consultation process which took place during the 1960s and early 1970s:

All 47 interviewees out of 65 who specifically referred to the initial process of consultation which established the mine during the 1960s-70s did so using negative terms. The Australian colonial administration's engagement with local communities was mainly described as having been manipulative and/or not inclusive of the people and landowners; this resulted in respondents feeling that the mine's establishment had been 'imposed' upon the people of Panguna. Some respondents also emphasised that local resistance to the mine occurred very early on, and that some men were even imprisoned for their actions. The three main reasons respondents gave for feeling that the mine had been imposed upon the people of Panguna, were as follows:

First, **the introduction of 'land titles'** and individual male 'land title owners', who later formed the old landowners association (PLA), was denounced by some interviewees as a source of conflict as it broke traditional matrilineal ownership norms.

Second, five interviewees felt that past conflict may have been caused, or worsened, by misunderstanding, or a **'clash of cultures'**, between locals and the mining company. This clash of culture was said by respondents to have had a number of unwanted impacts, such as the encouragement of personal enrichment over communal benefit, and altering the way decisions were made about the management of resources and the environment.

Third, some respondents expressed the belief that their communities have been victims of a deliberate **strategy developed by 'outsiders'**² in order to steal Bougainville's mineral resources and diminish its people's rights over the land.

¹⁰⁴ In the interviews, respondents were specifically asked to talk about their or their ancestors' general living conditions during the mine's operation. Participants who were not yet born at the time of the mine's inception and/or during its operation (youth and young adults) answered these questions based on personal knowledge of what they had heard from other community and family members. Given that their views, in this respect, cohered with what other, older, participants (adults and elders) recalled, the authors of the report decided not to separate answers from youth, adults and elders. The following findings are, therefore, to be considered as 82 (including 17 FGD participants) mine-affected community members' current knowledge and feelings towards the mine's initial inception and operation.

"The first meeting prior to the operation was held at Dokotonama village with the CRA officials, and our village elders. Our elders said no to mining, however the CRA people documented false information and went ahead with mining. They would not listen to our leaders because the CRA secretly did exploration and saw the gold that literally grows out at Biuro Mountain. Even today the terrible arrogance still continues. Some of the leaders including my dad ended up at Kieta prison for protesting against mining."

Interview n°25, community leader from Dapera, SML

"There was this problem with BCL using other people to sign on behalf of the true landowners... The landowners did not know that these people were getting the money. It came about in 1989, when the next generation of formally educated people came out and were taking over the landownership in the association (PLA); they saw the in-equalities... That's when the trouble really began."

Interview n°51, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings

"The company forced its way in and still is forcing its way in again... today is the first time for people like me to share my thoughts"

Interview n°20, woman from Dapera, SML

"The worse ever consultation was done. We, the people here never knew that upstream there is something going on which will directly affect us. We were shocked to see the changing color of the river (by the release of chemicals from the mine) which killed all our water creatures. ... Since the inception of the mine women voices were suppressed... youths are not considered worth listening too... us, the old people are completely out of the scene"

Interview n°32, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

"The whole process of consultation from the beginning is full of lies, and false hope, and bribery"

FGD with 17 men from Dupanta, outside mine site

"There has been no good consultation towards the people, and I heard this from my father who was a chief at that time... Another big issue was to do with the land title holders...our leaders gave the land to their children while it should have been given to the women."

Interview n°19, community leader from Dapera, SML

B) Respondents' feelings towards the mine's operation (1972-1989):

All 65 interviewees and the FGD referred to the mine operation period (1972-1989) as a negative one, which produced a range of disastrous and irreversible impacts on their communities as a whole. Only one respondent (quoted below) mentioned personal enrichment and improved (personal) living conditions. However, the latter respondent also emphasised the loss endured by the rest of their community who were not deriving any benefit from the mine, and were losing use of their land. Key themes emerging from this period are disaggregated and described below.

Respondents' description of the Panguna mine's impact(s), 1970s-1989.¹⁰⁵


Impact on health, living conditions including dust, polluted air and rivers, mud, acid rains, drowning of people and 24hr noise.

Destruction of land, hunting grounds, crops and sacred places with direct impact on people's livelihoods and culture.

Little or no compensation compared to the destruction of the land, and discrimination around employment.

Divisions amongst communities and families, racism and enrichment of a minority to the detriment of the majority.

Harassment from foreign mine workers, restricted freedom of movement and cases of rape



General foreign interference in Bougainville affairs and BCL control of most economic sectors.

¹⁰⁵ Information from each respondent may have covered more than one category.

1. Environmental destruction & the modification of livelihoods:

A majority of respondents (71%) reported that mining had resulted in (ordered according to frequency): pollution of rivers and soils, disappearance of wild trees and vegetation, shortages of land and the relocation of people and villages, an increase in the frequency of landslides, destruction of crops buried under waste from the mine, destruction of sacred places, unproductive food crops, extinction of both marine and land animals through the release of chemicals, poisoned vegetables, and/or the reduction of the community's hunting grounds.

Interviewees also commented on the significant effect the above impacts had on the communities' ability to live on the land, physically and spiritually. Respondents living outside the SML area (middle tailing & outside mine site) expressed concerns over the destruction of their environment as much as respondents living within the SML area.

2. Pollution, impacts on health and living conditions:

In addition to the destruction of the environment, some respondents (20%) described other kinds of mine generated harms, which negatively impacted on people's health, security and quality of life. They include, dust from the mine operation, which resulted in people having difficulties breathing and children getting sick; noise from mine machinery running 24 hours a day; increased mud in the river and in the bush, which inhibited freedom of movement and access to crops; acid rain, and modification of weather patterns; noxious smells from the river; the release of gas and pollution into the air; and, blisters that developed on people's legs after crossing polluted waterways. Two respondents believed the release of chemicals from the mine's operation has resulted in deformities of newborn babies. Two other respondents also referred to the general increase in danger people faced when crossing the river¹⁰⁶ during the mine operation period, and the occurrence of deaths after individuals were taken by river rapids, which had been accelerated by the dumping of tailings.

3. Lack of response to local needs and grievances by the mining company:

14 participants noted the lack, or inadequacy, of compensation for the destruction caused by the mine and/or, in a few cases, employment discrimination against locals.¹⁰⁷ Interviewees expressed feelings of not being heard, if not laughed at, by BCL's Community Relations Office, which was in charge of following-up on people's demands and claims (including claims for access to water, good housing when relocated, free education and compensation for the destruction of crops and gardens). Four interviewees from three different villages also cited demonstrations and road blocks their community carried out before the crisis, noting in particular that BCL ignored their protests.¹⁰⁸ Finally, two interviewees stressed the fact that because their villages were

¹⁰⁶ Probably referring to the Kawerong river.

¹⁰⁷ All 14 respondents who reported insufficient compensation and lack of attention to people's grievances also referred to other negative impacts such as environmental destruction and/or increased social tensions associated with the mine's operation.

¹⁰⁸ Protests and mobilization of Bougainvilleans against the Australian Administration and the mining company, Cozinc Rio Tinto Australia (CRA) have been recorded as early as 1966. See also Chronology developed by Bougainvillean Literacy Trainers from BICWF: "Chronology", PDF tool developed in December 2001, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord%2012_19Chronology_2002_ENG.pdf.

"The river down there (pointing to the Kawerong river), the bush, land and all the animals perished from this place. We used to eat fish and crayfish from the river but the chemicals from the mine destroyed everything. No one can hunt for protein in the bush but they must find money to buy food." Interview n°75, elder from Pirurari, SML

"I think the eco-system was disturbed by the (company) helicopter: we saw the foreigners spraying chemicals around the entire area ... Later, taro gardens stopped bearing fruits, taro was our staple food. ... So many people's gardens were washed away and two big villages had to be relocated namely Dapera and Dokotonama. Looking at where you are standing, it is just gravel. This area was thick jungle, now it has been eaten by the mine... Our land was turned into something we never expected to see. Our forest and everything is all gone. We do not have forest now and all our gardening areas have been turned into unsafe places, landslides are very common here" Interview n°82, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings

"Straight after the inception of the mine, we stopped moving around with freedom. When crossing the river we almost drowned because the river was too quick, probably because it was not flowing in its natural way. The river was all muddy and smelly. All our bodies were turning brown every time we crossed the river. ... The destructive work they were doing during that time caused the death of my son. He drowned in the mud created by the work the company was doing upstream... Generally speaking, life before the crisis was worse compared to life during the crisis." Interview n°2, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

"My father actually worked in the mine before the crisis; he was the environmental coordinator for BCL ... so we enjoyed all that mining could give, all the luxuries of the mine, money was not a problem, we had a car, we had every modern thing in the house... It was hard after the mine closed because we were used to the town life... We were just enjoying the benefits and went so blind that we did not realise the injustices that mining had caused... there was no benefit sharing. Only those who had landowner titles were getting benefits... The whites came into villages in the early 60s and told the people that 'we will do business by renting your land'... BCL started destroying everything, they were making money but at the same time they were destroying the environment and that is the issue: when you rent a house do you destroy the house? You must give it back to the owner in the original way it was given to you....so the owner can lease it again or use it again. But you see the destruction made in Panguna is such that the people cannot use the land anymore" Interview n°51, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings

“It was hard, especially for us (the younger generations) who do not know our real village and land, even today we still don’t know where we come from...We don’t know our old village and our ancestral sites. Our parents were there when all of a sudden the company came in and started destroying our connection with the rivers and our sacred grounds... We are now living like aliens; no roots. We were born and brought up in this new village where the company has thrown us” Interview n°78, young adult from Dapera, SML

“During the operation days, we, the mothers, were chased by the company’s workers with their working vehicles; children on our back, we used to run. Young ladies were harassed by the company workers. There was absolutely no freedom... we were becoming prisoners in our own land” Interview n°13, woman from Darenai, middle tailings

“During those days the company had a community relations office. But days, months, and weeks were just passing by without our claims been met. The office advised us to count the damaged crops, trees and plants, and price them before going to the office. That was exactly what we used to do, unfortunately the whites were giving us the lowest price you can think of to pay for our crops and plants... Mining did devastating destruction across this entire area, and what we got is this, gravel.” Interview n°27, elder from Dapera, SM

“The whites took advantage of the villagers’ friendliness, in order to destroy the land in the name of development. Dapera was resettled like a squatter settlement... We became spectators in our own land; farming projects and businesses in Arawa and Panguna, all belonged to BCL. It monopolized everything in the region.” Interview n°30, community leader from Guava, SML

“When our food gardens were destroyed there was no payment. The entire environment on which we, the people, rely on to make our living was destroyed by the company. All the good things were gone. The company never did anything good for us... (Mining) has destroyed our lives, the landowners. I do not want the mine to be reopened, neither do my children. Whichever white man wants to reopen the mine is a killer. The company treated us like animals, we are not animals... There is no benefits, that’s the most untrue part of the (mining) agenda” Interview n°44, woman from Pirurari, SML

“This war erupted as a result of the lack of respect from the foreigners to us. Lack of respect for our land, resources and the environment, which is part of us... Our living went from glory to hell when BCL came onto our land” Interview n°5, young adult from Paruparu, outside mine site

“Before the inception of the mine, people were living harmonious lives, there was not criminal activities and fighting. During the operation era friends became enemies, families became divided and money became the center of the society” Interview n°36, woman from Guava, SML

located beyond the mining lease area, they were not represented by the old PLA, even though their community was directly impacted by noise 24 hours a day, and the pollution of rivers and soils.

4. Increased feelings of insecurity: Nine respondents, both men and women, from all four areas around the mine site cited restricted freedom of movement due to increased feelings of insecurity. These increased feelings of insecurity were attributed to abuse from foreign workers (mostly from PNG) who were said to have no respect for locals, racial discrimination, and the harassment and murder of local women.¹⁰⁹ One interviewee also reported that the police themselves were on the side of Papua New Guinea workers, while another interviewee declared that the introduction of foreign ‘rules and law’ limited indigenous communities’ general freedom of movement and action.

5. Increased social tension and inequality: Seven respondents referred to the growth of informal settlements housing foreign workers (from the Papua New Guinea mainland) during the mine’s operation, in addition to the emergence of new divisions within village communities between a minority who benefited from the mine, and the majority who did not.

Some respondents reported racial tensions, or being looked down upon by mainland Papua New Guinean, Australian and ‘white’ workers. Tensions were also described as heightening between the old landowner association executive, and those often described as the ‘newly educated generation’ led by Francis Ona. Other respondents suggested the mine’s operation had undermined community-oriented local culture, resulting in increased inequality, and tensions within families and clans.

6. Extreme dependency upon the mining company: Three respondents alluded to the fact that during the mine operation period they felt their community was becoming more and more dependent upon foreign investment, which was coupled to greater foreign control of most economic sectors. Additionally, seven respondents, as well as the FGD, described the blockade period (1990-96) – denoting the period when parts of Bougainville were denied access to all goods and services – as one characterized by a new sense of freedom, as communities enjoyed independence from the mine and/or foreign interference in general (see the next research question for more details on this point).


¹⁰⁹ Local women were described as being the object of sexual harassment by foreign mine workers. In particular, references were made to the case of a local nurse raped and murdered by foreign workers; this event has been identified by analysts as one trigger of heightened tensions during early 1989. See table “Structural Factors at Root of Conflict, Consensus Amongst Analysts” in John Braithwaite et al. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing peace in Bougainville (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010).

2. What was the experience of mine-affected communities during the conflict (1988 - 1997)?

This section relates interviewees' personal experiences during the conflict, as well as discussions around whom the respondents hold responsible for the hostilities, and the war crimes perpetrated during the violence. Most crimes described here were directly endured or witnessed by interviewees, but attention is also paid to what respondents believed happened during the conflict and what their feelings are surrounding this.

The following typology has been distilled employing testimony from 64 out of the 65 interviewees¹¹⁰; questions of responsibility are left to the next section. Categories of crimes were defined using Amnesty International's classification of war crimes and human rights violations, as described in its 1993 report.¹¹¹

1. Loss of property: Interviews contain strong evidence of deliberate destruction and pillaging of people's property during the crisis, with a majority of interviewees (83%) declaring that their houses were burnt down,



animals killed, gardens and/or shops destroyed. One interviewee also mentioned the pillaging and shipment of local property to the Papua New Guinea mainland by the RPNGC mobile squad unit. Most interviewees had to leave their home whether it was to go to a 'care centre' (35%) and/or hide in the jungle, sleep in caves, under trees, improvised huts, or, in a few cases, find refuge in other people's houses. Only one interviewee managed to leave Bougainville.

2. Extrajudicial killings: A large number of respondents (46%) as well as the FGD, reported unlawful killings perpetrated by the RPNGC mobile squads, PNGDF and/or the BRA. The mutilation and public display of bodies that often accompanied the killing of combatants, suspects and/or civilians, including children, was found to exacerbate the trauma of conflict survivors. Two interviewees directly alluded to the 'shoot to kill' order issued by the Papua New Guinea security forces, which resulted in increased violence and terror, with respondents describing young Bougainvillean men being tortured and thrown from helicopters or dragged behind 'high speed cars'.

¹¹⁰ Some participants were too emotional to go into details about their experiences. For example, one respondent could not talk when asked about violence she may have endured or witnessed during the conflict, while another deliberately asked to skip the question because he was not comfortable with sharing his personal experience. Only one respondent declared that he and his family were spared the violence as his home was located in a remote place, within the BRA controlled area, which the PNGDF could not reach.

¹¹¹ See Amnesty International's two reports on war crimes in Bougainville: Papua New Guinea: Bougainville: the forgotten human rights tragedy (February 1997); and, Under the Barrel of Gun - Bougainville 1991 to 1993 (November 1993).

3. Civilian infrastructure targeted: Five respondents reported mortar fire, and aerial bombardment (including grenades dropped from Australian supplied helicopters), targeted at villages. One respondent lost her daughter and another her mother after grenades were thrown at their houses, and together with other respondents they stressed the enduring trauma this experience has created.

4. Unlawful detention: Three interviewees reported unlawful detention, as well as ill-treatment and torture experienced during detention. One interviewee described the poor conditions endured by detainees, with days spent without food and no access to sanitation, medical care or trial.

5. Ill-treatment and torture (including rape): 14 interviewees reported torture and ill-treatment. These included cases of rape, and other forms of torture and ill-treatment, which occurred in security force custody, 'care centres' and in villages under BRA control. Respondents cited four cases of mutilation perpetrated by the PNGDF.

6. Ill-treatment & extrajudicial killings in care centres: Respondents held in 'care centres' under PNGDF control (27 out of 65, and 3 unknown) reported inhibited freedom of movement; compared care centres to a 'prison camp'; described being in a state of constant fear; and/or witnessing ill-treatment, rape and unlawful killings. Differential treatment of people based on their village of origin was also reported by several respondents.¹¹² Only one respondent believed that the 'care centre' apparatus helped to save lives (although she did not stay at the care centre and was away from Bougainville during the blockade), while a majority of interviewees stated that life was better in the jungle. A number of participants also noted that the care centre apparatus was just another way to 'control' and 'suppress' Bougainvilleans.

7. Shortages of food, medicines, and other basic goods and services as a result of the conflict and blockade: Life under the blockade is reported in different ways. A large group of respondents (69%) highlighted increased hardships, including a lack of basic goods and services such as food, medicines, clothes, and/or health and education services which was said to have resulted in hunger, starvation, medical complications, death and/or an underqualified generation of workers. On the other hand, a smaller group of respondents (25%), as well as the FGD, noted one unexpected byproduct of the blockade was that Bougainvilleans learnt to become independent again. Interviewees noted it was a time of innovation, where traditional ways of life were restored without the interference of outside interests.¹¹³

8. Different experiences based on gender: Different experiences of the conflict based on gender were highlighted throughout the interviews. Women respondents stated that a particular difficulty was

"All our houses were burnt down, our gardens were destroyed and our animals were shot by guns. We ran away and were sleeping in the caves. Many times when we were in the jungle the children were sick, there was no food we could eat and there was no good place for sleeping and resting. At that time too I was pregnant with my second child which made life very hard for me...Mortars were thrown by the defence force one after the other, and that made it difficult to find food or anything edible. Life was very dangerous and we had to sleep on the mud if it rains...In Wakunai a very young boy, while alive, had one side of his penis castrated, and a testicle removed, by the defence force (PNGDF). Later they tied his body with a wild banana. Here in this village also were my cousin and her mother, they were raped and after killing them, they (PNGDF) pushed dead leaves into their vaginas. They brought them into Arawa afterwards" **Interview n°34, woman from Guava, SML**

"Around that time I was still working for the company...At three o'clock in the afternoon I was driving back from camp 6 to my village Moroni when we got attacked by the (RPNGC) Riot Squad...the Riot Squad ordered us to stop the car, and bashed us...They got a cup ...poured the soil in, got two Riot Squad people to urinate into the cup and gave it to us to drink; ...They never stopped bashing us. From there we were brought to the prison and we got charged a K2000 fine for breaking the (curfew) rule. The incident happened at around 3 pm but from what we were told the curfew time is after 6pm. ...Our cars were burnt down and other properties were stolen and were shipped out of the province by the Riot Squad. The ones we hid in the bush rotted away... The riot squad stole the most valuable stuffs and sent them out, whilst our BRA stole our poultry and ate them. We totally understand that they had nothing to eat while protecting us... We did not go voluntarily (in the 'care centre') we went in answer to their (PNGDF) command. They (PNGDF) told us you will stay for two weeks only at the care centre and you will come back after Francis Ona gets located. We left everything and went and stayed maybe two years at the care center." **Interview n°26, elder from Dapera, SML**

"My daughter died as a result of a hand-grenade bomb thrown down to us from the helicopter ...On that day we lost most of our properties, poultry and piggery too and our home, all at once... In search of safety we went into the care centre. Later we realized that the care centre was not a safe place for me. Armed men from PNG were after me because I was from Guava village. With the hope of giving some youths a rest I took them into the care centre and they ended up being bashed by the defense force" **Interview n°33, community leader from Guava, SML**

¹¹² Respondents from Guava village, which is Francis Ona's village, underlined being harassed and targeted by the PNGDF at the 'care centre'.

¹¹³ Seven interviewees, plus the FGD, were proud to say that no one died of sickness or hunger under the blockade which is in contradiction with the first group of respondents. However another nine respondents recognized both good and bad aspects of the blockade, acknowledging the hardships but also pointing out a series of innovations that were developed to cope with the lack of goods and services, including hydro-electricity systems and the use of plants for medicines. Four interviewees did not answer the question.

protecting and providing for their children whilst surviving in the jungle, often with the men away fighting. Other specific experiences for women included forced marriage for security reasons, complications giving birth with limited medical care, and being the first target for rape by both sides in the conflict.

Experiences of the conflict and human rights violations described above were said by all respondents and the FGD to have resulted in significant trauma within mine-affected communities.

These traumatic impacts were recognized as being still very seriously present in people's lives at the time the interviews and FGD were conducted, over one decade after the end of conflict. The lack (30%) or absence (60%) of support and medical care for dealing with trauma was stressed by 90% of interviewees, although four respondents referred to the existence of local volunteer associations for counseling and/or diverse actions from local church groups.



"I can remember staying in the bush in fear of guns, hungry and homeless... My cousin was shot dead at Paruparu where we were all living together. After they shot him, they slaughtered his head into four quarters" Interview n°9, young adult from Paruparu, outside mine site

"During my stay at the prison I was not treated as a human being rather as a dog. They did not bring me to the hospital, I was thrown into the prison. I stayed there for a month and a week without food. ...When I was there I was really sick but they refused to bring me to the hospital, rather they mixed the soil with water and gave it to me saying here is the land you are defending; swallow it while we watch.... Later they transferred me to Arawa prison. Life was just the same as in the Panguna prison...no food in the afternoons and we just had to sleep next to our excreta...We lived like animals in there. After a while in Arawa the defense force sent me to Kuberia prison camp. As soon as I arrived the PNGDF bashed the hell out of me...I stayed there for 3 months. I was told that I would be afforded a court hearing, I waited and waited but nothing happened." Interview n°49, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings

"As time passed the BRA went out of control and they started raping women at gunpoint. In the care center too the same thing was happening...Another one of the biggest risks in the care center, was that when the BRA killed one of the defense force, the defense force will take it out on the refugees. What they do is they wait for the mothers to sleep and the defense force creeps in easily into the houses and takes the man to the beach and kills them there. It was more dangerous in the care centres than in the jungle" Interview n°82, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings


"I witnessed many people being killed in front of me and my family. Some died as a result of shortages in medical supply... Life (under the blockade) went bad to worse services wise, but we felt more free and became innovative" Interview n°15, community leader from Darenai, middle tailings

"We did not stay in the care centre, we know it's not a good place to be. Life in care centre is hell... we suffered starvation during the conflict" Interview n°8, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site

"Many things went missing, the things we really needed for survival were destroyed by the defense force...We tried to hide some things like certificates and land title papers; they rotted away. Many of our children had no access to schools...We had no access to our gardens and many women and children died. They died from curable diseases because the PNGDF blocked our way because they wanted us to die... I saw one person with my own eyes


What are the mine-affected communities' views of the origins of the conflict, and whom do they hold responsible for the violence?

1. Respondents' understanding of the origin of the conflict:



Respondents primarily identified mining and its impacts, such as environmental destruction, as the main factor fuelling the conflict (89%). Interviewees also cited concerns over the sharing of benefits, cases of false land title claims, the personal enrichment of a few Bougainville elites to the detriment of the majority¹¹⁴, a 'clash of cultures' which prevented meaningful negotiations from taking place, and the murder of a local nurse by a mainland Papua New Guineans, which heightened local racial tensions.¹¹⁵

2. Actors identified by respondents as parties to the conflict and fighting:



¹¹⁴ Bougainville elites and the landowners associations were also identified by 10 interviewees as contributing to the conflict by selling community land to BCL, abusing their privileges during the operation, and/or being divided and therefore not defending the people's interests vis-à-vis BCL.

¹¹⁵ See also question one for more detail on interviewees' perceptions of the mine's operation and its impact on communities during the 1970s and 80s.

... The Defense force told him this is what you get for crying over your land. They castrated him, tortured him. They smashed his lower jaw and removed the upper jaw... I was not in a care centre, I was moving around in the bush with my children and relatives...we desperately needed medical assistance, but we could not call for help because of the blockade imposed. We really needed medical support because so many mothers and children were dying" **Interview n°21, community leader from Dapera, SML**

"(During the blockade), outsiders thought we suffered and we could not grow healthy and smart but nobody died... We lived in the village care centre (area under BRA control), the type where you could enjoy your humanity...the town care centre owned by the intruders (PNGDF) was like a prison camp." **Interview n°13, woman from Darenai, middle tailings**

"Many of the students' education stopped ... and today they are living at home without anything good to do. Many more suffer negative impacts in terms of bad attitude and behavior, therefore their frustrations for not completing their education is displaced on other people... My dad was murdered during the crisis and we became orphans in the village. It was common that every night we had to see mortar volleys landing nearby us. Since we were very young that experience had bad impacts, it generated especially intense fear... Even today if we hear a gun fire in the distance or a plane flying in the air we will always panic and everything from the past will be revived...it got worse when we went into the care centre, all of a sudden the PNGDF would tell us to run and... if we were slow they either swore at us or fired guns near our ears. It really traumatized us because I was very small back then." **Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailing**

"The crisis came about because we, the landowners, had grievances over the egoistic attitude of the company. And remember that god created us different from the white people, but the whites were expecting us to conform to their standard. They were in a way forcing us to abandon our way of life, and match theirs. We can never ever change our way of life. Life back then, it was like we were being dragged around with strings attached to us. For us, it is very hard to make the transition (to their way of life), these were two opposing culture. Mining was not part of our life style. The whites thought that they are better off than us. ...We are a community oriented society, we do not aspire to generate individual wealth. So the biggest issue that caused this conflict was misunderstanding and disrespect for our culture. They kept on pushing us to accept something foreign. I am sorry that this crisis occurred as a result of white-men's selfishness." **Interview n°22, elder from Dapera, SML**

The two main actors identified by all respondents asked (63 out of 65) as directly involved in the fighting were: the Papua New Guinea government, represented by the police (Mobile/Riot Squad) and/or its defense force (PNGDF), and the BRA, also referred to as “us” or “Bougainvilleans” by 32 interviewees and the FGD (including 13 women). 17 interviewees also referred to the Resistance Force (local anti-BRA paramilitaries), with a number of allusions to the manipulation of the Resistance Force by Australia and Papua New Guinea. Nine interviewees, as well as the FGD, also mentioned ‘Australia’ (6 interviewees plus FGD) and/or ‘BCL’ or ‘CRA’ (6 interviewees plus FGD) or ‘white people’ (1 interviewee) as direct actors in the conflict.

While some interviewees censured the BRA for its crimes, most respondents considered the BRA’s struggle as a ‘just’ fight for land rights and/or survival. Additionally, most stated that they could not understand why outsiders, mostly Papua New



“It was the mining that started the war on Bougainville... There was no respect for us, we were considered animals, bastards meant to be killed” Interview n°7, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site

“This crisis came about as a result of the destruction that was happening to our land. This village in particular, we made the first move, when we realized that we were being dumped as rubbish. We called a community meeting and we talked with our two chiefs. This village was going through a lot of issues, especially when the trucks were running, one after another, pouring dust over us - we developed coughs and diarrhea. So the whole village installed a roadblock up at the junction, we marched thinking that we would be heard unfortunately our campaign fell on deaf ears. Later we fought.” Interview n°28, woman from Dapera, SML

“If they (PNG government) had respected us they would have approached our leaders and would have had a dialogue... Then, through the chiefs, there would have been an order or way to follow (away from armed conflict)... They (PNGDF) did not respect human rights because when we were in the jungle they would just throw mortars in all the places that people lived in.” Interview n°19, community leader from Dapera, SML

“The PNG government gave the shoot to kill order ... (however) our fight was not against PNG but against the company...I see that PNG tried its best to address the situation but BCL made it fail and turn the unrest into war. So PNG and Australia and other companies attached to BCL are responsible for this crisis...CRA owned the mine management but there are other multi-million dollar companies who are also shareholders in the company. It’s true we can blame CRA as the funder of the crisis and the person behind PNG, but it is not only CRA who owned the mine operation, other multimillion companies were there too.” Interview n°24, man from Dapera, SML

“I have a feeling the Australian government was responsible for spreading propaganda to make us turn against each other” Interview n°31, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

“BRA stood and fought to defend our land, land and environment, and also human life... This war on Bougainville is the responsibility of BCL... If BCL had not come, this crisis would not have happened... This company had no respect towards the status and rights of the people of Bougainville, especially towards us, the landowners.” Interview n°21, community leader from Dapera, SML

“BCL left without even paying the workers. Up to this date there is no retrenchment pay for the employees... When I was in the BRA I saw that during the crisis PNG was supported by Australia. PNG does not have the capacity to finance helicopters, these helicopters were purposely designed for war. We saw that and we are confident Australia was behind PNG... Because there was no way we could defend our children, the only option left was to join the BRA.” Interview n°29, elder from Dapera, SML

“The Australian government came to kill us. It has never respected us” Interview n°12, community leader from Darenai, middle tailings

“BRA took possession of guns after killing the (PNG) soldiers and the look of the guns told you straight off that there was foreign involvement in the war. Remember that PNG before the war used to say that it does not have money, so how could the PNG government afford to buy these deadly and expensive guns?” Interview n°83, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

“The Australian government is solely responsible for this conflict, it was Australia that granted the operation license to CRA. PNG was not independent at that time. I also know the 7 or 9 helicopters used all came from these people... It is true that both sides, PNG and Bougainville, were wrong but looking deeper it is CRA to be blamed because it ignorantly opened the mine without our consent... The peace you are talking about was forced upon us because they still want the gold deposit on the island”
Interview n°40, man from Guava, SML

	PNG government	Australian government	BCL	Others supporters of the conflict cited by respondents:
Supporter of the conflict	62 out of 64 interviewees plus FGD	62 out of 64 interviewees plus FGD	62 out of 64 interviewees plus FGD	CRA shareholders, NZ government and/or US government (3 interviewees)
Main or sole supporter of the conflict	2 interviewees	13 interviewees	2 interviewees	

Guineans, would come to Bougainville to fight and cause destruction, except out of a desire for the natural resources of Bougainville or because, respondents thought, they were manipulated by external supporters of the conflict as described below.

3. Respondents’ perception of foreign support for the conflict:

When asked about the potential involvement of foreign actors in the conflict, 92% of respondents, as well as the FGD, identified the Papua New Guinea government, Australian government and BCL as supporters of the war. In three cases, CRA shareholders or the New Zealand/US governments were added to the list of those complicit in the conflict.

Behind Papua New Guinea, interviewees identified the Australian government as being the most ‘obvious’ external supporter of the conflict. Thirteen respondents declared that ‘Australia’ was the main or sole outside influence, and therefore, significantly responsible for the crisis. They also argued that the Australian government had manipulated the Papua New Guinea government and the PNGDF, in addition to priming the violence through the provision of ‘funds’, ‘food’, ‘arms’, ‘bullets’, and ‘helicopters’, all of which were needed to run the war.¹¹⁶

The lack of dialogue with local leaders during the conflict’s gestation, with a view to avoiding hostilities, was also cited by two interviewees as something very hard for them to make sense of, unless the Papua New Guinea government was being pressured by foreign interests.

“This crisis came about as a result of the destruction that was happening to our land. This village in particular, we made the first move, when we realized that we were being dumped as rubbish. We called a community meeting and we talked with our two chiefs. This village was going through a lot of issues, especially when the trucks were running, one after another, pouring dust over us – we developed coughs and diarrhea. So the whole village installed a roadblock up at the junction, we marched thinking that we would be heard unfortunately our campaign fell on deaf ears. Later we fought.” **Interview n°28, woman from Dapera, SML**

¹¹⁶ See introduction, section 3.

1. How do interviewees from the mine-affected communities feel about plans to reopen the Panguna mine in the near future?¹¹⁷

All 65 interviewees, as well as the FGD, are against reopening of the Panguna mine in the immediate future by BCL. Fourteen interviewees from all the four areas covered by this study, including all villages within the SML area, referred to a ‘we’ or to ‘the majority of people or landowners’, suggesting that their opposition to the mine’s reopening in the near future is shared by a larger number of their community members.

The reasons given for this opposition are identified below:

1. Negative environmental and social impacts associated with the mine: The combination of perceived environmental damage, numerous abuses endured, and a decline in living conditions under the previous mine was often cited as fundamental reasons for interviewees’ opposition to the mine’s reopening, with BCL as its operator (see theme 1, above, for a description of the impacts identified by respondents). Fifty respondents feared a ‘repetition of history’ with respect to these negative impacts, and felt that the mining company had previously not prioritised the wellbeing of the local people. In 14 cases respondents also expressed concerns for future generations on Bougainville, feeling that this time the effects of the mine would be worse, especially if the extension of the mine and the relocation of more villages, as was planned during the past operation, were to take place.¹¹⁸

2. The association of the conflict’s origins with mining and foreign interests is also evident in people’s resistance to BCL’s proposed return. The suspected involvement of foreign governments, as well as BCL, in the conflict means many respondents expressed strong mistrust towards any foreign investment. (See also theme 1 which covers respondents’ understanding of the conflict, and its main supporters, in addition to the next research question which covers respondents’ views on the involvements of AusAID in the consultation processes).

3. The lack of meaningful reconciliation and justice, and the ongoing effects of trauma were recognised by a majority of respondents¹¹⁹ as important issues in their respective communities. The fact that respondents hold the mine and BCL responsible for the conflict, as well as their losses and current hardships, means that a large number of interviewees referred to the need for BCL to pay compensation, face justice and/or be involved

¹¹⁷ See introduction for a summary of ABG’s and other actors’ current position on the reopening.

¹¹⁸ See planned extension of the mine described in Applied Geology Associates’ report: Environmental, Socio-Economic and Public Health Review of Bougainville Copper Mine Panguna (Auckland: 1989).

¹¹⁹ Thirty-eight respondents said there was no compensation or remedy for losses, trauma, and disabilities resulting from the conflict. More details and figures on these findings, and the perceived ongoing impacts of trauma are available under theme three of the present report.

“I don’t want the mine to reopen... It was because of mining we went through a lot of suffering. Now we are living a good life so why should we invite the killer again” Interview n°8, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site

“BCL destroyed our lives, took our land, took our money and never properly compensated our parents who were the rightful titleholders of the land which they took, and now they want to reopen the mine; we still face problems from their previous actions, all our properties were lost, and we have not even recovered yet from all these impacts. Now they want to come and reopen Panguna mine, this is a no, I personally say no to the reopening of the Panguna mine” Interview n°19, community leader from Dapera, SML

“There is no benefit from mining, to be true. We have been fooled more than enough already.” Interview n°50, woman from Enamira, upper tailings

“BCL are thieves. How can a thief who has been stealing for the last 17 years change its selfish attitude and become generous overnight? “ Interview n°17, woman from Darenai, middle tailings

“We (Guava people) do not support mining... if the mine reopens we fall into disunity like I talked about... they (mining) will control and destroy the environment and the people at their will; no one will have the power to control the company” Interview n°36, woman from Guava, SML

“BCL has a lot to do in terms of reparation for what it did to us. When did BCL admit its wrongs? And now it is trying to come back; mining is not a negotiable issue” Interview n°35, woman from Guava, SML

“I do not want to talk about the reopening! ... I seriously don’t want to discuss it, I hate it!” Interview n°16, woman from Darenai, middle tailings

“(Reopening), that is impossible. ...If the mine is to reopen we will return to the terrible life-style we were forced into before; sorry, it will never happen again.” Interview n°23, woman from Dapera, SML

“If the mine reopens,...it will destroy the remaining natural surroundings, and the damage will be felt by our children. And where will our children make their gardens and where will they go? “ Interview n°79, community leader from Pirurari, SML

“I don’t want Rio Tinto to come back and reopen the mine because right now we are living on

the rubbish it created. Our land was destroyed and if it comes back where will we go? ... Its (BCL's) return will assume a different path this time. On Bougainville it (BCL) lost assets worth millions of kina. If it comes back a second time there would be no room for mercy...because we Bougainvilleans destroyed the assets belonging to the company.... I fear the company coming back" **Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings**

"Reopening will lead us to a situation where the impending bloodshed will this time around be the responsibility of politicians (ABG)... It (the mine) must not come." **Interview n°48, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site**

"Reopening is impossible because the scar of what happened is still on our hearts... In some ways, if it follows the right process it (mining) can help. Currently the way I see it is, the ABG is using a lot of force to make people say yes (to mining), on that note I can say that it will be really hard (to enjoy any benefits from the mine)" **Interview n°54, youth from Guava, SML**


"Mining should never be reopened it has been nullified by our blood" **Interview n°5, young adult from Paruparu, outside mine site**

"(Reopening the mine) it will continue to destroy us, and then it will continue to destroy more of our fertile land ...I am not a landowner, so I do not have any right to talk about my children's land. As a father I am there to look after them, not to make decisions. It is my children's land". **Interview n°76, man from Guava, SML**

"The thought of repeating history again traumatises me. Because it will happen again." **Interview n°77, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings**

in the reconciliation process before discussing the mine's reopening. (Theme three addresses issues of justice, reconciliation and compensation from the details contained in the interviews).

Main reasons identified for opposition to reopening:



2. Under what conditions would the mine's reopening be acceptable to those interviewed from the mine-affected communities?

Most of the respondents who opposed reopening in the near future (49 of 65) were also opposed to large-scaling mining, at any time or under any circumstances. This overwhelming sentiment against any mining is indicative of the depth of feeling that surrounds the mine and the conflict in the communities visited.

A minority (13 of 65) did state that they might change their mind and support the reopening if certain conditions were met. These included:

1. After Bougainville independence: It was emphasised by 17 interviewees that a decision over the mine's reopening should not be taken before Bougainville realises independence. Until then, respondents felt that their voices could not be heard, their political leaders would be too subject to foreign influence, they themselves would not be properly included in the consultation process, and/or simply that mining should not be the current priority (see also the next research question dealing with the consultation processes). Significantly, all respondents asked (63), but one, stated that the mine's reopening should not be viewed as a pre-requisite for independence. This stands in contrast to the ABG's stated position that the mine's reopening is an essential presupposition for autonomy or independence.¹²⁰ (see also theme four of the report)

2. Under local ownership and/or control: Eight interviewees declared they could support the reopening of Panguna if it was operated by a Bougainvillean company. In contrast, 49 respondents and the FGD were opposed to mining even if this condition was satisfied¹²¹, including 8 who doubted that this would ever be possible, either because of the lack of human resources, or because they felt BCL/Rio Tinto would still be involved in some way, even if remotely. Twenty-four respondents expressed a general lack of trust in mining regardless of ownership, or the actors that would be involved (17 did not specify why they were opposed).

The need to develop locally made rules and governance systems, inclusive of all landowners, regardless of the nationality of the operating company, was also raised by five respondents. Reflecting respondents' feelings that they have not been involved in developing such rules and governance systems to date, 53 out of 60 participants asked had not heard about the drafting of a new mining act (including the seven interviewees who said they had been consulted by the PLA).¹²²


¹²⁰ See transcript of ABG's president, John Momis, presentation given at the Australia Papua New Guinea Business Forum in Cairns on May 20, 2014: "John Momis: Deciding the Future of the Panguna Mine", posted on blog Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, last modified 21 May 2014, <http://ramumine.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/john-momis-deciding-the-future-of-the-panguna-mine/>.

¹²¹ Interviewees were specifically asked about whether they would support the reopening if it was for a Bougainvillean or another foreign company than BCL to operate the mine.

¹²² See Pacific Beat's article and ABC News audio at: "PNG's Bougainville to Pass World First Mining Law" Australia Network News, last modified March 8, 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-07/bougainville-mining-law-a-world-first/4559170>. And a critic from PNG Mine Watch: "Landowner Revolution or

The diagram below summarises the conditions given by interviewees who specifically stated that they might, under certain circumstances, support the reopening of the Panguna mine:

Question: Would you support the reopening today if it was by another foreign company (other than BCL) or a Bougainvillean company?



3. After compensation, reparation and reconciliation:

A large number of respondents noted before any negotiation over the Panguna mine could begin BCL needs to pay compensation and/or engage in a process of reconciliation, that acknowledges and atones for past wrongs including both the mine operation itself, in addition to the company's complicity in the hostilities. One common aspect of these requests is that, because they refer to the restoration of trust and the mending of relationships, meaningful reconciliation would need to be long term, and multi-layered, in order to be successful. (The details and diversity of meanings interviewees associated with reconciliation, justice, and compensation are explored under theme three of the report).

4. After other options for economic development have been explored:

There is strong evidence that most people interviewed wish to pursue an alternative development model which excludes industrial-scale mining. To that end respondents feel their government is not doing enough to stimulate agrarian markets, and is failing to support forms of economic growth that will be stable in the long term (See diagram in theme 4 for the relevant details).

Government Power Grab?", Islands Business, last modified June 2013, <http://www.islandsbusiness.com/2013/6/mining/landowner-revolution-or-government-power-grab/>.

"If it is for Bougainvilleans to operate the mine, I think I can change my mind, but not now because it is not us, the resource owners, doing it" **Interview n°12, community leader from Darenai, middle tailings**

"There will be no mining on Bougainville. The mine will be closed until after independence... until the moment we feel that we have total ownership of the mine." **Interview n°30 leader from Guava, SML**

"(A Bougainville owned company) would be great after independence" **Interview 54, youth from Guava, SML**

"I can never change my mind because it would be BCL coming with another name... (Even a Bougainvillean company) would be linked to other companies, so I'll never change my mind." **Interview n°1, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site**

"I would give a bit of support if mining is done by the Panguna people, that is by our own people who have concern for us, the grassroots...If the (locally run) mining company were to do things in a way we want them to, I will be happy because I know that my children are making sure that no harm will come to us". **Interview n° 15, leader from Darenai, middle tailings**

"Even a Bougainvillean company would be connected to BCL" **Interview n° 32, elder from Darenai, middle tailings**

"If we create our own policy to safeguard mining I would say yes there can be some form of benefit but right now we have no control whatsoever over the issue. If there is no home grown policy, forget mining...I can change my mind if Bougainville comes up with a homegrown policy framework and conditions to guide mining for the people of Bougainville. ...In Bougainville I have seen a lot of crooks and it is very hard to trust people." **Interview n°33, community leader from Guava, SML**

"If a company comes with another name, still CRA will have a share in that company... Future generations, when they have the human capacity, then they will be able to open the mine. But at the moment it must not open, even if it is a Bougainvillean company." **Interview n°41, Leader from Paruparu, outside mine site**

"I will never be satisfied unless they (mining company) operate under the landowners strict rules and control" **Interview n°77, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings**

"I would be happy for this (a Bougainville owned company)...the company should dig based on our demands and control" **Interview n°39, woman from Darenai, middle tailings**

"If they (foreign mining company) operate under tough homegrown laws and really mine with total consent from all the landowners I would agree but not 100 percent... This (Bougainville owned company), I'm not sure, unless I see good reliable human resources." **Interview n°34, woman from Guava, SML**

"Mining is not our agenda; it is not in our mind either. I firmly say this, the company must address all the issues it created before it talks about reopening the mining. It must not cover up the issues that are obviously affecting us, and it must stop spreading lies in the media. They (BCL) must address the problems we have. But it doesn't mean we want the mine reopened, but since it (BCL) is pushing its way in anyway, it has to meet our demands." **Interview n°22, elder from Dapera, SML**

"There is no way I will change my mind when I know that mining killed a lot of people" **Interview n°83, elder from Darenai, middle tailings**

"They (BCL) are saying that the mine is going to be open but we on the ground know that the mine is not going to open. The company must compensate us good and proper first before they talk about mining.


...We are left with a tiny piece of land, where will we go if the mine comes back?" **Interview n°29, elder from Dapera, SML**

"(Mining) can be discussed after independence.. (This) does not mean it will be a yes. If all the policy and laws are designed in a way that all Bougainvilleans want, then we can think about it...But I think mining is the last resort, after all the other options have been exhausted" **Interview n°81, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings**

3. How do interviewees feel about the mine consultation process administered by the ABG, and the landowners associations (2009-2014)?¹²³

A) Respondents and the consultation processes

All respondents, and the FGD, expressed dissatisfaction with the mine consultation process led by UPMALA¹²⁴ and the ABG since 2009.¹²⁵ The main reasons given for this dissatisfaction are as follows (information identified from 54 interviews out of 65):



1. The consultation was not sufficiently inclusive:¹²⁶ This was specifically referred to by 24 interviewees. Also, all respondents asked (56), confirmed that there had been a lack of consultation with the mine-affected communities, including direct references to a lack of consultation with the landowners themselves. Youth, women and elders were especially said to be excluded from the consultation process and/or their opinions were not taken into account. Forty respondents, as well as the FGD, also stated that the ongoing consultation processes were no better than the consultations which took place during the mine's initial establishment in the late 1960s (see also theme one of the report).

2. Failure of representatives within the UPMALA and/or council of elders to defend community interests: Ten respondents noted their disappointment with elected representatives and leaders – it was felt that the latter parties were failing to defend, during the consultation process, the interests of their communities. Additional concerns were raised by three interviewees with respect to the nine landowners associations, and the way they were allegedly being led by UPMALA into supporting the mine's reopening. Two interviewees, as well as the FGD, also accused the ABG and other representatives of being bribed to push for the reopening.

3. Manipulation of public opinion: Seven respondents, as well as the FGD, reported the manipulation of public opinion through the dissemination of misleading statements by the media, and/or political leaders. These latter statements related both to the willingness of the Panguna people to see the mine reopen, and the implications of this prospective reopening for the community.

4. Lack of awareness: Nine respondents declared not knowing what is actually happening with the consultation process, and/or being confused by the statements of their leaders and politicians. Respondents' also lacked knowledge of the proposed mining law (which was subsequently passed by parliament on 8 August 2014).¹²⁷ 53

¹²³ This refers to the consultation processes described by the ABG's president, John Momis, during his presentation given at the Australia Papua New Guinea Business Forum in Cairns on 20 May 2014: "John Momis: Deciding the Future of the Panguna Mine", posted on blog Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, last modified 21 May 2014, <http://ramumine.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/john-momis-deciding-the-future-of-the-panguna-mine/>.

¹²⁴ Interviewees frequently referred to the PLA, which is the historic title of the overarching landowners association representing the mine affected communities.

¹²⁵ This included seven participants who were directly involved in the consultation process through their respective landowner associations, 13 interviewees who stated that they had been represented by elected individuals in the consultation process, and 36 respondents who denied either being represented and/or consulted at all. The FGD, in addition to nine interviewees discussed the consultation process generally but did not provide information on whether they had been directly involved and/or represented.

¹²⁶ Specific questions were asked about the involvement of women, youth and elders in the consultations; in addition, more open questions were also asked about the respondents' general satisfaction with the consultation processes.

¹²⁷ See Pacific Beat's article and ABC News audio at: Australia Network News. "PNG's Bougainville to Pass World First Mining Law", last modified March 8 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-07/bougainville-mining-law-a-world-first/4559170>. And a critic from PNG Mine Watch: Islands Business. "Landowner Revolution or Government Power Grab?", last modified June 2013, <http://www.islandsbusiness.com/2013/6/mining/landowner-revolution-or-government-power-grab/>.

interviewees out of 60 had not heard of the law; including all seven interviewees who declared being consulted under the umbrella of the PLA.

5. Flawed consultation process: Two respondents stated that the consultation forums were held in distant towns, which meant that many people were unable to attend. They added that these forums were conducted in a way that did not provide space for people to share their views, and in that sense they felt that it was actually an information session not a consultation. Three other respondents felt that the consultations in general were 'one-sided' or 'biased'.

6. Dissatisfaction with the consultation process itself: Eight interviewees, as well as the FGD, declared not being interested in talking about mining and/or avoiding meetings and discussions about it. Enduring trauma and moral opposition to mining played an important role in the refusal of some interviewees and FGD participants to engage with the consultation process.

"No consultation done from the past, (and it) is still rubbish today. Repetition of history... Personally when people talk about mining, I am not interested because it's bad, the evidence is right here, the first thing you see when you wake up and the last thing you see before bed, you sleep over it, and it's the waste." Interview n°27, elder from Dapera, SML

"BCL has come in through the ABG system... Here (on Bougainville) leadership belongs to the mothers, the deal they (BCL) are now doing with the men is shameful to our way of life...I am always surprised by the secret arrangements (going on), and then they come here to announce things we know nothing about...The PLA are fortunate that we don't know what is happening....us at the village level are used as tools for getting money" Interview n°82, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings

"When I look at the consultation, when I hear about it, it looks like we are dancing to BCL's music already. None of the landowners here approve of what is happening, it is only a few of them who claim to be the landowners, who are the ones chasing after BCL. There is indeed no good consultation...The leaders are using the community's name because they wish to serve their own interests by reopening the mine. So all the stories that come out through the media and newspapers and the rest saying we want mining is not true. These are lies spread by certain leaders to make others rise up and say ok let us reopen the mine because the Panguna people are up for it... It looks like we have wasted our time voting because we vote in people who do not represent us at the leadership level." Interview n°83, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

"Consultation, and everything concerning mining that is happening now, happened

before... With the establishment of the association (Middle Tailings Association) we feel as if we are now being represented, but still we feel that we do not have enough freedom to talk. We do not really understand what is actually going on... What leaders are doing will affect the livelihood of the people, and future generations. ...Leaders are the only ones making the decision and their doors are closed to the people on the ground" Interview n°39, woman from Darenai, middle tailings

"I am not happy about the way things are going because we are not sure if they (representatives in the PLA) tell us the truth or not" Interview n°25, community leader from Dapera, SML

"This consultation has not been conducted in a fair way. Many people do not have a voice. This small handful of people who are coming out in public (in support of the mine) are lying about the reopening, saying 80 to 90% of people in Bougainville are supporting the reopening... They do not come down to us, rather they stay in the public facilities located in places with road links. I don't think that going to such places will make the ordinary people feel free to talk...The consultation itself too is not the type you would expect. What has happened before is happening again... At the end of the day, men are always the dominant figures because there is a distribution of power, with the government system standing over the traditional system... It is now common all across Melanesian society, matrilineal society's name is used as a veil for the decisions made by men.... I am not sure about the content of the law (new mining legislation)...we told the leaders that the first draft should come to the people to have their say on it. As we are talking the first draft has not yet reached the communities." Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings

"I actually attended a so called forum in Arawa, that was about two months ago and I was not impressed...The forum was a mining advocacy forum, it was not a forum. A forum is a place people put their ideas, and actually they missed a golden opportunity to get views they could put in the mining act. ...They have never solved the problems, all they want to do is just open up the mine upon the blood of the thousands who died." Interview n°51, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings

"Youths were affected by this war, for that reason you will hardly see them getting close to where the meetings are held" Interview n°14, woman from Darenai, middle tailings

"No one is hearing our cry, because they know we (women) hate mining... There is a representative but that representative does not disseminate the information to the community clearly" Interviewee n°44, woman from Pirurari, SML

“Our representatives (in ABG) are our members. We elected them because we wanted them to be our mouthpiece but things did not work out the way we expected; they are already bribed, that is why they cannot say anything on our behalf.” Interview n°1, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site

“I do not agree with this misleading government who is serving corporates’ interests and not the people.” Interview n°30, community leader from Guava, SML

“They (ABG) have become puppets” Interview n°25, community leader from Dapera, SML

“The mistake we made was to vote the old folks up into the parliament, these are the ones who cannot come up with new initiatives. They do not have ideas on how to recover Bougainville’s economy. Now they are talking as if mining is the key to economic recovery... ABG has already jumped into the soup of the brainwashed and are now supporting the reopening” Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailing

“The people in the landowner association are not the real landowners, some of them are the ones who were benefiting from other people’s lands. They were land grabbers from the beginning. The real landowners did not benefit from the land. I am not happy because these people are claiming other people’s land” Interviewee 34, woman from Guava, SML

“Some (PLA) are on the reopening side but pretend to be opposing it in public, others are already with the company” Interview n°54, youth from Guava, SML

“I don’t know (PLA’ stance on the reopening) because they have been confusing us so much” Interview n°79, community leader from Pirurari, SML

“Media releases are issued (by the landowners association) that are the opposite of what we say. Don’t believe we are happy with all the lies people are putting out there. The Panguna Landowners Association are the major liars, all they put out in the newspaper is crap. They don’t talk with us.” Interview n°29, elder from Dapera, SML

“They (PLA) are lying to us too much and are putting our lives at risk” Interview 32, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

stating that the ABG has been influenced or manipulated by ‘outsiders’, or is simply incapable of imagining new options outside of what they’ve always known: mining.

Panguna Landowner Association (PLA):¹²⁸ Most respondents (56) expressed dissatisfaction with the PLA’s pro-mining stance, including 20 who questioned their legitimacy as representatives of the landowners, implying that ‘real landowners do not support mining’. Seven interviewees as well as the FGD, stated they did not know about PLA’s official stand on the reopening and/or were confused by the association’s contradictory statements and actions (see introduction). Only one interviewee expressed satisfaction with the PLA’s work.

“There are so many good and genuine ex-combatants, these are the ex-combatants who do not support mining. Even the ones mingling around with the pro-mining people, they are just there to benefit from the money” Interview n°73, woman from Enamira, upper tailings

“I am not happy with them because they do not have a heart for the women” Interview 33, leader from Guava, SML

“We are not satisfied with what the ex-combatants are doing. They don’t even come into the villages to brief us on what is going on.” Interview n°1, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site

“The ex-combatants are against reopening; although it is true that we are divided in some ways, but the division is mostly among the commanders” Interview n° 77, young adult from Enamira, upper tailing

“The ex-combatants are fence sitters. They go to where the current takes them. Their minds are not steady. We, the resource owners should know what is happening; right now we are in the dark.” Interview n°34, woman from Guava, SML

“These people really get on my nerves, I don’t understand what they fought for” Interview n°10, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site

Veterans in favor of the mine: A majority of interviewees (41 out of 57 asked) expressed dissatisfaction and frustration towards some ex-combatants who were perceived to be in favor of the reopening. However, 15 interviewees disagreed, and declared that veterans were not in favor of reopening the mine.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Interviewees frequently referred to the PLA, which is the historic title of the overarching landowners association representing the mine-affected communities.

¹²⁹ There does appear to be mixed opinion among ex-combatants about whether or not to support mine reopening, which might explain the different positions here.

B. Respondents’ views on key actors involved in the consultation processes

Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG): Most interviewees (61 plus FGD) expressed dissatisfaction with the ABG’s stance in favor of the mine’s reopening, whilst three declared not being aware of this position. Some interviewees qualified their dissatisfaction,

"It (AusAID's involvement) is a lure for hidden agenda" Interview n°4, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site

"Their people are here, but we are not given clear explanation for AusAID's presence here and why" Interview n°27, elder from Dapera, SML

"(The Australian government) used robbery tactics from the very beginning, Australia gave the operation license to an Australian company in order to steal the gold at Panguna. But Australia should be reminded that what happened in the past cannot happen again" Interview n°73, woman from Enamira, upper tailings

"They (AusAID) are not adequately supporting those living in the mine affected area because they are living outside at Arawa and work in Panguna...If they want to address our issues they must come and live in Panguna and consult with the people". Interview n°19, community leader from Dapera, SML

"That (AusAID's work) is like putting a bandage to cover a cancer" Interview n°5, young adult from Paruparu, outside mine site

"AusAID is funding a lot of projects on Bougainville... These funds which are coming in, are not because Australia feels for Bougainville, it's because it wants to lure the Bougainville people. It's a cunning government." Interview n°30, community leader from Guava, SML

Australian Government/AusAID:¹³⁰ A majority of interviewees (49 out of 53 asked) expressed dissatisfaction with what they saw as the illegitimate role of Australia (through AusAID) in the peacebuilding and consultation processes¹³¹, whilst four were not sure about AusAID's position and activities in Bougainville. There was strong disapproval of the perceived interference of the Australian Government or AusAID in both the past and present of Bougainville.



¹³⁰ The Australian Agency for International Development, i.e. AusAID, ceased to be an executive agency of the Australian government on 31 October 2013; it has since been amalgamated into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

¹³¹ See article by Kristian Lasslett: "AusAid Fuels Bougainville Mining Tensions", New Matilda, last modified April 23 2013, <https://newmatilda.com/2013/04/23/ausaid-fuels-bougainville-mining-tensions>.


1. What is the mine-affected communities assessment of the peace and reconciliation processes that have occurred until today?

Of the 41 respondents who specifically discussed the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the associated reconciliation efforts, there was uniform dissatisfaction. Some felt while the process of reconciliation had restored peace, the ‘problems’¹³² facing families since the conflict’s cessation have not been adequately addressed (31), whilst others felt peace had not been fully restored (4 interviewees plus the FGD), or that no peace at all had been achieved (6). One respondent differentiated local peace processes, which he considered to be relatively successful within his community, from peace processes involving foreign actors, which he said were a long way from being achieved.

Twenty-seven respondents strongly felt further reconciliation efforts needed to take place between Bougainvilleans and/or Australia, Papua New Guinea and/or BCL. This is suggestive of a broader feeling in mine-affected communities that the peace on Bougainville remains incomplete.¹³³

A non-exhaustive list of reasons why respondents felt the peace process had partially or totally failed have been extrapolated from 31 interviews, plus the FGD, which both featured extended discussions on peace, truth and reconciliation. The list is featured below:¹³⁴

Participants’ views on the Bougainville peace process:



A) Peace processes did not follow local traditions:

This factor was discussed by 19 respondents. Traditional peace processes were described by a number of respondents as rituals and ceremonies designed to re-establish relationships between people, but also importantly, with the land and with the dead. Two respondents stated that recognizing which people died, on which land, is of traditional importance, and therefore a large number of localized ceremonies involving specific actors would be needed in order to bring a robust peace that accords with custom.

¹³² This included issues ranging from the ongoing effects of trauma, a perceived lack of justice and reconciliation, the enduring impacts of environmental damage, as well as certain economic difficulties.

¹³³ Out of the 27 respondents who called for further reconciliation to be carried out, 11 specified that this should happen between Bougainvilleans (11) and/or with Australia (2), PNG (5) and/or BCL (5). Twelve respondents referred to reconciliation in general without specifying the actors who should be involved.

¹³⁴ There was no specific interview question asking why respondents felt the peace process has partially or totally failed, therefore, information included in this section have been extracted from answers some respondents gave during their discussion of peace and reconciliation.

“We need reconciliation from one end of the island to the other. And we need to restore the relationship with the bodies that have rotted in the jungle by bringing them back to their village and giving them some form of dignity by doing a proper burial.... Australia too is responsible for spilling the blood of the innocent on this island. These deaths have not been given dignity yet.... No one has facilitated peace, these are the lies they (Australia) call peace... We are still suffering whilst waiting for justice to happen, I don't know when we will find healing” Interview n°33, community leader from Guava, SML

I don't know who facilitated the peace on Bougainville, I haven't experienced peace here.” Interview n°11, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site

*“No one has written anything...no one has been brought to court. The issue has been ignored despite its seriousness. We the indigenous civilians are the forgotten tribe” **Sample n°17, woman from Darenai, middle tailings***

*“Our government of Mekamui tried recording everything (that was lost) under the leadership of Francis Ona, just to keep a record, and to try to find ways to get help. The PNG government on the other hand has done nothing... It is like there are only deaf ears out there that cannot hear or understand the life of the people: up to this date we have received nothing in terms of compensation on Bougainville... The (human rights) issues from the war were pardoned under the Bougainville Peace Agreement. And it was the (PNG) government who came up with that idea and went ahead with it...We are experiencing some good changes after the signing of Bougainville Peace Agreement. But still I see that there is a need to make changes to the agreement because the arrangement was not inclusive of the victims”. **Interview n.24, man from Daperu, SML***

*“This (trauma) is a very big issue and a burden to us. Now because of the crisis, people have lost trust in each other. The practice of killing people unnecessarily has diminished communal trust... Huge number of abuses are still buried inside people’s hearts. Only the common ones have been recorded. ...We do not have a way and chance (for justice), like concerning my father’s case. Also we are waiting for the right time” **Interview n°72, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings***

*“Many of us helped ourselves at the village level. The PNG government and the pacific nations tried, but their perspective was different from ours. Real peace will come if both parties agree, the peace you are talking about was force upon us, because they (BCL) still want the gold deposits on the island” **Interview n° 40, man from Guava, SML***

B) The peace process restored ‘peace’ without justice

(12 respondents plus FGD): This category includes respondents who made direct reference to ongoing impunity, called for justice in general,¹³⁵ and/or who demanded that BCL and the Australian government face justice for their complicity in the conflict. The lack of consideration given to victims in the Peace Agreement was also raised by two interviewees.¹³⁶

Moreover, in response to a specific question, 56 interviewees, plus the FGD, stated that they were unaware of any case where the perpetrator of a crime has been brought to justice.¹³⁷

C) Peace processes lacked consultation or grassroots involvement (6 respondents): Six interviewees felt the peace process had failed to date because the views of the grassroots on Bougainville had not been taken into account by leaders and politicians, and therefore the peace and reconciliation process put into place has been unable to address people’s ongoing concerns (mostly related to trauma, its enduring impacts, and the perceived lack of justice described above).

D) Peace process serves the needs of Australia and/or Papua New Guinea (5 respondents): Respondents in this category felt that decisions over the future of Bougainville have not been, and still aren’t, decided by its people, and that top-down peace efforts have been carried out with a view to preparing the way for the reopening of the Panguna mine.

*“This (trauma) is a very big issue and a burden to us. Now because of the crisis, people have lost trust in each other. The practice of killing people unnecessarily has diminished communal trust... Huge number of abuses are still buried inside people’s hearts. Only the common ones have been recorded. ...We do not have a way and chance (for justice), like concerning my father’s case. Also we are waiting for the right time” **Interview n°72, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings***

¹³⁵ It is likely that respondents referred to forms of restorative justice here, as well as more formal concepts of justice.

¹³⁶ See introduction for details on the Peace Agreements and the amnesties offered.

¹³⁷ Out of the 64 respondents asked about whether they knew of any case brought to justice, 56 plus the FGD declared there was no such thing; three stated not knowing; three referred to the class action against Rio Tinto and launched in the

US in 2001 but did not know that the case has been dismissed in 2013; and two respondents referred to local traditional justice and conflict resolution processes.

2. What are the gaps in the peace and reconciliation process which mine-affected communities feel need to be addressed?

Additional information was gathered from respondents' interviews which chart unresolved issues emerging from the conflict. The issues center on the enduring need to recognise and treat trauma, and on the competing views on the issue of compensation and best ways to achieve meaningful reconciliation.

A) Putting an end to trauma:

63 interviewees plus the FGD recognised that trauma was still very much present in their respective community; only two interviewees felt the issue of ongoing trauma was slowly improving, while several other respondents doubted that they could ever free themselves from it. Trauma was said by some respondents to have triggered other social issues including an increased consumption of alcohol (3), people being unable to work and/or stand as leaders (3), and a general lack of trust in society (1). Nine respondents felt their community needed a way to record their experiences, and memorialize loss, in order to help with the process of healing, truth recovery, justice, understanding, and/or put an end to trans-generational trauma. 60 interviewees plus the FGD, also state that there was none (39 plus the FGD), or not enough support, for those suffering the effects of trauma in their community (21).¹³⁸

B) Compensation versus meaningful reconciliation

Four respondents stressed that the reestablishment of trust requires the implementation of a long-term reconciliation process. An additional three interviewees also highlighted the concerns that reconciliation has been too focused on monetary compensation; these respondents felt the peace process has been too money-oriented, which has, therefore, reduced the possibilities of achieving sincere reconciliation. Two others highlighted the fact that trauma and grief are complex issues that require non-material efforts such as public recognition, an inquiry into the committed crimes, and the creation of space for victims to be heard.

In contrast, two respondents specifically stated that the lack of compensation and/or the embezzlement of compensation money by a minority was the reason why they think the peace process has not been successful; 13 interviewees also felt further restorative justice efforts are a precondition for future well-being on Bougainville.

All respondents, plus the FGD, noted that their community had neither received compensation for material destruction that occurred during the conflict, nor had they received any support for persons living with a disability.¹³⁹ However, the expressed need for

compensation was not limited to destruction and losses emanating from the conflict, it also included destruction that occurred during the mine's operation. The fact that some interviewees referred to the K10 billion demand for land destruction and pollution articulated by the PLA in April 1988,¹⁴⁰ demonstrates that BCL's perceived debt towards the people of Bougainville remains an issue of contention.



¹³⁸ Though five interviewees mentioned that church groups and volunteer groups are working on trauma counselling, but did not specify whether there was a need for further support in this respect or not.

¹³⁹ One respondent stated that a few BRA commanders benefited from aid and support for people with disabilities, adding that the rest, and majority, of disabled people had not received any support at all.

¹⁴⁰ In August 1987, Francis Ona and Perpetua Serero were elected to lead the PLA on a platform of opposition to mining. In April 1988 the PLA formally issued a demand for 10 billion kina compensation. This demand was rejected by BCL. See introduction.

“(BCL) has already given us the road linking our community to the coastal people and villages... today, we have had enough of the company. But if it wants to reopen it has to compensate for life, life in the river, life in the air, and everything that is called life. The environment has to be brought back into its original shape.” **Interview n°26, elder from Dapera, SML**

“I believe that reconciliation must truly happen throughout the island. The reason is because not all of us were BRA, some went on to become resistance. This group of people (the resistance) sided with the PNGDF, and we killed some of them” **Interview n°29, elder from Dapera, SML**

“(The lack of justice) is a challenge to all youths in school now. They must help to find means to make the company take responsibility for its evil doings. Us (elders), we do not have the capacity to bring this case to court, it is a huge and serious case... (We need) to prove ... who really was behind the PNG government, sponsoring the fighting and all the other things.” **Interview n°83, elder from Darenai, middle tailings**

“The reconciliation was done more in a western way because the aid given for reconciliation was conditioned and had time limits, so leaders had to fast track (the process). Because we were pushed around by the outsiders many of the cases were commercialized... Today we know that if there is any form of mediation somewhere, we know that there is money hanging somewhere behind it” **Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings**

“The church is doing its part but still it is not enough. We need (professional) trauma counselors to be based at the village level... These people (disabled) need to have a medical check-up; but no one has taken responsibility for these issues. Some people lost a part of their body but were not properly patched up, and no one has taken responsibility for this. ... It is not fair for us, the ones living with trauma, because there is absolutely no room for us to voice our problems” **Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings**

“We want others to hear our problems... There is not peace on Bougainville, the peace people are referring to here is a money oriented peace. There is something real inside, which may burst out like a bomb, and to our shock there will be another war on Bougainville” **Interview n°36, woman from Guava, SML**

“All deaths whether recorded, or not, shall be given dignity by BCL, the PNG government and the Australian government.” **Interview n°20, woman from Dapera, SML**

“The government of the day must speak on behalf of its people to Rio Tinto and relay the people’s demands. Ten billion (kina) for the

environment and land destruction” **Interview n°78, young adult from Dapera, SML**

“A minority have become rich with the money that has come in, in the name of peace and reconciliation. The money sinks into some unknown pockets, it hardly reaches the village people” **Interview n°49, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings**

“There is healing taking place but not in all places... all of us here are still suffering the aftermath of the crisis... Reconciliation has to happen... involving PNG, Australia and BCL. A true reconciliation, not the lies like what is happening now... We don’t see people coming into communities and allowing everyone to talk like what you are both doing now. No-one is interested in listening to little people like us, and I believe that this research you are both doing will pave a way forward for us... These experiences have to be documented so that it will help future generations to remain informed about their history.” **Interview n°21, community leader from Dapera, SML**

1. What are the views and aspirations of mine-affected communities with respect to future forms of economic development?

Information on respondents' views and aspirations for the future development of Bougainville was gathered during discussions. The respondents' visions can be summarized as follows:

A) Respect for the environment: Although this is not a source of revenue in itself, environmental conservation and/or reforestation was mentioned by 11 respondents as well as the FGD, as a desirable alternative to the mine. Indeed, according to participants, environmental conservation is an essential condition for the protection of traditional livelihoods based on subsistence agriculture, farming, fishing and hunting (see Theme 1 in the present report). It was also cited as a condition for tourism and eco-tourism which were suggested as a potential area for Bougainville's future development by 18 respondents.

B) A focus on people-centered development: Interviewees expressed a desire for more micro-projects, and increased support for subsistence farming. This reflects respondents' wish for a development that is localised, based on improving people's current living conditions, and is respectful of their traditional ways.

Education and/or development of Bougainville's human resources was also mentioned by five interviewees as an important precondition for any future development. One interviewee referred to the need for more 'people-centered development' (including trauma healing), before any positive economic and political initiative could be realized.¹⁴¹ There was a sense that in order to benefit from development, local communities must be at its center. Three interviewees suggested that those discourses which claim that mining is the key to 'development' are only defending one model, which is not necessarily inclusive of people's physical, intellectual, cultural and spiritual wellbeing.¹⁴² That is not to suggest, however, that some respondents did not hope for larger scale developments, but rather that they perceived the need for this to be managed in a gradual and responsible manner in order to ensure positive change for local communities.

C) Controlled and defined by Bougainvilleans: Six interviewees specified that Bougainville needed more guidance, support and governing frameworks designed to underpin different sectors of economic-activity (2)

¹⁴¹ 'People-centered development' or 'Integral Human Development' is a concept also championed by one local NGO active since 1992 on Bougainville, LNWDA. LNWDA's projects have highlighted the need for "non-material development as a pre-requisite for economic and infrastructure development". See: Peter Ninnés. "Building Peace in Bougainville: Gender, Development and Education for Post-Conflict Recovery" (Paper presented at the 2004 ANZCIES conference, Melbourne, 3-5 December).

¹⁴² This suggestion was made by three interviewees in response to the way a certain question on Bougainville's capacity to develop without mining was formulated, these respondents argued they "were already developed people". The question was "do you think Bougainville can develop without mining?".

"There are agricultural projects that are now being started by our leaders here. That money is completely ours. Anything that will come from our sweat is ours... We are the ones who will develop our region" Interview n°7, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site

"Everything in Bougainville can make money. ... We can raise pigs, poultry and also plant rice and reforest our land. ... Those along the coastlines and us, the mountain people, can create resorts and should be into tourism, prawn farming, and logging to some extent." Interview n°48, youth from Darenai, middle tailings

"Before the crisis, Bougainville was the leading province in cocoa and copra production" Interview n°29, elder from Dapera, SML

"We have roads, we have human resource through a self-initiated educational institution; all we need is to support each other and grow our economy (step by step)." Interview n°1, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site

"Bougainville will be destroyed in the name of development...Our government should look o the community to understand development. We have a governance structure in place where we are making our own money... We are ready to pay tax but the government is not doing anything. The answer for the crisis is not mining, the answer is good governance and (human) development (based on education and health for the people)" Interview n°81, community leader from Enamira, upper tailings

"We have to use our own hands to work for our nation's income. The moment we ask for foreign help we are subjecting ourselves to destruction and bloodshed." Interview n°2, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

"Look at the cash flow in the informal sector, we are already developed but it is the government who is failing to empower us...We must get independence first and then think about mining, and address the issues that emerged from mining" Interview n°21, community leader from Dapera, SML

"Our leadership is too weak to see that informal economic activities are strong So a lot of money that is going to the ABG as aid has not been utilized well" Interview n°24, man from Dapera, SML

"I am a villager and when I hear the term reopening I am thinking of a dying future generation. I know that only independence will save my children. These are two different issues" Interview n°32, elder from Darenai, middle tailings

and/or alluvial gold mining activities (4); the lack of ABG action and/or capacity in creating new markets, and supporting the development of the local economy, was also noted.


Additionally, ten respondents declared that they perceived discourses conditionally linking the mine’s reopening to realising independence, as pressure from BCL, their ‘leaders’, and/or ABG, designed to influence people’s perceptions of the issue.¹⁴³ In that sense, such discourses were found to reinforce some respondents’ lack of trust towards foreign investment, with ten respondents stating that Bougainvilleans are the ones who will develop Bougainville, with four specifying that no foreign investment (especially from BCL and Australia) should be accepted.¹⁴⁴ Three interviewees also stated that independence, once recognized, will present an opportunity for all Bougainvilleans to stand united against the reopening, ensuring that BCL does not return.

“Many countries are surviving through other economic activities. We have been brainwashed into believe that mining is the key to independence on Bougainville. We are not poor, we are rich in our own land. The only thing we lack, is that we need innovative leaders. The mistake we made was to vote the old folks up into the parliament; these are the ones who cannot come up with new initiatives.... I wonder who is that particular economist spreading lies around (about mining as a necessity for independence)”
Interview n°43, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings

“The person who needs the mine is Rio Tinto and BCL because they have a lot of mining equipment which is collecting dust, thus they want to make use of them... The world has to know that we fought for it (independence), we have died for it, ...we sacrificed our lives, we deserve to be recognized. ... They say you have to open the mine in order to become economically viable, so that you can say you are independent because you have the financial resources to fund your government to bring the services; that’s a total lie, after all, even now we are fine. And I think slowly and slowly we will get to where we want to go, slowly but surely, we will stumble and fall and when we do, we will learn... Any government should look to its people because it’s the people that will develop the country and not machines and not even stones.”
Interview n°51, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings

D) Focusing on sectors other than industrial-scale mining: When discussing alternatives to mining, all interviewees (64 plus the FGD) but one¹⁴⁵ stated that there exist many other promising economic activities that could represent a solid source of revenue that would buttress Bougainville’s future development and wellbeing. The diagram below captures the variety of alternative economic activities identified by respondents:

RESPONDENTS’ SUGGESTIONS FOR CONCRETE ALTERNATIVE TO INTENSIVE MINING



143 All respondents but one, as well as the FGD, voiced their opposition to arguments that characterize the mine’s reopening as a condition precedent for independence. Thirty-nine respondents specified that they either, desire independence without mining (22), or that independence should come before any discussions start about reopening the mine (17).

144 These comments were made by four respondents referred to the risks of interference in Bougainville’s affairs by foreign actors, and right to self-determination. The concern over AusAID’s presence and role on Bougainville can also be linked to this point (see theme two of the report for details on respondents’ views, in this respect).

145 Only one interviewee implied that the mine might be necessary for achieving independence.

Some of the above alternatives proposed by participants focus on sectors that have long been a central feature of Bougainville's economy such as horticulture and farming¹⁴⁶, while other suggestions are relatively new and underline respondents' wish for diversification into secondary and tertiary sectors of economic activity.

Respondents' desire for genuine alternatives to mining was also illustrated in answers given to a question on securing the wellbeing of people into the future. Answers to this question not only highlighted the fact that many respondents wish to move away from industrial-scale mining, but also that interviewees wish to transcend economic reductionist understandings of development, to embrace models that place value on people's mental, social, moral and spiritual development (see also point B of this section and theme three of the report).

This last question helps to prioritise respondents' perceived needs, with the expressed need for reconciliation and restorative justice being the two most prominent responses. Eight respondents also cited 'be united' and 'work together' as a prerequisite for development and the creation of wealth on Bougainville. Education was also an important condition given by 11 respondents in order to make sure that Bougainvilleans have the capacity and human resources to control all steps of their chosen development path in a self-reliant manner (including options to reopen the mine in a more distant future). Finally, 14 respondents expressed the need for 'innovation' in development (away from mining), or 'good governance' and 'good leadership'. This included 12 respondents who specified that good governance meant their leaders should be more inclusive of the people's views, needs and aspirations (4), make sure they empower local businesses and/or pay attention to social aspects of development (7), and be independent (1).

What is needed to secure Bougainville's future well-being?




Photo: Josselin Amalfi



146 Joachim Lummani "Post-1960s cocoa and copra production in Bougainville" in Bougainville: Before the Conflict eds. Anthony J. and Helga-Maria Griffin, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005); Herb Thompson and Scott MacWilliam. The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea (Wollongong: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1992).

“The government is saying all these things (mining will help Bougainville gain independence) to threaten the people, so they will feel scared and say yes to mining. ... Bougainville has to come up with something inclusive and agreeable with respect to good governance. We need good governance. Good governance will encourage love to grow among the people in order to reach a bright future. Now is the time for leaders to look at alternatives, to help achieve a brighter future for the future generations to enjoy” **Interview n°30, community leader from Guava, SML**

“We must build our human resource as much as we can, we must have a lot of technical people too” **Interview n°38, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site**

“What the government should do is create a market for alluvial gold mining, poultry projects, piggeries and fisheries too. Let us support our god given independence.” **Interview n°50, elder from Enamira, upper tailings**

“We in Bougainville must resolve all the problems we have against each other. The foreigners, they have to compensate the insects, the plants, the animals, trees, and every individual Bougainvillean...BCL must do it.” **Interview n°23, woman from Dapera, SML**

“We must develop small projects at the village level. All communities must have projects to work on. If we have community-based projects we will not need to look elsewhere and talk about mining” **Interview n°37, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site**

“There are so many ways (to make money) but remember that those many ways can become sustainable only if all of us are on good terms with one another” **Interview n°42, community leader from Guava, SML**

“I believe that...the population on Bougainville, landowners and ABG, should work together. We must become united for the good of Bougainville. ABG is the authority but what can it do without the people? For that reason it must learn to address issues from different angles” **Interview n°77, young adult from Enamira, upper tailings**

“We should become united and work together and the victims should be compensated” **Interview n°11, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site**

“Bougainville must look to the social-economy, to help the people in the villages ... Our life will not be good (if we keep going the way we are going), and also Bougainville must start sending its students to school they must be educated, we must have people with knowledge so that they can come and run the affairs of Bougainville... The government of Bougainville must support local initiatives which were started during the crisis. Because if we look at the way people are living, the living standard is very low. So support must come to the level of the people.” **Interview n°41, community leader from Paruparu, outside mine site**

“Now is the time for leaders to look at alternatives, to help achieve a brighter future for the future generations to enjoy” **Interview n°30, community leader from Guava, SML**

“We must develop small projects at the village level. All communities must have projects to work on. If we have community-based projects we will not need to look elsewhere and talk about mining” **Interview n°37, youth from Paruparu, outside mine site**

V. CONCLUSION

MESSAGES OF THE RESEARCH

Bougainville is a large and diverse island – this report did not attempt to survey the entire population. Doubtless, some communities in other parts of Bougainville may have differing views both about what happened in the past, and what should happen in the future. Nevertheless, this study is only concerned with what the people of Panguna believe; it is, after all, they who have been most affected by mining to date, and what will happen in the future, were the Panguna mine to be reopened.

This research leads to a number of preliminary observations about the views of the mine-affected communities:

First, and most importantly, the stakeholders who have been most affected by the Panguna mine and subsequent conflict, are at present staunchly opposed to any discussion of the mine's reopening.

Second, most of the people we spoke to were deeply critical of the mine consultation process. Many believe that the consultation process has excluded them; while others appear to have eschewed engagement in disgust at the process' very premises. Under either circumstance, any attempt to reopen the mine in the present environment would almost certainly be received by most within the landowning community as illegitimate. Furthermore, unlike in the 1960s, were the mine to be imposed for a second time, the antagonisms associated with this process would be exacerbated by the great sacrifices made during the conflict. Accordingly, if the current mine reopening timetable is observed, it could very well fracture a fragile and incomplete peace.

Third, the people of Panguna have developed a sophisticated understanding of the actors involved in the conflict,¹⁴⁷ which is coupled with nuanced beliefs about what true reconciliation means. It is clear that the people who have been consulted in this study believe BCL bears a direct burden of responsibility for the war, and many of the atrocities that occurred during its early years. It is also clear that those spoken with do not believe that true and lasting reconciliation has taken place, or that the question of elite impunity has been adequately addressed.

Fourth, the people of Panguna who participated in this study clearly believe that their island should explore alternatives to industrial scale mining. They articulate with eloquence the sort of development they would like to see: environmentally sustainable; human-centered; based around agriculture, and the small-scale exploitation of the island's wealth. These are the deeply held views of large sections of the mine-affected communities, and cannot be simply dismissed as an outside agenda, or as materially infeasible. Most important of all, the mine-affected communities would like to see a modality of development take place that they control, and which takes place in an atmosphere where the crimes of the past are acknowledged and accounted for.

¹⁴⁷ Which, it should be noted, entirely accord with the most recent empirical evidence outlined in the introduction.

Despite their importance, these preliminary conclusions also lead to some deeper and perhaps more important observations about the future of Panguna and of Bougainville more generally.

CONNECTING THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

First, there is a direct link between the Panguna communities' understanding their own past and their demands for a future controlled and determined by themselves.

The people of Panguna that we spoke with never wanted a large mine on the land: they believe that it was forced on them by outsiders, aided by a small number of local intermediaries seeking personal enrichment. The mine's promised benefits, as they see it, never materialised, and assurances over the negative impacts on their land proved hollow. Their attempts to register discontent through non-violent resistance went unheard. The subsequent use of direct action and industrial sabotage was brutally repressed, an act that precipitated a long and protracted conflict which was, in the eyes of many, justified to liberate the land and the people from an enduring state of marginalization and dispossession.

That the mine was imposed on them; that it was bad for their communities; that the rebellion against it was (for many) justified; that the war, however justified, brought further sufferings upon them: all these beliefs form part of a consistent and coherent narrative of almost everyone spoken to in this study.

This narrative helps explain why the participants in this study are so implacably against the immediate return to mining. They feel that the current initiative to reopen the mine is yet another attempt by outsiders and complicit local elites to impose upon the landowning communities something that they have never wanted, and which they still do not want.

The people of Panguna clearly say that, unlike in the past, they would like a say in how they control the natural resources of the land in which they live. The conditions under which they seem prepared to consider exploiting their natural resources—i.e. via local ownership and control—would appear to preclude the sort of industrial scale operation that the ABG appears to have in mind when it talks about reopening Panguna.

COMMUNITIES IN TRAUMA

Second, the sufferings endured, not only during the civil war, but also through what the communities perceive as the initial seizure and pollution of the land by the mining company, have caused deep and traumatic wounds. These are communities that are still living with trauma.

The people of Panguna are not only well aware of the presence of this ongoing trauma, but believe that addressing it is an overriding priority.

Moreover, it is the communities' conscious connection of this trauma to the events surrounding the operation

of the mine, the civil war, and the actions of the PNG government and of BCL that is a further fundamental cause of their implacable resistance to any present consideration of the mine reopening.

Reopening the mine, in this context, would simply exacerbate this trauma. The idea, proposed by some, that the people of Panguna are ready to once reopen their lives again to such an occurrence, is thus repudiated in the strongest terms by this research.

LISTENING TO THE VOICES

Writing a decade ago, just after the signing of the Peace Agreement, Rosemary Dikaung of the Bougainville Women's Peace Forum wrote these words:

*The Panguna mine had been closed for 13 years and, during this period, there was recovery in the ecology. The rivers now had more fish, eels and prawns, the gardens were more productive and the forests had more animals. Now that we were moving out of our period of crisis, we were rebuilding economic activity. We learnt from the past mistakes of large-scale resource extraction and wanted to pursue sustainable agriculture and renewable resources as the basis of our economy. This is a critical period in which we will shape our future path.*¹⁴⁸

It seems that these sentiments, expressed ten years ago, are shared by the majority of the Panguna residents consulted in this project. They yearn for a future where their land can continue to recover and flourish and they can rebuild their lives in peace. They call for a deeper and truer acknowledgement of the past, and a greater say in the direction of their future.

This report has attempted to capture these Panguna voices and ensure that they reach a wider audience, in the hope that doing so will lead to a future for Bougainville that is prosperous, peaceful and without violence.



¹⁴⁸ in Havini and Sirivi, *Mothers of the Land*, 249-151.

APPENDIX: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

This study's primary objective is to produce a significant, qualitative data-set that examines the way in which experiences of mining, conflict, and transitional justice, in the mine affected areas of central Bougainville, shape responses to, and understandings of, the ABG's proposal to reopen the Panguna mine. Underpinning this primary objective is a working hypothesis which contends that the resilience of peace, security and development on Bougainville, is intrinsically entwined with legacy issues that have emerged from the Panguna mine's operation, and the conflict its closure triggered.

Connected to the study's overarching objective are a number of aims that informed the research design. These research aims include:

- Record community perceptions of the Panguna mine operation period (1972-1989).
- Document the experience of mine-affected communities during the Bougainville conflict, including human rights violations and humanitarian impacts.
- Register legacy issues that have emerged from the war, including outstanding concerns over trauma, impunity, truth, and reconciliation.
- Gauge community reactions both towards the current ABG proposal to reopen the Panguna mine, and the associated consultation process.
- Document local understandings of sustainable development.
- Conceptualise the relationship between community understandings of sustainable development, and their historical experience of mining, conflict, and transitional justice.
- Conceptualise the relationship between community understandings of sustainable development, their perception of legacy issues emerging from the war, and reactions to the proposed reopening of the Panguna mine.

METHOD: EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY

Before outlining the data-collection process, it is important to acknowledge the empirical context in which the study was conducted. Although there exists important literature covering the reconciliation process on Bougainville, in addition to scholarship that documents state-corporate deviance during the conflict, there is an absence of data which addresses the critical issues outlined in the preceding section. Accordingly Jubilee Australia's Research Committee (JARC) recognised the importance of conducting an exploratory case study, which would investigate these issues in the mine affected areas of central Bougainville, given the latter's critical position in the ABG's proposed strategy to secure a sustainable peace through mining. In addition to providing an empirical evidence base for communities, civil society, and policy makers, involved in conversations over the content of this strategy, JARC

also felt the results would provide a robust foundation for designing an island-wide study that addresses both legacy issues emerging from the conflict, and their impact on local attitudes towards sustainable development.

Exploratory case studies are typified by a need to obtain meaningful information, in a context marked by an absence of relevant data-sets. In this light, it was determined by JARC that in-depth, semi-structured interviews were the best tool for exploring, and mapping, the empirical landscape in the mine affected areas. In total 65 semi-structured interviews were conducted, in addition to one focus group discussion (FGD) consisting of 17 participants (see below for an explanation of why the FGD was used).

It was critical that data-collection accorded to local cultural norms, and accepted customary etiquette. Accordingly, the interviews and FGD were conducted jointly by two researchers (one female and one male), one of whom was from the mine-impacted area, with customary standing and knowledge.

SAMPLING

Participants were selected employing a purposive sampling method. JARC's primary objective was to sample a broad cross-section of society from the mine-impacted communities. Accordingly, interviews needed to be conducted with a range of different demographics, including adult women, adult men, youth (over 18 years old), elders and village leaders. Also, JARC determined that data needed to be gathered from villages dispersed across the entire mine area. As a result, interviews were conducted with communities from the special mine lease area, the upper tailings area, the middle tailings area, and those villages in outlying areas impacted by the mine.

As the study's purpose is exploratory in nature, participants were identified by first approaching culturally appropriate gatekeepers, which in this case were community leaders¹⁴⁹. Leaders were identified on the basis of the researchers' customary knowledge of villages in the mine area, and through guidance from local contacts. Leaders were contacted in advance of researchers visiting the village, either on the telephone or through written correspondence. They were apprised of the research aims, objectives, and sampling methods. Village gatekeepers then introduced researchers to potential local participants within each of the core demographics.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Principles of transparency, neutrality, anonymity, informed consent, and voluntary participation were observed during the data collection process. These principles were buttressed through two core mechanisms:

¹⁴⁹ Community leaders here includes positions such as a particularly influential school teachers, church leaders, youth leaders, women leaders or traditional village chiefs. Other leaders in official political positions took part in this study, including one member of the Council of Elders and one member of the Panguna District Women Association, but neither of the latter two participants were involved in organising potential respondents for the study.

- Participants were orally introduced to the project prior to interviews. Oral introductions outlined the scope of the study, its methodology, and proposed outputs. Participants were also advised about the importance of safeguarding their anonymity, and their right to withdraw from the study at any time.
- All participants read and signed consent forms, which included an information sheet that formally outlined the guidance contained in the oral introductions, including advice on risks associated with participation. In addition to obtaining participant consent for interviews, consent was also obtained before interviews were recorded.

The sensitivity of the topics discussed meant individual interviews were conducted in a safe place (often in secure public facilities, such as a community center or a church), where interviewees could talk freely, without the possibility of being heard. One exception to this rule, was the FGD conducted in Dupanta village. Here individuals refused to be interviewed separately, instead stating they preferred to reach a consensus among themselves, and then present one common position for each question through the FGD mechanism (see details below).

DETAILS OF THE SAMPLE

(a) Individual interviews

Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, with a list of questions and main topics for the interviewers to draw on and use as guides to orient the interviews depending on the way the conversation flowed within particular discussions. A total of 65 mine-affected community members were individually interviewed, including 33 women and 32 men originating from 8 villages. 49 participants declared having land rights and/or being landowners, 11 did not have land rights and 5 were not asked (unknown).

The following table details numbers of participants per age group, status and area they came from:

TABLE 1

	SEX		AGE			TOTAL
	FEMALE	MALE	ELDERS (56 AND OVER)	ADULTS (30 TO 55)	YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS (29 AND UNDER)	
LOCATION						
Special mining lease area (Dapera, Guava, Pirurari)	15	13	9	15	4	28
Upper tailings area (Enamira)	5	6	3	3	5	11
Middle tailings area (Darenai)	10	4	4	9	0	13
Outside mine site area (Paruparu, Onove/Oune)	3	9	1	1	11	13
STATUS						
Leader**	9	10	7	10	2	19
Community member	24	22	10	18	18	46
CLAN						
Originate from Panguna (Basikang & Bakerang)	13	23	13	12	12	37
Other clans living in Panguna	20	9	4	16	8	28
TOTAL	33	32	17	28	20	65

* The age category of participants was defined based on their experience of the time before the mine (elders), the time under the mine operation (adults), and those born just before or during the conflict (youth and young adults).

**Leaders here includes both, leaders who served as focal point to reach other participants and other leaders who took part in this study as respondents. These included any particularly influential community member, such as church leaders, youth leaders, women leaders, traditional village chiefs, one member of the Council of Elders and one member of the Panguna District Women's Association.

(b) Focus Group Discussion

The Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was conducted with 17 ex-combatants from Dupanta village which lies outside the mine site area, including two local leaders. Initial contact was made by telephone. Community members and leaders only agreed to participate, after it was confirmed the interviewers were not part of an effort to reopen the mine. Members of the community refused to be interviewed individually. The village noted they were not used to this kind of exercise, adding that they share the same views when it came to mining, conflict and development. It was decided that a FGD, was the most appropriate data-collection tool in this instance. 17 men were involved in the FGD while other community members were permitted to observe the discussion. Interviewers report that discussions amongst the group mostly reflected a strong common position on the topics presented to them. The findings from the FGD are clearly disaggregated in the report, from the 65 individual interviews.

DATA ANALYSIS

Interviews were conducted in Tok Pisin, or Nasioi when appropriate. All interviews were recorded with the consent of participants. Recorded interviews were then transcribed and translated into English by the interviewers themselves before being sent to JARC for analysis of the data and writing up. Regular communication between JARC and the field researchers was maintained during the analysis process in order to clarify specific points in the interviews as needed, and to confirm key findings.

The data was coded thematically, using a combination of deductive and inductive analysis. In the former respect, the data was initially organised according to four core themes which broadly correspond to the research aims underpinning this study (outlined above). The data was then coded inductively based on the sub-themes which emerged from the 65 interviews, complimented by the FGD data.

TABLE 2

THEME 1: EXPERIENCES OF THE MINE AND CONFLICT ON BOUGAINVILLE	
Research questions	Key corresponding elements from interviews
1. What were the experiences of interviewed members of mine-affected communities during the Panguna mine's inception and operation from the 1960s until its closure in 1989?	Respondents' views of the first approach and establishment of the Panguna mine in the 1960s and 70s; Respondents' perceptions of the impacts the operating of the mine had on living conditions of Panguna community members from 1960s until its closure in 1989.
2. Under what condition would the mine's reopening be acceptable to interviewed members of mine-affected communities?	Reported crimes and violence endured, witnessed and/or heard of during the conflict by respondents; Respondents' description of living conditions under the blockade from 1990 and, when applicable, their reported experiences of care centres; Respondents' views of origins of the conflict, and its main direct and indirect actors.
THEME 2: VIEWS ON THE REOPENING OF THE PANGUNA MINE	
Research questions	Key corresponding elements from interviews
1. How do interviewed members of mine-affected communities feel about plans to reopen the Panguna mine in the near future?	Respondents' views of a potential reopening of the mine in the near future with BCL as its operator; Respondents' justifications of their opposition to the reopening due to perceived negatives expected from the reopening.
2. Under what condition would the mine's reopening be acceptable to interviewed members of mine-affected communities?	Respondents' positions towards the hypothetical reopening of the mine under a different foreign company and a Bougainville owned company; Other conditions given by respondents before they could support the reopening of the mine.
3. How do interviewed members of mine-affected communities feel about the consultation process run by PLA/UPMALA (2009-2014) with respect to the mine's reopening?	Respondents' opinions of the consultation process run by UPMALA around the prospects of reopening; Respondents' views of the involvement of different actors in favor of the mine's reopening; including ABG, PLA, some ex-combatants, and AusAid/DFAT.
THEME 3: PEACE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION	
Research questions	Key corresponding elements from interviews
1. What are the experiences of interviewed members of mine-affected communities of the peace and reconciliation processes that have occurred until today?	Respondents' description of the current situation of their respective communities in regards to issues of trauma and recovery; Other information stated by respondents about various peace processes and progress towards justice and reconciliation until today (no specific question on peace processes was asked).
2. What are interviewed community members' remaining grievances over past peace and reconciliation processes?	Respondents' expressed claims over ways to best achieve lasting peace and reconciliation.
THEME 4: HOPES FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN BOUGAINVILLE	
Research questions	Key corresponding elements from interviews
4. What are the views and aspirations of interviewed members of mine-affected communities for future development trends on Bougainville?	Respondents' aspirations for future development on Bougainville; Respondents' identification of economic alternatives to the mine; Respondents' considerations of what is needed to secure future 'well-being' on Bougainville.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS






Once coded into theme and subthemes, participant responses were also disaggregated by different demographic variables, so responses could be broken down according to gender, age, location, and customary position.

ABG	Autonomous Bougainville Government
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
ANU	Australian National University
BCL	Bougainville Copper Limited
BICWF	Bougainville Inter Church Women's Forum
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
CRA	Conzinc Riotinto of Australia
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
FGD	Focus group discussion
JARC	Jubilee Australia Research Committee
JPNCC	Joint Panguna Negotiations Coordinating Committee
PLA	Panguna Landowner Association
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Force
SML	Special mining lease
UN	United Nations
UPMALA	United Panguna Mine Affected Landowners Association
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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