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BOUGAINVILLE STABILITY DESK STUDY

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ACRONYMS


ABG	Autonomous Bougainville Government
ABR	Autonomous Bougainville Region
ARB	Autonomous Region of Bougainville
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BCL	Bougainville Copper Limited
BPA	Bougainville Peace Agreement
BPC	Bougainville's People Congress
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BRF	Bougainville Revolutionary Forces
CoE	Council of Elders
IDIB	Inclusive Development in Post-Conflict Bougainville
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
MDF	Meekamui Defense Force
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PLA	Panguna Landowners Association
PMG	Peace Monitoring Group
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defense Forces
START	Support That Augments Rapid Transitions
TMG	Truce Monitoring Group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOMB	United Nations Observer Mission Bougainville
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

MAPS



Map No. 4104 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section



Map No. 4089 UNITED NATIONS
March 1999

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The peace process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, is widely recognized as a successful peacebuilding effort; yet the post-conflict order remains fragile. The legacy of the war is still apparent: armed groups remain outside the peace process; reconciliation of local conflicts is unfinished; political development and economic recovery has been slow; and law enforcement is limited. The upcoming referendum on Bougainville’s political status and the potential re-opening of the Panguna copper mine—both significant catalysts of the war—may further destabilize an already fragile environment.

In light of these potential threats to peace and stability in Bougainville, USAID requested that Development Transformations (DT) conduct a Desk Study to better inform the U.S. Government on the development and political challenges in Bougainville, particularly in regards to peace and security. DT found that in the coming years, Bougainville will face real and significant threats to stability. The potential for localized conflict—as a result of the sustained existence of armed groups and spoilers operating outside of the peace process, continued availability of weapons, and outstanding reconciliations—is cause for concern. Emerging new threats may also be catalysts for instability, including the loss of livelihood caused by environmental degradation from the mine, the displaced “lost generation” of unemployed youth and the unpredictable impact of ex-combatants reintegrating into their communities. Coupled with two potentially polarizing events—the referendum on political status and the possible re-opening of the Panguna mine—there is reason to fear that Bougainville may once again experience violent conflict.

These threats, however, will be countered in part by countervailing indigenous sources of stability. Foremost among them is Bougainville’s unique “formal-customary” hybrid model of governance and rule of law. This resiliency, which helps account for the success of the peacebuilding process, is also well suited for statebuilding. Bolstered by a nascent, though capable set of non-state actors and promising developments engaging potential spoilers, Bougainville appears able to sustain a fair level of stability. What remains to be seen, however, is whether and how these indigenous sources of stability would withstand a “shock” to the system (e.g. post-referendum violence). DT’s findings, which have been corroborated by the donor community, suggest that there is no immediate threat of widespread conflict, particularly on the scale witnessed during the war. However, the donor community should strengthen resiliencies in the peacebuilding process and actively mitigate ongoing and emerging threats to stability.

To help support peace and stability in Bougainville, the international community can play a modest but important role. Development assistance that is responsive to local interests, recognizes both traditional and formal authorities, and builds on (rather than seeks to substitute or replace) local resiliencies will best serve the people of Bougainville. Detailed further in the report, international assistance would be beneficial in the following areas: pre-referendum preparations, post-referendum statebuilding (both formal and customary institutions); inclusive and comprehensive dialogue on the re-opening of the Panguna mine; and, weapons removal and disarmament. Environmental degradation and climate change, which impact stabilization in a number of important ways, have been singled out as potentially significant factors that require further exploration. Addressing these pivotal issues will reinforce Bougainville’s “formal-customary” model of governance and rule of law, and thus help to mitigate ongoing and emerging threats.

I. INTRODUCTION

In July 2013, after consultation with U.S. Embassy Port Moresby, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) requested that Development Transformations (DT) conduct a Desk Study on the key issues affecting peace and stability in Bougainville. Under the Support That Augments Rapid Transitions (START) Indefinite Quantity Contract Task Order #2 (Asia, Middle East, Europe & Eurasia Technical Assistance), DT offers the following “Bougainville Stability Desk Study.”

For almost a decade (1989-1998), Bougainville experienced the bloodiest conflict in the South Pacific since WWII. Though the Bougainville peace process is widely heralded as a peacebuilding success, the post-conflict order remains fragile. Threats to stability still exist: political and economic development has been slow; armed groups remain outside the peacebuilding process; localized intra-group reconciliation is incomplete; and law enforcement is weak. The upcoming referendum on Bougainville’s political status and the potential re-opening of the Panguna copper mine may further destabilize an already fragile environment. With this context as a backdrop, this study identifies current and potential future threats to stability in Bougainville. In light of existing international development assistance programs, this study also highlights gaps in current support efforts and offers recommendations for further programming.

DT initially conducted an extensive literature review of relevant books, journal articles, media reporting, policy papers, reports from think tanks and nongovernmental organizations, and donor agencies; in total more than 85 sources were consulted. Almost 25 experts, practitioners, and academics in Bougainville, PNG, and the wider region were contacted as potential interviewees: nine interviews were held in person and by phone. A full bibliography is included as Annex.

The report is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the conflict and the peace process that followed. A detailed account of the drivers of the Bougainville conflict follows in Section III, including a review of the complex localized dynamics that were at play throughout the conflict. With a more complete understanding of past causes of conflict, the report shifts to Section IV, a review of current and anticipated sources of conflict and stability; this review includes an analysis of the formal and customary actors, events, and structures that are likely to impact Bougainville’s stability in the coming years.

In light of this analysis, Section V examines current international development programming in support of peace and stability in Bougainville. Section VI identifies the gaps in current international assistance and offers recommendations for additional future programming that could further promote peace and stability in Bougainville. Finally, the report concludes with Section VII by recognizing the limitations of a Desk Study, and proposes additional areas of fieldwork to strengthen the report’s findings.¹

II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS AFTERMATH

Background on Bougainville and Papua New Guinea (PNG)

Bougainville is a semi-autonomous region composed of several islands located off the east coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Though geographically and culturally affiliated with the Solomon Islands, Bougainville is a political entity of PNG. With an area of 8,646 square kilometers, Bougainville is home to a diverse

¹ Development Transformations would like to thank Nathan Stevens, Zoe Disselkoen, and Alex Pommier for providing essential research and support for the production of this Desk Study.

population of approximately 300,000, speaking over 21 different languages.² Pre-colonial social structures, incorporating small land-holding local clan lineages, mainly within language groups, continue to be the main social units.³ While PNG and Bougainville are primarily Christian, traditional indigenous religion continues to play a strong role in society.

The recent history of Bougainville is marred by a violent conflict that lasted for almost a decade (1989-1998). The conflict, which initially pitted Bougainvilleans against the PNG government, ultimately devolved into a civil war within Bougainville that killed up to 20,000 citizens and displaced up to 80,000.⁴

The political, social, economic, and environmental fallout from the opening of the Panguna mine in 1972 by Bougainville Copper Ltd. (BCL), a subsidiary of the Australian Rio Tinto mining company, was the primary catalyst for conflict.⁵ At that time, the Panguna copper mine was one of the largest open-pit mines in the world, accounting for over 40 percent of Papua New Guinea's total exports and 17 percent of government revenue.⁶ However, the Panguna mine was established without the consent of Bougainvillean leaders and against the interests of traditional clan-based landowners who were displaced with little compensation.⁷ Shortly after the mine opened, landowners in Bougainville began to protest the operation of the mine, petitioning the PNG government for increased revenue shares, asking for regulations to curb the environmental degradation caused by the mine, and demanding compensation for their consequent suffering.

The PNG government and BCL authorities largely ignored these demands.⁸ Following the breakdown of peaceful negotiations to address these concerns in 1988, young locals began a protest and sabotage campaign on the mine. Resistance initially coalesced around the leadership of Francis Ona who later formed and led the Bougainville Resistance Army (BRA)⁹. Ona, a former BCL employee, felt the leadership of the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) was not effectively representing the landowners' interests; among the issues at stake was an intergenerational dispute among landowners and the representation of their interests in negotiations with BCL.

The BRA began a series of sabotage attacks, which ultimately led to the complete cessation of mining operations in May 1989. The mine fell under the control of the Meekamui movement¹⁰, a faction of the former BRA that to this day controls the area around the Panguna mine.

² Anthony Regan, "Bougainville: Beyond Survival," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 26.3 (2002), <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csqa/article/bougainville-beyond-survival>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Joanne Wallis, "Ten Years of Peace: Assessing Bougainville's Progress and Prospects," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 101 (2012): 29, doi:10.1080/00358533.2012.656028.

⁵ Anthony Regan, "The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas," in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, ed. Karen Ballentine et al. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 136.

⁶ Ron May, "Papua New Guinea: Issues of Internal and External Security," *Security Challenges* 8 (2012): 53.

⁷ Anthony Regan, *Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville*, (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 13.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The BRA grew out of an inter-generational dispute among the Panguna area residents; it comprised younger residents from areas affected by the mine that were frustrated by the older leadership who ran the Panguna Landowner Association (PLA). Regan, *Causes and Course*, 277.

¹⁰ One of the better-known nationalist movements in Bougainville, the Meekamui movement, was created by Damien Dameng of Panguna's Irang-Panga area in the 1960s with a mission to preserve Bougainville and expel foreigners and so-called *redskins* (individuals from mainland PNG). In the 1990s, Ona and the BRA picked up the Meekamui ideology, and the two movements have since become nearly synonymous with the BRA group controlling the area around the Panguna mine taking the Meekamui name. The Meekamui has its own tribal government (the Meekamui Government of Unity) and traditionally elected president to represent residents around the Panguna mine in discussions with the ARB and PNG governments.

http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2012/02/shining-a-light-on-bougainvilles-meekamui-ideas.html

In March 1989, in response to these acts of sabotage and consequent disruption of the Panguna mine's output, the PNG government deployed the Papua New Guinea Defense Forces (PNGDF) to Bougainville. The PNGDF intervention, coupled with the severe brutality of the PNG mobile police squads¹¹, fueled a wider mobilization of resistance beyond the areas immediately affected by the mine. As a result of continued violence and marginalization, the BRA adopted a secessionist position and conflict spread throughout Bougainville.¹²

As the BRA gained strength (i.e. manpower and weapons), Ona started to lose control of his forces; they began to use their power to settle old land disputes and other grievances (e.g. theft, slights related to marriage, and sorcery) unrelated to the Panguna mine. In response, some areas in Bougainville formed their own BRA contingents to counterattack BRA groups; still others, with monetary and arms support from PNG intelligence, established the Bougainville Revolutionary Forces (BRF) to defend against BRA attacks and looting. After the establishment of the BRF, the Bougainville conflict shifted from primarily being a war between PNG and Bougainville to one largely among Bougainvilleans.¹³ Many BRF cadres initially received support from PNG intelligence services and defense forces, and were considered proxy-fighters for the PNG government; however, this support soon dissipated as the PNG government distanced itself from the conflict in the early 1990s.

The PNGDF was ill equipped and inadequately trained to contain the situation in Bougainville, particularly as the internecine fighting between Bougainvillean factions grew. As a result, the PNG government withdrew its forces in March 1990. In its place, the PNG government implemented a blockade on the island, restricting all flows of goods and services.¹⁴ As a result of disease, deprivation, and fighting, an estimated additional 10,000-15,000 Bougainvilleans (6-8 percent of the population) died between 1990 and 1998.¹⁵ Many thousands more (with some estimations of up to 40 percent of the population) were displaced or forcibly relocated.¹⁶

In 1997, after a number of failed peace talks¹⁷, the Prime Minister of PNG, Sir Julius Chan, contracted the help of Sandline International, a private military firm, to combat the BRA. International outrage at PNG's use of mercenaries against its own populace encouraged the PNGDF to disarm and arrest the very mercenaries their own government had hired, leading to the mission's failure and the resignation of Prime Minister Chan.¹⁸ This incident drew international attention to the conflict and increased pressure on PNG to resolve the situation in Bougainville.

¹¹ For example, the UN Report of the Secretary General on Human Rights Violations in Bougainville states that the PNGDF "were said to have targeted civilians whom they suspected of being BRA members or sympathizers"; "several cases of rape and other forms of sexual abuse" were reported in the so-called "care centers"; and, "from early 1992, [PNGDF] boats were reportedly shot at by the security forces from the air or from military patrol boats, which resulted in the killing of many civilians". UN Commission on Human Rights - Report of the Secretary General on "The Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of the World: Human Rights Violations in Bougainville", January, 28 1994, <http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/3bf0b09b7e4ce38e802567370034d107?Opendocument>.

¹² Regan, *Light Intervention* 13.

¹³ Regan, "The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas," 147.

¹⁴ Guy Wilson-Roberts, "The Bougainville Conflict: An Historical Overview," in *Peace on Bougainville*, ed. Rebecca Adams. (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Joanne Wallis, "Ten Years of Peace," 29.

¹⁷ Due to internal disagreements over the cease-fire and concerns for their security, the BRA leadership failed to attend an important peace conference organized by the PNG government and the international community in Arawa in October 1994. When the BRA leaders did attend peace talks with the PNG government in December 1995 in Australia, they were attacked by PNGDF troops upon their return to Bougainville, essentially eliminating the prospects of successful peace talks. Regan, *Causes and Course*, 281.

¹⁸ Ronald May, "Papua New Guinea: Issues of Internal and External Security." *Security Challenges* 8, no. 4 (2012): 54.

General war weariness and an economic downturn eventually led the BRA to the negotiating table. Additionally, the PNG government was weakened by the complete loss of mining revenue and the failure of the PNGDF to defeat the rebels. A truce was eventually signed in New Zealand in 1997 with a permanent ceasefire following a year later.¹⁹ The New Zealand Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was established in 1997 to facilitate peacekeeping efforts and communication between the parties. In 1998, with a similar mandate, the Australian Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) replaced the TMG.²⁰

The Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA), signed in August 2001, sought a permanent end to the conflict. The Agreement provided for elections to establish the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB), which was formed after elections in 2005; the drafting of a Bougainville constitution; the disarmament of armed groups; and an electoral path to a referendum on the political status of Bougainville within ten to fifteen years of the creation of the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG).²¹ When the referendum is held, independence will be an option – although not the only option - for the political status of Bougainville. According to the BPA, if Bougainvilleans ultimately vote in favor of secession, the PNG parliament must ratify the decision before the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) can claim complete independence. The United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB), established to oversee the weapons disposal program, declared this process successful in 2005.

III. UNDERSTANDING THE BOUGAINVILLE WAR: DRIVERS OF CONFLICT

In seeking to understand current and future threats to peace in Bougainville, it is important to first identify the drivers of conflict and sources of stability during and immediately after the war.

The operation of the Panguna copper mine is the most commonly identified catalyst of the Bougainville war. Yet, there is a more nuanced and complex narrative at play: the downstream impact of the mine on a society rooted in traditional, customary practice, and culture. Both are examined below.

The Panguna Mine

Founded by BCL, the Panguna mine was jointly owned by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), the PNG Territory Administration, and approximately 9,000 PNG resident shareholders.²² Of the mine's total earnings, one-third went to CRA and shareholders outside PNG, almost two-thirds went to the PNG central government, and only the remaining 5.63 percent went to the Bougainvillean provincial government and mine lease landowners.²³ Not surprisingly, this revenue sharing policy was unpopular among Bougainvilleans, who felt they deserved a larger share of profits generated from the mine located on their land.²⁴ Further, with few alternative sources of revenue, the income from the mine was (and still is) critical for the Bougainville government.

The development and operation of the mine also had a grave environmental impact on the surrounding land. Three miles wide and two miles long, the Panguna mine displaced 150,000 tons of rock waste a day at its peak

¹⁹ Raymond Apthorpe, "Bougainville Reconstruction Aid: What Are the Issues?" (Acton: Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1998), 2.

²⁰ Braithwaite, *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment*, 51.

²¹ Boege, "Bougainville Report," 18.

²² *Ibid*, 12.

²³ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 14.

²⁴ Braithwaite, *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment*, 12.

production.²⁵ This discharge was accomplished by displacing villages essential for Bougainvilleans' land-based subsistence. Moreover, the mine polluted large swathes of the surrounding land and rivers, which led to the depletion of fishing stocks and damaged forests. In addition to calls for a more fair distribution of revenue, Bougainvillean landowners demanded compensation for, and regulation of, environmental degradation; these demands were also ignored by the PNG government and BCL.

The dispute with PNG and BCL over revenue sharing and compensation did not unfold in a vacuum. The political dynamics between Bougainville and the central government in Port Moresby were an important backdrop to the escalation of violence in the late 1980s. Post-colonial agreements between Britain and Germany aligned Bougainville with PNG rather than the geographically proximate and culturally similar Solomon Islands.²⁶ The desire for greater political autonomy, a greater share of mining revenues and improved economic opportunities led Bougainvillean leaders to unilaterally declare independence from PNG in 1975; though unsuccessful, the leadership did secure a constitutionally entrenched system of autonomous provincial governments throughout the island nation.²⁷ This was a significant step for Bougainville in distancing itself from PNG.

As highlighted previously, the brutality of PNG's mobile police squads helped broaden support for the resistance beyond the Panguna area to the rest of Bougainville. With a history of anti-PNG sentiment and a growing resistance movement, it is not surprising that, though not an initial motive of the resistance, Ona was able to add secession to the BRA's agenda early in the conflict (February 1989).²⁸ By then, the BRA had concluded that Bougainville's problems were caused by outsiders: BCL, the PNG government, and non-Bougainvillean mineworkers²⁹. Bougainvilleans resented the remnants of Australian colonial rule, the failed attempt to attain independence in 1975, and the perception that they were not fully benefiting from Bougainville's natural resources.³⁰ Thus, secessionist undercurrents became a central component of the resistance movement.

These were the proximate causes behind the Bougainville war. The roots of the conflict, however, run deeper than the adverse financial impact of the mine; nor was the conflict simply a war of secession. Rather, the protracted, violent nature of the conflict resulted from the drastic challenges to—and in some instances, breakdown of—Bougainville's traditional, customary practice, and culture.

Land Ownership and Rights

One of the core challenges to Bougainville's traditional way of life centered on competing concepts of land. Land lies at the heart of Bougainvillean culture.³¹ Communal ownership of land is a fundamental organizing principle of Bougainvillean social fabric; as a result, land ownership and rights are highly prized and protected. Threats to ownership and rights, therefore, have far reaching social implications.

The development of the Panguna mine brought with it a codification of land rights and an evolution of property law. PNG and the BCL ascribed particular plots of land to individuals, shifting away from the

²⁵ Ibid, 14.

²⁶ Hammond, "Conflict Resolution in a Hybrid State: The Bougainville Story," 1.

²⁷ Regan, Light Intervention, 15.

²⁸ Anthony Regan, "Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict," *The Journal of Pacific History Inc* 33 (1998): 277.

²⁹ Mineworkers drawn from outside of Bougainville were a significant factor in the civil war. These workers were known to consume alcohol in excess, harass women in the community, and undermine local culture and laws. The brutal rape and murder of a nurse by a non-Bougainvillean mineworker was a trigger for the violence that ensued.

³⁰ Anthony Regan, "Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict," *The Journal of Pacific History Inc* 33 (1998): 272

³¹ Boege, "Bougainville Report," 10.

traditional matrilineal communal system to one that rewarded single, often male, owners of land.³² This shift divided communities and created high levels of inequality both within and among clans. These developments undermined the traditional practice of communal land ownership and the customary mechanisms used to redress land disputes (discussed further below).³³

As tensions grew between Bougainvillean landowners, the PNG government, and BCL, so did disputes among Bougainvilleans themselves. This was due in part to how BCL approached revenue sharing: rather than following customary practice and allowing the clans to distribute revenue amongst themselves, BCL negotiated with a select few clan members.³⁴ Awarding land—and by extension, revenue—to single owners rather than utilizing the traditional practice of revenue sharing, meant that certain individuals became rich at the expense of other clan members. This created hierarchies and inequality within what had historically been an egalitarian-based clan system.³⁵ Moreover, this approach proved divisive: some clans received large revenue shares, while others received little or nothing at all. This inequality became a catalyst for internecine dispute and conflict.

Proliferation and Escalation of Localized Conflict

A second core challenge to traditional Bougainvillean society was the proliferation and escalation of localized conflict. Conflict and violence were not new to Bougainvillean society. Customary, local conflict resolution mechanisms, which were designed to moderate small-scale, localized violence, had been functioning for centuries.³⁶ These traditional mechanisms control violence through ritualistic norms of reciprocity among clans³⁷; as such, violence was not viewed as the antithesis of order, but rather a means to maintain and effectively control it.³⁸ These traditional mechanisms, however, were no match for the scope of violence that erupted in the late 1980s.

The escalation of localized conflict can be attributed to the collective impact of a number of factors. Quite simply, local internecine conflict ultimately overpowered the capacity of these traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Ongoing factionalism within the resistance movement contributed to the decentralized and diffuse nature of the conflict. “It was not unusual for individual BRA or Resistance units to change sides, or for BRA to fight other BRA or Resistance to fight other Resistance.”³⁹ Such fluidity in the fighting ushered in a new aspect of the conflict: “traditional conflicts between different groups and clans were also fought under the umbrella of the ‘great’ war of secession.”⁴⁰ Though ostensibly fighting for the BRA or the BRF, local groups engaged in private wars to avenge personal or social-kin group grievances or settle old land disputes.⁴¹ The rise in the number of attacks on individuals and groups who had no role in the Panguna mine, and the

³² Regan, *Light Intervention*, 18.

³³ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁶ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 9.

³⁷ According to customary conflict resolution practice in Bougainville, affected parties must first develop a consensus within each group, initiated through mediation, and culminating in a public reconciliation ceremony in which each side presents grievances and admits to transgressions committed. If it is mutually agreed that one side is responsible for the victimization, gifts – in the form of pigs, payment of cash or ceremonial shell money – are provided by the aggressor. Ceremonies are often concluded with symbolic acts of burying the conflict (Braithwaite, *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment*, 75).

³⁸ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 9.

³⁹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 10.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

resulting civil unrest, encouraged other Bougainvilleans to arm themselves to defend against rogue BRA and BRF elements.⁴²

Furthermore, the internecine nature of the conflict fed into the customary logic of “pay back”: revenge had to be taken for losses to one’s own side by violent attacks on the clan or the family whose members had caused the losses.⁴³ Pay back also became a feature of the conflict for PNG security forces, which increasingly were driven by a culture of revenge rather than orders from Port Moresby. As a result, “while the traditional type of violence and warfare was highly ritualized and thus well controlled (and could relatively easily be brought to an end by using the principles of reciprocity), it was much more difficult to maintain the customary rules of warfare and the enshrined limitations to the conduct of violence in the context of the large-scale war which involved modern actors like state security forces or militias.”⁴⁴ Traditional reconciliation mechanisms were simply not designed, nor able, to resolve conflict on such a scale.

Not only did customary reconciliation mechanisms bend under the pressure of conflict among Bougainvilleans, but the mechanisms were further strained by the introduction of non-clan affiliated “outsiders” into the system. In the 1970s and 80s, a large influx of young, male, non-Bougainvillian workers migrated to work in the mine. The rapid expansion of foreign workers coincided with a growth in law and order transgressions, including rape, assault, prostitution, and alcohol abuse.⁴⁵ These foreign workers, who did not have clan-affiliations in Bougainville and were unaware of, or did not understand, the customary culture of local conflict resolution mechanisms, disrupted these practices, and further burdened the already strained traditional system.⁴⁶

The availability of weapons further exacerbated the violent nature of the conflict and placed additional pressure on customary mechanisms of resolving conflict. Early in the conflict, BRA members used basic hunting tools and less lethal arms such as bows and arrows, knives, and other improvised weapons.⁴⁷ According to BRA military commander Sam Kauona “the BRA never imported or bought any arms from abroad” due to the availability of significant World War II weapons caches and the BRA’s ability to fashion homemade weapons capable of using WWII caliber ammunition.⁴⁸ BRA weapons shops, staffed mainly by former BCL-trained metal workers, restored hundreds of recovered weapons from 1990 – 1997.⁴⁹ As the conflict progressed, the BRA also executed a series of ambushes on PNG weapons depots to procure more advanced weapons, including M16s, grenade launchers, and ammunition. Higher caliber and more sophisticated weaponry intensified local disputes and made the ramifications of such disputes more deadly, ensuring that local resolution mechanisms were unable to provide reconciliatory or retributive actions that were proportionate to the crimes committed.⁵⁰

With a deeper understanding of past drivers of conflict, the report now turns to assess the future of stability in Bougainville.

⁴² Braithwaite, *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment*, 30.

⁴³ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 10.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 25.

⁴⁸ Sam Kauona Sirivi, interview by Dorothy, “Conflict in Bougainville – Part 3: Successes of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army,” NZine, June 30, 2000, <http://www.nzine.co.nz/features/bville3.html>

⁴⁹ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 25.

⁵⁰ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 11.

IV. THE FUTURE OF STABILITY IN BOUGAINVILLE: CAUSE FOR CONCERN OR HOPE?

Fifteen years after the end of the bloodiest conflict in the South Pacific since WWII, it is not surprising that Bougainville remains fragile. Despite relative calm since the signing of the peace agreement, continued stability in Bougainville should not be taken for granted. Sources of instability are detailed below.

Cause for Concern: Potential Threats to Stability

With the cessation of the war less than a decade and a half ago, the legacy of the Bougainville conflict remains present for many of its people. A number of factors still pose a threat to stability in Bougainville. As it did in the past, the opening of the Panguna mine may once again be a trigger of conflict. Similarly, the referendum on the political status of Bougainville—to be held before 2020—may reignite tensions, both within and outside of Bougainville, leading to further instability. Further, the potential for increased localized conflict—as a result of the sustained existence of armed groups and spoilers operating outside the peace process, continued availability of weapons, and outstanding reconciliations—is cause for concern.

If the combination of these factors were not enough, by virtue of having experienced recent conflict, Bougainville is statistically more likely to experience renewed violence.⁵¹ It appears, therefore, that there is good reason to fear that Bougainville may once again descend into violent conflict.

Re-Opening the Panguna Mine

Given the centrality of the Panguna mine in sparking the war, it is not surprising that movement toward re-opening the mine is drawing significant attention. Simply stated, negotiating the “most conflict-prone problem in Bougainville today” is a high-risk endeavor, particularly because reaching “consensus on the future of the Panguna mine is crucial for the future of peace in Bougainville.”⁵²

In building this consensus, two parallel tracks have been pursued. Starting in 2009, the ABG held extensive consultations within Panguna and the areas in its immediate surrounding.⁵³ In the process, nine associations were established to protect the rights and interests of landowners. Despite these developments, the more recent public fora appear less inclusive and comprehensive.

The fora have been held primarily for former combatants, and though some moderate Meekamui factions have participated in the debates, hard-line Meekamui elements have opted out.⁵⁴ Though restrictions to the mine area have eased, these hardline factions still control the access road to the mine, as well as the site itself. They also enjoy considerable support, including from communities downstream from the mine who were subject to the environmental damage. Their buy-in to the process is therefore critical.⁵⁵ How hardliners will be dealt with—marginalized or brought into the fold—remains to be seen and could have significant impact on the potential for conflict.

⁵¹ Barbara F. Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,” World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, September 13, 2010, 1.

⁵² Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 16.

⁵³ Author interview, August 5, 2013.

⁵⁴ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

⁵⁵ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

These ongoing public fora have also been criticized for not representing other key constituents. To date, only a few fora have been held, turnout has been low, and questions remain about the outreach to, and thus participation of, key landowners.⁵⁶

A number of leading women activists have disparaged the process for not including women's voices more visibly and prominently; this is particularly significant in a society that is traditionally matrilineal.⁵⁷ The perception that plans to re-open the mine are moving forward without a meaningful voice for Bougainvillean stakeholders—reminiscent of the 1970s and '80s—is a cause for significant concern.

The re-opening of the mine may cause instability in other ways. BCL appears unwilling to provide financial compensation to victims of the conflict⁵⁸. This is likely to be a sticking point, given that according to the Umbrella Panguna Landowners Association, compensation “will come as a pre-condition to any negotiation talks.”⁵⁹ The Meekamui, for example, still demand that Rio Tinto pay 10 billion Kina (approximately 4.2 billion U.S. dollars) in compensation.⁶⁰ Some even demand that Rio Tinto be prohibited from mining in Bougainville.⁶¹

A related concern by many who live in the area is the long-term impact of the environmental degradation allegedly caused by the mine. Not only are residents worried about toxic chemicals stemmed from tailings, they are also facing the economic impact of the mine on their livelihood. Namely, that significant tracts of previously fertile land are unsuitable for most agricultural or other income producing activities.⁶² Plans to re-open the mine that do not take into account the environmental and economic impacts of doing so may further destabilize the situation.

In addition to these concerns, landowners are also demanding a more equitable distribution of the revenue share generated by the mine. The notion that outsiders (the PNG government or BCL) would disproportionately benefit from the Bougainville mine is as unpalatable today as it was in the 1970s and '80s when it sparked the conflict. The mine's revenue distribution is particularly salient for the ABG as Bougainville looks to become an independent state within a few years. Failure to reach an agreement that provides the ABG sufficient revenue could result in an independent Bougainville with scant resources at its disposal; such an outcome would undermine an already vulnerable ABG government.

Strong support has emerged in Bougainville in favor of opening the mine prior to independence: this is based on the belief that independence is only possible if Bougainville is economically viable, which can only be accomplished by reopening the mine⁶³. If the timetable of the referendum is held, however, it seems

⁵⁶ Author interview, July 29, 2013.

⁵⁷ Peter Ninnas, “Building Peace in Bougainville: Gender, Development, and Education for Post-Conflict Recovery,” Pacific Archive of Digital Data for Learning and Education, accessed July 29, 2013, 321, http://www.paddle.usp.ac.fj/collect/paddle/index/assoc/anzcies0/4_05.dir/doc.pdf.

⁵⁸ “Mining shareholders dismiss Panguna compensation suggestions,” Radio New Zealand International, last modified July 16, 2013, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=77596>.

⁵⁹ “Compensation Key to Panguna Negotiations: Landowners,” ABC Radio Australia, last modified June 13, 2013, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2013-06-12/compensation-key-to-panguna-negotiations-landowners/1144950>.

⁶⁰ Fabian Gatana, “Panguna Landowners Speak Out,” Meekamui News, March 30, 2010, <http://mekamui.wordpress.com/2010/04/01/panguna-landowners-spoke-out/>.

⁶¹ “Bougainville leader says negotiation will sort compensation claims,” New Zealand Radio International, last modified July 30, 2013, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=77918>.

⁶² Author interview, October 2, 2013.

⁶³ “Bougainville chief claims support for Panguna re-opening,” Radio New Zealand International, last modified June 26, 2013, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=77099>.

increasingly unlikely that the mine will be open before that time; even more certain is that it will be years (well after the referendum) before the mine is generating revenue for the government.⁶⁴

The new mining law that was developed by the ABG ostensibly looks promising in that “approval of mining and resolution of disputes will be negotiated in an all-inclusive landowner forum process.”⁶⁵ A potential pitfall, however, appears to be the provision in the law placing the ABG in control of mining once operations have begun, including decisions on revenue sharing.⁶⁶ This has the potential to marginalize landowners, and, reminiscent of the 1970s and 80s, could reignite conflict over equitable revenue sharing.

Given that the PNG government played such a significant role in the opening and operation of the mine prior to the conflict, it would not be surprising if stakeholders in Port Moresby today still had a keen interest (financial or otherwise) in the future of the mine. Interference from such stakeholders into an already sensitive issue could be an additional destabilizing factor for Bougainville moving forward.

With the prevalence of such uncertainties, the private sector may be reluctant to invest in re-starting the mine. It should not be taken for granted that Rio Tinto has enough confidence in the operating environment to reinvest the estimated \$4 billion to re-open the mine.⁶⁷ Investor confidence will likely depend, at least in part, on political developments; these are discussed further below.

Referendum on Political Status

As the most significant political event in the coming years in Bougainville, the referendum could be a major source of instability and raise the potential for conflict.⁶⁸ Conflict could be sparked by factors at play in the lead up to the referendum, by the outcome of the referendum, and by what follows the vote. Each is examined below.

Preparing for the Referendum. The referendum is a pivotal event in the Background On Bougainville And Papua New Guinea (PNG) peacebuilding process. While the likely result—a vote in favor of independence⁶⁹—may be a springboard to long-term stability and political development in Bougainville, the lead up to the vote may in fact be destabilizing. Though most Bougainvilleans appear in favor of the notion of independence, it is not clear that there is a deep understanding of what independence actually entails. Details on when and how the referendum will be held remain controversial.⁷⁰

To date, a number of procedural and substantive questions remain unanswered regarding the referendum. How they are addressed is critical if conflict is to be avoided. The timing of the vote, for example, is still a sensitive and significant issue. According to the BPA, certain requirements for weapons disposal and good governance must be met before a referendum can be held.⁷¹ Addressing the weapons disposal issue has been a challenge for the government and remains one of the more urgent issues for the ABG. Additionally, given

⁶⁴ Author interview, October 2, 2013.

⁶⁵ “PNG’s Bougainville to pass world first mining law,” Australia News Network, last modified March 8, 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-07/bougainville-mining-law-a-world-first/4559170>.

⁶⁶ Bougainville Mining Law Not So Revolutionary, “Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, last modified May 13, 2013, <http://ramumine.wordpress.com/2013/05/13/bougainville-mining-law-not-so-revolutionary/>

⁶⁷ Author interview, October 2, 2013.

⁶⁸ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

⁶⁹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 72.

⁷⁰ Author interviews, July 30, 31 and August 5, 2013

⁷¹ “Bougainville Confirms Independence Referendum before 2020,” RadioAustralia, last modified January 24, 2013, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/bougainville-confirms-independence-referendum-before-2020/1077886>.

the limited reach of the ABG, particularly in central and southern Bougainville, meeting the standards for good governance may also prove difficult.⁷²

Given these challenges, President Momis's March 2013 comments that even "if we do not remove the weapons, we are not self-reliant, and if we do not achieve good governance...[the] referendum will [still] happen"⁷³ are of particular concern. This willingness to push through with the referendum despite failing to meet BPA requirements could antagonize those in Bougainville and PNG that are concerned about the pace and timing of independence. For those in the PNG government who are lukewarm to Bougainville's independence, too aggressive a stance by the ABG on timing or an unwillingness to fulfill its commitments under the BPA may be counter-productive; this is significant given that the PNG parliament must approve the outcome of the referendum. Political actors in Port Moresby who have a vested interest in the outcome of the referendum may be tempted to play a role in the process; doing so, however, without the utmost care could further exacerbate tensions between Bougainville and PNG.

The timing of the vote has yet another significant destabilizing dimension. If the referendum is held in 2016 or 2017, as President Momis has suggested, the vote will coincide with both Bougainville and national PNG elections. Elections for the ABG are scheduled for 2015, while polls in PNG are to be held in 2017. With new governments coming in and old governments being pushed out, this period is likely to be highly unstable.⁷⁴ This also increases the likelihood of a delayed vote by the PNG parliament (discussed further below), as the parliament is not expected to do much in the midst of a national campaign.

Another procedural issue that remains unresolved is the nature of the referendum itself. Though the BPA calls for a referendum on the political status of Bougainville, it does not specify whether independence is the only alternative to the current arrangement. According to the BPA, "the choices available in the referendum will include a separate independence for Bougainville."⁷⁵ That the vote may not simply be for or against independence may introduce a level of uncertainty that could exacerbate an already fragile process.⁷⁶

Though polls in the past have been conducted without significant election-related violence, as the culmination of the secessionist movement, there may be greater threats to security around the referendum itself. Disrupting the poll—a high profile event—could be perceived as an effective protest strategy against independence. Referendum-related violence could spark other localized conflicts and lead to an escalation of violence.

Outcomes of the Referendum. Though difficult to predict with any certainty, there are a number of possible outcomes to the referendum on Bougainville's political status. Bougainvilleans could vote against independence and keep Bougainville an autonomous province within PNG. Under such a scenario, pro-independence groups, in particular armed groups such as the Meekamui, would likely rearm⁷⁷; the potential for violence along the old north-south (pro vs. anti-independence) axis would be considerable.

A more likely possibility is a vote in favor of independence, but a veto by the PNG parliament. Despite the anti-PNG sentiment this would unleash, there currently are no PNG installations in Bougainville that would

⁷² Wallis, "Ten Years of Peace," 34.

⁷³ "Momis: Referendum to be Held," Post-Courier Online, last modified March 1, 2013, <http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20130301/news09.htm>.

⁷⁴ Author interview, August 13, 2013.

⁷⁵ Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001, 58.

⁷⁶ Author interview, July 31, 2013.

⁷⁷ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

serve as targets.⁷⁸ More significantly, though, could be violent fallout among local factions and groups as they try to make sense of an uncertain and unpredictable political future.⁷⁹

Another scenario is a pro-independence vote in Bougainville, and a non-vote by the PNG parliament. Some fear that the PNG parliament would refuse to approve independence (though not vote against it), under the pretense that the conditions for granting independence (i.e. good governance and disarmament) have not been met.⁸⁰ The instability caused by holding the referendum amidst Bougainville and PNG elections would be considerable, raising the prospect for opportunities of conflict.

Any of the scenarios short of outright independence could be destabilizing for Bougainville. Though certain groups and communities that have historic leanings in favor or against independence may be mobilized⁸¹, the real threat is not formalized fighting among political factions. Rather the fear is renewed localized conflict that is fought under the umbrella of the referendum outcome.⁸²

Coming to Terms with Independence. Another possible scenario is a vote in favor of independence, followed by approval of the PNG parliament. Though seemingly a positive outcome for stability in Bougainville, the reality is more complex. To date, there has been almost no public debate on the post-referendum period.⁸³ There has been little (if any) preparation for the very real possibility that within five to seven years, Bougainville could become an independent state. The BPA ends with the holding of the referendum; there is currently no formal framework for Bougainville's transition to statehood.⁸⁴

Major political questions have yet to be answered on such issues as: transfer of powers, establishing new institutions (i.e. foreign affairs and defense), role of traditional authorities, integration of former combatants, and perhaps most importantly, financial viability vis-à-vis the re-opening of the Panguna mine. The uncertainty created by a Bougainville public that does not trust its government would be destabilizing.

Further, though the ABG currently enjoys broad support, it has come under criticism for poor service delivery.⁸⁵ To date, deflecting such criticism has been relatively easy: nascent post-conflict recovery, PNG recalcitrance, ungovernable pockets under armed group control, and little income generation (due to the Panguna mine shutdown) have all provided adequate excuses. Soon after a vote to secede, however, Bougainvilleans are likely to demand an "independence dividend" and hold the government accountable for poor service delivery. These demands would likely be most severe in areas currently controlled by armed groups. Left unaddressed, these demands would further destabilize an already fragile environment.

It also remains unclear how the ABG would finance an independent Bougainville. Many have pinned the financial health of Bougainville on the re-opening of the mine. This is problematic, however. Even if the mine were to open prior to the referendum (which seems very unlikely), it would take years before it generated revenue for the government.⁸⁶ An adverse circular effect is therefore in place: the mine is necessary to generate revenue for ARG operations, yet the re-opening of the mine is likely to destabilize the ARG. There are further concerns that the ABG lacks the capacity to adequately and transparently account for and

⁷⁸ Author interview, August 13, 2013.

⁷⁹ Author interview, August 5, 2013.

⁸⁰ Author interview, July 29, 2013.

⁸¹ It is possible that the outcome of the referendum could reignite conflict along historic and geographic lines, with Central and South Bougainville predominantly pro-independence, and Buka and North Bougainville more pro-PNG.

⁸² Author interview, August 5, 2013.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Wallis, "Ten Years of Peace," 33.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

manage revenue resources.⁸⁷ A Bougainville government that does not have the resources—or the oversight capacity—to provide basic services to its population would be a grave threat to stability.

Proliferation and Escalation of Localized Conflict

The potential for the proliferation and escalation of unreconciled local conflict is a significant threat to stability in Bougainville.⁸⁸ The threat is twofold. First, conflicts that have gone through the customary, ritualized reconciliation ceremonies are less likely to be renewed.⁸⁹ As detailed previously, Bougainville culture and custom place great value on restoring harmony (reciprocal exchange) within communities after violence has taken place; in this context, reconciliations provide a certain level of stability. By the same logic, those conflicts that have not been reconciled remain particularly destabilizing.

The second aspect of the threat of localized conflict is the potential that they escalate, as they did during the war in the 1990s. The lesson from the war is important: the interplay of external factors with localized disputes is a recipe for widespread conflict. These external factors—PNGDF, proliferation of weapons, and secession, among others—ignited long-simmering localized conflicts that had been to that point contained by traditional means. The fear today is that once again external factors—i.e. the referendum and the re-opening of the mine—could unleash local conflicts. This may be particularly destabilizing given the number of unreconciled conflicts that still exist as a legacy of the war. Individually, these unreconciled conflicts have not posed a broad threat, and in fact have remained relatively isolated at the local level. Collectively, however, these conflicts could undermine stability throughout Bougainville.

Though outstanding reconciliations can be found throughout Bougainville, central Bougainville (around the Panguna mine) and southern Bougainville remain the greatest threats. The areas of Siwai and Buin (see Map section above) in southern Bougainville are a potential hotbed of future conflict.⁹⁰ Decades long unresolved land disputes coupled with poor economic development in an area of easily available weapons (discussed further below) collectively have created a “confined conflict-ridden area of southern Bougainville.”⁹¹ Some have suggested that this toxic mix of factors helps explain the severity of violence during the conflict and why it persists today. Unreconciled conflict in the Meekamui-controlled “no-go” zone is another area of concern. Growing discontent over limited government service delivery along with outright resistance to, or highly conditional acceptance of, re-opening the mine (external factors) could also make this area of Bougainville a source of violent instability.

Availability of Weapons

Despite a widely heralded weapons-collection program under the BPA, a large number of weapons continue to circulate in Bougainville.⁹² Though perhaps not an immediate threat on their own, the availability of weapons in a fragile context of local conflict is cause for concern.

The proliferation of weapons can be traced to a number of sources. First, though the BPA was highly successful in removing weapons from the hands of groups committed to the peace process, little has been accomplished in disarming groups that still oppose the process.⁹³ Further, some believe that the UN observer mission’s endorsement of the disposal program was politically driven, as it was required before elections

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 127.

⁸⁹ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁹¹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 16.

⁹² Wallis, “Ten Years of Peace,” 37.

⁹³ Author interview, 30 July 2013.

could be held in 2005.⁹⁴ As a result, though the process was officially supported, it was widely understood that individuals and groups kept weapons in hiding.⁹⁵ Unexploded ordinance from WWII—though more modest in quantities—are still being uncovered and further contribute to the availability of weapons.⁹⁶ Additionally, though not verified, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is illicit weapons trafficking within PNG and between Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.⁹⁷

Though the government recognizes the need to further remove weapons from community life, it has struggled to do so effectively. A difficult dilemma has arisen as a result: “People are afraid of the weapons and therefore not willing to reconcile, but they also often cling to weapons out of fear of weapons in the hands of others.”⁹⁸ With a recent history of violent conflict and the potential for renewed conflict, the continued existence of armed groups that have not joined the peace process (detailed below), and the ABG’s lack of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force throughout Bougainville, the widespread availability of weapons is a serious concern.

Armed Groups

As long as areas of Bougainville are still controlled by groups that have not joined the peace process, there is “the risk of armed conflict emerging again.”⁹⁹ To varying degrees, numerous groups still pose a threat to peace and stability in Bougainville. The aforementioned Meekamui movement, which has yet to commit to the peace process, controls the “no go” zone around the Panguna mine. Despite some indication of a rapprochement with the ABG, the re-opening of the mine could trigger a violent response from hard-line factions within the movement, especially if they do not play a meaningful role in the consultations leading to the re-opening of the mine.¹⁰⁰ In the south, factions of Meekamui, including the Meekamui Defense Force (MDF) and the Bougainville Freedom Fighters (BFF), continue to undermine stability. Other potential spoilers include influential and minor warlords in the South who have so far been excluded from collaborative efforts.¹⁰¹

As highlighted above, Bougainville remains in a highly fragile state. Given the risks of escalation of unreconciled local conflict, the continued existence of armed groups, and the availability of weapons, it is reasonable to fear that the re-opening of the Panguna mine and the referendum could spark renewed violence. It is against this backdrop that the report turns to examine the forces working in favor of stability.

Cause for Hope: Sources of Stability in Bougainville

The aforementioned threats to stability are noteworthy and significant. Nevertheless, there are countervailing resiliencies that have kept Bougainville free of widespread violence to date. This is due primarily to Bougainville’s “formal-customary” hybrid model (similar to the “top-down bottom-up” peacebuilding processes) of governance and conflict resolution. This model helped account for the success of the peacebuilding process and is well suited for continued capacity building.¹⁰² A number of other developments

⁹⁴ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 93.

⁹⁵ Volker Boege, “How to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post-conflict Hybrid Political Order – the Case of Bougainville,” *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 14 (2010): 343.

⁹⁶ Sarah Douglas and Felicity Hill, editors (2004). “Case Study: Bougainville - Papua New Guinea. Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” UNIFEM, 3.

⁹⁷ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

⁹⁸ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 20.

⁹⁹ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 127.

¹⁰⁰ Author interview, July 31 2013.

¹⁰¹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 20.

¹⁰² Statebuilding is the process of states functioning more effectively. Understood in this positive context, it can be defined as an endogenous process to develop capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships.

since the end of the war also reinforce Bougainville's stability, including, for example, the role of non-state actors as peacebuilders and a decreased threat of potential spoilers.

The “Formal-Customary” Hybrid Model

The “formal-customary” hybrid model is shorthand used to describe Bougainville's governance and rule of law systems. The model comprises three interrelated components: formal or state institutions and systems, customary or traditional authorities and practices, and most importantly, the structures and processes where the two intersect (the hybrid aspect of the model). The section that follows details Bougainville's formal institutions, briefly describes customary authorities and practices, and subsequently assesses the strength of the hybrid structures and processes that are central to Bougainville's political system.

Formal Institutions. Bougainville's formal institutions and systems were enshrined in the BPA and subsequently the 2004 Constitution. The BPA paved the way for the ABR and ABG to be established, and a constitution to be drafted, among other benchmarks.¹⁰³

Though the capacity of the ABG remains limited and the transfer of power to Bougainville has been slow, the fundamental pillars of governance are functional. Due to its autonomous status, Bougainville enjoys the power to establish its own public service, police force, and court system and laws, with PNG retaining only the powers “consistent with national sovereignty, including over defense, foreign relations, immigration, central banking [...] (and) direct implementation of the PNG Constitution.”¹⁰⁴ Bougainville also has revenue mechanisms to achieve fiscal independence.

Though it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the governance institutions established under the BPA, the conduct of the 2005 and 2010 elections may offer important foreshadowing for political stability in Bougainville. Elections that immediately follow a post-conflict period are often marred by violence and conflict. The 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections in Bougainville, however, were regarded as free and fair. An observer team from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat found the elections to be “conducted in line with generally accepted democratic principles and practice,” and commended the “professional and cooperative provision of security during the elections.”¹⁰⁵ That two post-conflict elections were conducted without notable violence bodes well for the referendum on independence that will almost certainly take place in an environment of heightened tension.

Customary Authorities and Practice. Years of conflict caused state institutions to withdraw or cease functioning in Bougainville. As a result, traditional authorities emerged to fill the void of governance and rule of law. “In many places elders and chiefs once more became responsible for regulating conflicts and organizing everyday community life.”¹⁰⁶ In some areas, chiefs controlled BRA or BRF units and initiated reconciliation efforts.¹⁰⁷ Though often overwhelmed during the war, these systems of reciprocal exchange “create considerable pressure to restore balance,” even when significant conflict and violence has occurred. These reconciliation processes were an essential factor in the ongoing resilience to violence and maintenance

Statebuilding is also understood to include informal as well as formal institutions. OECD- DAC, *Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility*, 2008, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/development/incf/41212290.pdf>

¹⁰³ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 12.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat “Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat's Election Observer Team to the 2010 Elections for the Offices of President and Members of the House of Representatives of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville,” (report, Suva, Fiji, 2010).

<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Bougainville%20elections%20Report%202010.pdf>

¹⁰⁶ Volker Boege, “Peacebuilding and state formation in post-conflict Bougainville” (paper presented at the International Peace Research Association conference, Sydney, July 6-10, 2010), 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

of social order.¹⁰⁸ Some traditional authorities also incorporated more modern approaches, including, for example, local peace committees and district reconciliation steering committees.¹⁰⁹

These reconciliation practices are not only relics of the past. Though many conflicts are yet to be resolved (as detailed above), these traditional mechanisms are at work today and have accounted for a number of high profile reconciliations. The 2007 Panguna Communiqué that was signed by the Bougainville government and one of the major factions of Meekamui in central Bougainville was conducted according to local custom. In November 2011, warring factions in the Southern constituency of Konnuo came together in a ceremonial ritual to follow traditional “processes of reaching a truce, restorative justice...and actual reconciliation.”¹¹⁰ Furthermore, in July 2013, three former BRA leaders held a major reconciliation ceremony; this is further detailed below.

The Hybrid Model. The basis for the hybrid model can be found in what has been described as the success of the “top-down bottom-up” peacebuilding effort. In short:

The Bougainville peace process owes its success to a combination of activities at the top and at the bottom as well as to a combination of liberal introduced and local customary ways of operating. While the peace process ‘at the top’ followed more the international liberal peacebuilding template, the processes ‘at the bottom’ were dominated by local agency and customary practices. However, the logic of local customary peacebuilding also permeated the ‘top’ processes, and the liberal approach colored and re-formed processes at the ‘bottom’. What ensued was a liberal-local hybrid. And it was due to the permeation of liberal forms with local practices that the negotiations at the ‘higher’ political level led to a comprehensive peace settlement while the sustainability of this settlement depended on the maintenance of everyday customary conflict resolution practice in the local context.¹¹¹

As was the case for initial peacebuilding efforts, the strength of the hybrid model is the intersection of formal and customary structures and processes. Though still in its nascent development, the interplay of these two systems provides Bougainville a “well-established and functioning political system”¹¹²; in this case, the sum is truly greater than its parts. Through deliberative policies of exchange, accommodation, and negotiation, the formal and informal governance structures and actors share power and sovereignty in a manner that works in the Bougainville context.¹¹³

The basis for this model is enshrined and institutionalized in Bougainville’s foundational governing documents. According to Article 13 (2) of the 2004 constitution, “The roles, responsibilities and authority of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders shall be recognized at all levels of government.”¹¹⁴ The constitution is, in fact, replete with references to customary forms of governance. This design should not be surprising, given that the “majority of our people in rural communities live under traditional rather than the formal system of government.”¹¹⁵

An example of the hybrid model in action is the Council of Elders (CoEs), a formal sub-national governance structure comprising of traditional leaders. Regarded as one of the more promising governance institutions

¹⁰⁸ Regan, *Light Intervention*, 36.

¹⁰⁹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 12.

¹¹⁰ “Warring Factions in Bougainville Reach Truce,” Radio New Zealand International, last modified November 28, 2011, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2011/November/11-29-07.htm>.

¹¹¹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 37.

¹¹² *Ibid* 18.

¹¹³ *Ibid* 3.

¹¹⁴ The Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Article 13 (2), 2004.

¹¹⁵ Bougainville Constitutional Commission (2004: 202).

below the ABG, the CoEs are highly representative, are governed by their own constitutions, and execute their tax and spend responsibilities efficiently.¹¹⁶ Though many CoEs do not yet function at this level, the institution provides customary leaders an opportunity to participate in, and shape, political developments in their communities. Village assemblies, which operate outside the formal system, also function well, in particular for consultation and decision-making in the local context.¹¹⁷

These structures are significant in ensuring stability by providing traditional leaders a formal voice in national affairs. This occurred throughout the peace process, where traditional authorities were included in high-level discussions and planning for the BPA.¹¹⁸ This model, therefore, bodes well for traditional leaders seeking to participate in high-level political discourse, including, for example, on the referendum and the re-opening the Panguna mine.

The hybrid model can also be seen in the justice system, and law enforcement institutions in particular. Establishing a formal court system has been slow, at least in part because of “the deliberate strategic decision not to rely primarily on the formal court system but to allow comprehensive space for customary law and traditional means of dispute resolution.”¹¹⁹ This is consistent with the Bougainville’s Constitution Commission’s own desire that the police become “an integral part of the Bougainville system of justice based on our kastomary (sic) practices of restorative justice.”¹²⁰ Where police capacity is weak or where police simply cannot establish a presence, the force relies on relationships with chiefs and other traditional authorities to provide law and order. Though incidents beyond the capacity of law enforcement remain (witness, for example, the burning of three ships on Buka Island in March 2012¹²¹), the hybrid arrangements appear effective in providing peaceful mechanisms to resolve conflict.¹²²

The “formal-customary” hybrid model, which draws on the strengths of both formal institutions and customary authorities and practice, has helped establish a political system that is considered to be operating reasonably well.¹²³ Only 15 years after a brutal violent conflict, this hybrid model is the foundation for “actors [who] prefer policies of exchange, accommodation and negotiation and only resort to contestation very selectively, thus avoiding relapse into major (violent) conflict and opening avenues for the further improvement of governance, development and peacebuilding on Bougainville.”¹²⁴

Though not a new phenomenon, the hybrid model today is bolstered by more robust formal institutions than existed in the past. The potential of Bougainville’s hybrid model to maintain stability, therefore, is promising. In the years since the end of the war, Bougainville has avoided large-scale conflict. Whether this mix of formal and customary authorities, institutions, and practice can withstand and/or absorb major shocks to the system, however, is uncertain. Either the referendum or the re-opening of the mine could push Bougainville’s governance system to the brink—or perhaps even beyond its breaking point. Continued trust in customary authorities is also critical, particularly from the “lost” generation and veterans who themselves are potentially destabilizing elements. Under serious duress, hybrid institutions may be overwhelmed and function poorly at the very moment they are needed most.

¹¹⁶ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 19.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid* 25.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid* 14.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 21.

¹²⁰ Bougainville Constitutional Commission (2004: 233).

¹²¹ “Rebels Set Ships on Fire,” Malum Nalu Blogspot, accessed October 5, 2013, <http://malumnalu.blogspot.com/2012/03/rebels-set-ships-on-fire.html>.

¹²² Author interview, July 31, 2013.

¹²³ Regan, Light Intervention, 100.

¹²⁴ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 39.

Even if overwhelmed, however, weakened hybrid institutions would not necessarily mean a return to widespread violent conflict. To understand why, two factors must be considered.

First, Bougainville today differs significantly from pre-war Bougainville in several important ways. Though Bougainville is statistically more prone to conflict today than it was in the past, the population is war weary. Having affected such a broad sector of the public, the toll of the conflict is still widely felt.¹²⁵ Additionally, there is broad consensus that armed groups operating outside the peace process should not be addressed by the use of force. Rather the groups and individuals still holding weapons should be involved in dialogue and given incentives to lay down arms.¹²⁶

With guaranteed autonomy and/or independence on the horizon, it is highly unlikely that PNG or other outside actors would try to intervene in Bougainville; for example, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which PNG forces would be redeployed to Bougainville. As such, some of the key external prompts for the past war are absent today. Though the re-opening of the Panguna mine raises the specter of the past, the approach and engagement of the Bougainville government today is qualitatively different than it was previously.

Second, old and new non-state actors have a significant role in maintaining peace in Bougainville. An active civil society sector, including women's groups and the Church, was critical in peacebuilding and has much to offer statebuilding as well. Since the conflict ended, there has been an expansion of civil society actors—particularly women's groups and faith-based organizations—that comprise a sector that was underdeveloped before the war.¹²⁷

Further, spoilers who once seemed formidable challenges to stability are increasingly being co-opted into the peace process. Finally, the engagement and investment of the international community is significant (addressed in greater detail in Section V). These resiliencies, working in concert with the formal-customary authorities, institutions and practice, are cause for cautious optimism. The study now turns to examine these sources of stability in greater detail. The international community needs to be alert, however, that other substantial accelerators and drivers of conflict can overcome emerging local and formal efforts for peacebuilding and continue to closely monitor and address supporting peacebuilding programs and develop longer term solution to drivers of the violence.

Re-Emergence of Civil Society Organizations

In addition to the chiefs and elders, other non-state actors also promoted stability after the conflict and continue to do so today. Largely due to the highly religious and matrilineal-based nature of Bougainvillean culture, churches, faith-based organizations, and women-led civil society organizations (CSOs) are believed to have been highly effective in supporting reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.¹²⁸ NGOs and CSOs on Bougainville are re-emerging in a variety of areas, from conflict transformation and peacebuilding through community development, health, and education to capacity-building for good governance at various levels.

Women's organizations played an important role in informing the peacebuilding agenda. These organizations leveraged contacts in Australia and New Zealand to raise international awareness of violence through the "Bougainville Women Speak Out" forum in October 1996. Women participated in official representative delegations to the Burnham talks in July 1997 and the Lincoln Agreement of January 1998. Their participation culminated in the New Zealand-funded Bougainville Women's Summit, which preceded the signing of the

¹²⁵ Author interview, July 31, 2013.

¹²⁶ Boege, "Bougainville Report," 21.

¹²⁷ *Ibid* 27.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 46.

BPA.¹²⁹ Building on this success, women's organizations have continued to support Bougainville capacity building.

Because women face considerable obstacles to playing a visible role in Bougainville politics, many women have found a meaningful role in today's peacebuilding efforts through working with civil society organizations. For example, the participation of women in the constitution-making process in 2002-2004 resulted in the creation of three reserved seats for women in the Bougainville legislature.¹³⁰ Many women's groups, most prominently the Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency, provided humanitarian aid during the conflict and peace awareness education, rehabilitation, and trauma counseling in the aftermath; today these groups advocate for increased women's representation in the political process and are facilitating women's empowerment through capacity training. While many women's organizations still have limited capacity, observers are hopeful that women can reassert their role in statebuilding and once again serve as a force for stability.¹³¹

As a central pillar of Bougainvillean life, the church also serves as a stabilizing force, and can often reach where no other entities can. Reflecting Bougainville's increasingly Christian population, organizations such as the Bougainville Inter-Church Women's Forum and Catholic Women's Association, have participated/led local reconciliation efforts while also providing humanitarian aid. For example, Christian World Services has worked extensively with local affiliates in Bougainville to fund livelihood programs and increased development opportunities. Local faith based groups have "played a strong role in giving community members a channel through which to have their voice heard."¹³²

As a result of active contributions by NGOs, women's groups and the church, the "maintenance of order and security" in Bougainville today "is based on the efforts of both formal state and informal customary actors, as well as civil society."¹³³

Reconciliation Between Spoilers

Recent developments suggest that former combatants and spoilers of the peace process may pose less of a threat to stability in Bougainville than was previously feared. The reconciliation of three former BRA commanders—ex-BRA kingpin Ishmael Toroama, Moses Pipiro from the Meekamui Unity Government and Chris Uma from the original Me'ekamui faction—in July 2013, "has opened up a new and positive chapter for Bougainville's future."¹³⁴ In addition to an expected reduction of altercations among their respective armed groups, the reconciliation may also bode well for the re-opening of the mine, including the offer of safe passage to people and investors to explore the island.¹³⁵ This reconciliation may also "provide cover" for other potential spoilers to join the peace process.¹³⁶

Further, over the last few years, there has been a rapprochement between the Meekamui authorities and the ABG. Meekamui authorities have gradually increased cooperation with the Bougainville government, especially with regard to the maintenance of order and the delivery of basic social services; even the Meekamui Defense Force (MDF), though never having officially joined the peace process, has never

¹²⁹ <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/role-women-promoting-peace-and-reconciliation>.

¹³⁰ Regan, Light Intervention, 139.

¹³¹ Author interview, October 2, 2013.

¹³² Hammond, "Conflict Resolution in a Hybrid State: The Bougainville Story," 1.

¹³³ Volker Boege, "How to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post-conflict Hybrid Political Order – the Case of Bougainville," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 14 (2010): 343.

¹³⁴ "Former Bougainville Military Commanders Reconcile," Pacific Islands Report, last modified July 25, 2013, <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2013/July/07-26-05.htm>.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Author interview, July 30, 2013.

disturbed the process or the ceasefire provisions.¹³⁷ It is also noteworthy that people in the “no-go” zone in Panguna voted in the 2010 parliamentary elections¹³⁸ and that Meekamui combatants provided security for the elections in their area of control. Similar arrangements for the referendum may increase confidence in the vote and reduce the threat of poll-related violence, both contributing factors to overall stability.

V. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: CURRENT PROGRAMMING

The international community has played a significant, if limited, role in promoting peace in Bougainville since the end of the war. The New Zealand government was instrumental in initiating the peace process, hosting the first rounds of talks in 1997 and otherwise facilitating the early process.¹³⁹ Additionally, both the New Zealand Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), which served from 1997-1998, and subsequently, the Australian Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), which served from 1998-2003, further bolstered peace efforts.

As both the TMG and PMG were unarmed, their presence increased confidence in non-violent conflict resolution; further, that the teams comprised military and civilian personnel, men and women, and representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu, contributed to their legitimacy and ultimately their efficacy.¹⁴⁰ The highly regarded United Nations Observer Mission Bougainville (UNOMB) played a particularly important role in overseeing the weapons disposal program. Though a small presence, the collective impact of the international community contributed to stability in the post-conflict period.

Donor agencies, international and national non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multilateral organizations are active today in providing development assistance in support of peace and stability. The overview presented below is neither exhaustive nor explicitly detailed and only the major organizations operating in Bougainville are identified. Further, the section below seeks only to report on existing programs and does not attempt to assess their impact on stability. An in-country assessment would be required for a more comprehensive account of relevant actors and to assess the impact of current programming.

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

AusAID is the largest provider of aid to Bougainville.¹⁴¹ The mission has had a consistent presence in Bougainville since 1993¹⁴², initially supporting the TMG, and expanding its assistance significantly after the end of the war. Today, AusAID provides support to Bougainville in a number of ways. The Agency provides direct aid to support large-scale development and infrastructure rebuilding projects, including on hospitals, schools, and road reconstruction.¹⁴³ In 2007, the Governments of PNG and Australia committed to the Sub-National Strategy (SNS) as a long-term program of engagement to improve PNG’s decentralized system of service delivery.¹⁴⁴ A component of the SNS targets the ARB “for improved governance and the

¹³⁷ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 31-32.

¹³⁸ “Bougainville Set to Reopen Notorious Panguna Mine,” ABC News Correspondents Report, last modified May 16, 2010, <http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2010/s2900363.htm>.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, 12.

¹⁴⁰ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 15.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, 35.

¹⁴² Geoff Adlidge, “Supporting Peace on Bougainville: Rehabilitating Basic Services” *Focus Magazine*, accessed July 31, 2013, <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/focus/focuspdfs/997/99713-18.pdf>, 15.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁴ “Papua New Guinea: A Sub National Strategy (SNS): SNS Program Completion Report,” AusAID, Australian Government, September 2011, <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Documents/sns-program-completion-report-2011.pdf>, 9.

implementation of autonomy arrangements.”¹⁴⁵ AusAID has also provided funding for large-scale relief efforts, in particular the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC).¹⁴⁶ In 2001, for example, AusAID provided the IFRC a grant of \$2.3 million to help resettle displaced people in Bougainville.¹⁴⁷

New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID)

In addition to playing a critical role in facilitating the peace process, over the past 10 years, New Zealand has supported Bougainville’s reconstruction, including strengthening governance, law, and justice systems. One of NZAID’s flagship programs in Bougainville has been the Bougainville Community Policing Project. This project provides training and support to the Bougainville Police Service and Community Auxiliary Police, who help communities address law and order problems in consultation with village courts and traditional leaders.¹⁴⁸ In a joint initiative with the governments of Australia, PNG, and ABG, New Zealand also funds the Bougainville Governance Implementation Fund, which supports the improvement of government administration and service delivery in Bougainville.¹⁴⁹

Additionally, in 2011 the governments of New Zealand and PNG signed the Joint Commitment for Development, establishing a shared vision for a commitment to long-term development outcomes, and integrating gender equality and the empowerment of women throughout all activities.¹⁵⁰

The United Nations (UN)

The UN played a significant role in Bougainville’s transition from conflict. The UN Political Office and the UNOMB were important contributors of stability within Bougainville and were integral to the disarmament process.¹⁵¹ Today, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funds a Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Program, which provides support for the “implementation of a home-grown weapons disposal strategy and a development-oriented post-conflict recovery agenda, covering gender, local governance, planning, access to basic services, HIV and human rights.”¹⁵² Current programming is funded at approximately \$1.5 million/year and supports several satellite offices throughout Bougainville, including a new office in Buin.¹⁵³ UNIFEM also supports ongoing programs in Bougainville focused on increasing the representation of women in post-conflict Bougainvillean society.¹⁵⁴

The World Bank funds the Inclusive Development in Post-Conflict Bougainville (IDIB) program that aims to benefit women and women’s organizations across the region by building capacity for inclusive development, giving small grants for inclusive community development, and overseeing project management and

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴⁶ Matt Francis, “AusAID in Bougainville: The Peace Doctors” *Focus Magazine*, accessed July 31, 2013, <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/focus/698/069810-15.pdf>, 12.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ “New Zealand Aid Programme: Papua New Guinea,” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed July 31, 2013, <http://www.aid.govt.nz/where-we-work/pacific/papua-new-guinea>.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ “New Zealand – Papua New Guinea: Joint Commitment for Development,” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed July 31, 2013, http://www.aid.govt.nz/webfm_send/106.

¹⁵¹ Sarah Douglas and Felicity Hill, editors, *Case Study: Bougainville - Papua New Guinea. Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (New York: UNIFEM, 2004).

¹⁵² United Nations. “Papua New Guinea United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2012-2015,” accessed July 31, 2013, http://www.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Papua_New_Guinea_-_PNG_UNDAF_2012-2015.pdf, 16.

¹⁵³ “UNDP Succeeds in Opening an Office in South Bougainville,” New Zealand Radio International, last modified May 25, 2012, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=68443>.

¹⁵⁴ Sarah Douglas and Felicity Hill, editors, *Case Study: Bougainville - Papua New Guinea*.

monitoring and evaluation.¹⁵⁵

VI. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

The international community played a modest though important role in supporting the peace process. Ultimately, however, Bougainvilleans themselves played the leading role in securing the peace in the aftermath of the war. As such, Bougainville is best served by international support that is responsive to local interests, that recognizes both traditional and formal authorities, and that builds on (rather than seeks to substitute or replace) local resiliencies. In this spirit, identifying future areas of programming is best accomplished by engaging Bougainvilleans themselves on this question (i.e. an in-country assessment). The analysis conducted above, however, can help inform such engagement by identifying and recommending a range of programmatic options for consideration.

It should be noted that Bougainville is a challenging environment in which to work. Limited travel, communication, and access opportunities will inevitably delay programming and reporting. It is therefore imperative that the international community commits sooner rather than later to potential interventions. In light of the analysis above, the international community should consider the following program areas:

- ***Support Preparations for the Referendum.*** The period leading up to the referendum will be a time of heightened tensions. The ABG may find it valuable to call on international technical assistance to help further define the options available to citizens under the referendum; there also appears to be scope for civic and voter awareness and education once these decisions have been made. Though polls in the past have been conducted without significant election-related violence, as the culmination of the secessionist movement, there may be greater concern for security around the referendum. Building on the success of New Zealand's police programming, support to law enforcement on providing security for the referendum would be advisable. Further, supporting the establishment of domestic election observation groups may both build on local CSO peacebuilding efforts and set the stage for improved oversight of governance performance. Such organizations can also play a role in promoting civic education and awareness regarding the referendum.
- ***Support Post-referendum Bougainville Statebuilding.*** Whether Bougainvilleans choose to remain an autonomous province or an independent state, the government will need support in strengthening and reinforcing its capacity. Consideration should be given to providing (additional) assistance to: strengthen the administrative capacity of the ABG; accelerate the transfer of powers from the PNG to the new Bougainville state; and strengthen the joint ABG-PNG governing institutions, particularly the Joint Supervisory Body and the PNG-ABG Referendum Committee.
- ***Support Traditional Authorities.*** The international community must recognize the importance and continued existence of traditional authorities. Capacity building for the formal sector should be balanced with assistance to customary authorities and practice. Though support for statebuilding theoretically aspires to this balance, the international community has struggled to provide it effectively. Serious attention must be given to supporting the hybrid institutions and processes that are the backbone of Bougainvillean political order. To this end, support to local governance structures should also be considered, particularly in strengthening their service delivery and conflict resolution

¹⁵⁵ "Inclusive Development in Post-Conflict Bougainville," The World Bank, accessed July 31, 2013, <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P125101/inclusive-development-post-conflict-bougainville?lang=en&tab=overview>.

functions. More specifically, assistance to expand the Councils of Elders would help ensure continued linkages between the new national government and its citizens, as well as further support for unresolved reconciliations.

- **Promote Women's Political Participation.** Women have traditionally played an important role in capacity building through civil society and other traditional leadership forums. Remaining sensitive to established norms and accepted practices, it is essential that the international community support women in playing an active and visible role in the political arena. This may include assisting women's political participation through political parties, legislatures, and local governance among other platforms.
- **Accelerate DDR.** To help prevent or mitigate violent conflict, former combatants will need assistance disarming, demobilizing and most importantly, reintegrating into Bougainvillean society. Reintegration, which may be seen as a form of restoring harmony to the community, may require further support to economic development and employment programs. Armed groups, such as the various Meekamui factions, that have been in opposition for so long may be interested in assistance to transition from traditional guerilla forces to more formal political entities. Removing weapons from communities is also essential, particularly to help prevent an escalation of localized conflicts. Currently, there is only one international advisor on weapons disposal. Additional support in this area would be critical to post-referendum peace and highly welcomed by the ABG.¹⁵⁶
- **Support an Inclusive Consultative Process to Re-opening the Mine.** If not handled appropriately, the re-opening of the Panguna mine could once again be the catalyst for the emergence of conflict. The most critical factor in preventing an outbreak of violence is the conduct of a consultation process that is highly inclusive.¹⁵⁷ Support to meaningful, substantive public dialogues, workshops and information campaigns may feature in such assistance. Through both development assistance and diplomacy, the international community should help ensure that these discussions are as inclusive and exhaustive as possible.

Targeted Diplomatic Engagement. To complement the international community's ongoing diplomatic and assistance activities, five additional areas are recommended for targeted diplomatic engagement:

- The international community should work with the newly elected leaders and appointed officials to assist leaders understand the events leading up to the conflict, the peace agreement and agreed to responsibilities moving forward. This Desk Study could be considered as a basis for this dialogue.
- The international community should consider diplomatic options related to a potential veto or non-vote on the referendum by PNG. Given that the BRA leadership was promised international support to encourage the PNG government to honor the results of the referendum, the ABG likely anticipates this support.¹⁵⁸
- The international community should leverage its experience in statebuilding to engage the ABG to begin planning and preparing for the referendum.
- The international community should encourage stakeholders to conduct and participate in as inclusive and comprehensive a consultation process as possible prior to the opening the Panguna mine.
- The international community should encourage public and private debate on the sequencing of the mine re-opening and the holding of the referendum.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Volker Boege, interview by Oren Ipp, July 30, 2013.

¹⁵⁸ Regan, Light Intervention, 90.

VII. CONCLUSION

What started as a conflict between Bougainvilleans and the PNG government soon descended into a full-fledged civil war among Bougainvillean factions. The customary practices of reciprocity and retribution played a pivotal role in the escalation of violence among and between Bougainvillean parties. The roots of the conflict, therefore, lie deep in the social fabric of Bougainvillean society. That very social fabric is also largely responsible for the success of the post-conflict peacebuilding process; namely, the resilient customary conflict resolution mechanisms and the Bougainvillean-led formal and informal peace processes. In this context, traditional local authorities (e.g. chiefs and elders) matter as much as official national politicians. Similarly, customary practice is as important as modern governance systems and institutions. In fact, the intersection of, and interplay between, these two systems is a core strength of Bougainville's political system.

International assistance efforts must recognize the importance of customary culture and practice, and design future programs accordingly. Doing so will likely pose a challenge for most international development actors, who may not always be as sensitive to local realities as one would desire. Development actors also often struggle to engage informal political authorities, preferring instead to work with formal state actors. In Bougainville, this would be a costly mistake. Outsiders should be mindful that “external actors are compelled to actually engage with local legitimate authorities in a constructive way if they really want to make a contribution to conflict transformation, peacebuilding, good governance and development.”¹⁵⁹ In so doing, the international community can once again play an important role in supporting a genuinely Bougainvillean-led development effort.

This Desk Study exemplifies the challenges to, and need for, in-depth, local-level information gathering and analysis. Given that the potential threats and resiliencies in Bougainville are inherently local in nature, they are to a large extent inaccessible from afar. Though the study called on primary documents from Bougainville, as well as local media, the team was limited in its ability to access prominent Bougainvillean figures, let alone local stakeholders, such as chiefs or elders. Scarce input from sources at the very local level limited the team from gaining as granular and nuanced an understanding of Bougainville as is called for by this unique context.

For a more informed and refined analysis, areas for field-based analysis could explore the following key issues:

- The strength and resiliency of the hybrid model and its ability to withstand potential future threats.
- The motives, incentives, and strengths of potential spoilers and armed groups and the degree to which they are genuinely buying into the peace process.
- The links between the outcome of the referendum, the re-opening of the mine, and the escalation of local conflict.
- The role and strength of NGOs, women's organizations, and the church in supporting capacity building efforts.
- The planning by key actors in the international community for supporting post-referendum capacity building efforts (both formal and customary).
- The potential for Bougainvillean elites and PNG stakeholders to undermine or facilitate peace.

¹⁵⁹ Boege, “Bougainville Report,” 67.

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